CPIN
Iraq: country policy and information notes
gov.uk change note: Removed outdated guidance on internal relocation, civil documentation and returns.
Headline
The Iraq CPIN has removed all guidance on civil documentation, internal relocation and returns, replacing it with a state protection assessment only.
Changes in detail
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Complete restructuring — Old assessment focused on civil documentation (CSID/INID cards), feasibility of return, and internal relocation → New assessment is a standalone state protection note. The Home Office has removed all guidance on documentation requirements, return processes, and relocation within Iraq.
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Civil documentation guidance removed — Previous detailed guidance on Civil Status Identity Cards (CSIDs), Iraqi National Identity Cards (INIDs), and the risks of undocumented return → No documentation guidance. The previous finding that "persons not in possession of either a CSID or INID on return...are at a real risk of serious harm sufficient to breach paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii)" has been removed.
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Internal relocation guidance removed — Previous assessment that "in general, there are parts of the country where it will be reasonable for a person to relocate" with detailed area-specific guidance → No internal relocation assessment. All guidance on relocating within Iraq, to Baghdad, or to the Kurdistan Region has been removed.
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Return feasibility guidance removed — Previous detailed assessment of whether persons could feasibly be returned via passport/laissez-passer → No return guidance. All guidance on obtaining travel documents and return routes has been removed.
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State protection assessment introduced — New assessment states "Iraq's constitution and laws guarantee equal treatment of citizens, judicial independence, the right to a fair trial...In practice, however, the state often fails to uphold these rights." The Home Office now assesses that "the onus is on the person to demonstrate that they would not be able to seek and obtain effective protection."
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Security forces assessment — New detailed assessment of federal Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Government security forces, noting federal forces "suffer from a lack of resources" while KRI forces "generally have better resources than their counterparts in federal Iraq but are compromised by corruption and the influence of party politics."
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Justice system assessment — New finding that "criminal justice systems in federal Iraq and the KRI are weak" due to "corruption, a large backlog of Daesh-related cases, and pressure from influential actors." Assessment that "tribal justice systems...cannot, in general, be considered willing and able to provide effective protection."
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Country Guidance references removed — All references to the SMO, AA, BA, and AAH Country Guidance cases and their specific findings have been removed.
Implications for practitioners
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Documentation-based claims severely weakened: Claims based on lack of civil documentation (CSID/INID) no longer have Home Office guidance supporting them. The previous strong position that undocumented returnees face Article 3 risks has been removed entirely.
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Internal relocation arguments unsupported: The Home Office no longer provides any assessment of whether internal relocation within Iraq is safe or reasonable, removing a key line of argument for both appellants and the Home Office.
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Return feasibility challenges: Without guidance on travel document requirements, practitioners will need to rely on older Country Guidance cases and independent evidence to argue return is not feasible.
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State protection claims potentially strengthened: The new assessment acknowledges significant weaknesses in Iraqi state protection, potentially supporting claims where applicants can demonstrate inability to access effective protection.
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Need for updated country evidence: Practitioners should obtain current evidence on documentation requirements, return processes, and internal relocation as the Home Office has removed all official guidance on these critical issues.
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Humanitarian Protection claims affected: The removal of documentation-based HP guidance means practitioners will need to rely on older precedents and independent evidence to argue Article 3 breaches for undocumented returnees.
Diff
@@ -1,8 +1,4 @@ -Version 15.0 - - - -October 2025 +Version 2.0, September 2025 @@ -11,31 +7,35 @@ -The Iraqi Nationality Identity Document (INID) is a government issued electronic biometric card, which holders are required to carry at all times. The INID replaces the Civil Status Identity Document (CSID) however CSIDs remain valid ID documents for legal and administrative purposes whilst INID rollout continues. These documents legally allow access to healthcare, education, freedom of movement within the country, the state justice system, social welfare and humanitarian assistance. - - - -In SMO2, the Upper Tribunal found that persons not in possession of either a CSID or INID on return, or shortly after return, to Iraq or the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), are at a real risk of serious harm sufficient to breach paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) at security checkpoints when attempting to travel internally by land within Iraq or the KRI. - - - -Persons without a CSID or INID will also face significant difficulties in accessing public services, employment and housing and this is likely to result in destitution sufficient to amount to a breach of paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the ECHR. - - - -Following the replacement of the CSID with the INID, nationals of Iraq are no longer able to reapply for CSIDs either in Iraq or abroad and can only obtain an initial INID, in person, in the governorate they originate from. Whilst CSIDs are no longer being produced in Iraq, they can still be used to pass through checkpoints. - - - -Family members or friends remaining in Iraq may be able to apply for a replacement INID on behalf of someone in the UK, providing the person has had their biometrics taken in Iraq and has previously been issued with an INID. - - - -People who cannot return and/or relocate because of a lack documentation but are not otherwise at a real risk of persecution do not fall within the definition of the Refugee Convention but may in some cases be granted Humanitarian Protection. - - - -In general, there are parts of the country where it will be reasonable for a person to relocate. Consideration must be given to a person’s particular circumstances, civil documentation held and the details of where they originally lived in Iraq when assessing if internal relocation is viable. A fact-specific sliding-scale assessment should be used when assessing return or internal relocation. +Iraq’s constitution and laws guarantee equal treatment of citizens, judicial independence, the right to a fair trial, and various other rights related to state protection. In practice, however, the state often fails to uphold these rights. + + + +In general, where a person has a well-founded fear of a non-state actors, their ability to access effective protection will depend on various factors. These include gender, socio-economic status, access to family support, political party affiliation, the profile and influence of the actor from whom they need to be protected, and the type of crime from which they need protection. This is the case in both federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). + + + +Whilst the law enforcement and justice systems are vulnerable to manipulation, the onus is on the person to demonstrate that they would not be able to seek and obtain effective protection. + + + +The security apparatus in federal Iraq suffers from a lack of resources, and the persistence of the terror threat makes it difficult for security forces to address other types of crime. Security forces in the KRI generally have better resources than their counterparts in federal Iraq but are compromised by corruption and the influence of party politics. + + + +The federal Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) do little to punish members of the security forces accused of human rights abuses. There have been instances of those under investigation for human rights violations targeting the officials investigating them. + + + +The criminal justice systems in federal Iraq and the KRI are weak. They are under-resourced and hampered by corruption, a large backlog of Daesh-related cases, and pressure from influential actors. Informal tribal justice systems also exist but suffer from issues including a lack of standardisation, bias towards the more powerful of the parties involved in a case, and violations of the rights of women. Tribal justice systems in Iraq cannot, in general, be considered willing and able to provide effective protection. + + + +Corruption is pervasive at all levels of Iraqi society, including in state institutions. Government efforts to combat corruption have had limited success. + + + +All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they would not be able to seek and obtain effective protection. @@ -43,843 +43,155 @@ +Section updated: 25 July 2025 + + + ## About the assessment -This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is information in the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general: - - - -- - - -a person can feasibly be returned to Iraq (because they have, or can obtain, the requisite travel documents), - - -- - - -a person can reasonably relocate elsewhere in Iraq or the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) if they are unable to return to their registered place of origin, - - -- - - -a person is at risk of serious harm sufficient to breach paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as a result of their lack of documentation, - - -- - - -a grant of asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave is likely, and - - -- - - -if a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. - - - - - -Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts. - - - -## 1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals - - - -1.1 Key terms and points to note - - - -1.1.1 The Iraq Country Guidance (CG) case of AH, AK and AJ was heard on 15 – 18 September 2025. The country of origin information and assessment in this CPIN are based on CG determinations and sources available before that hearing and do not reflect the Home Office’s position during the hearing. The CPIN will be updated in full following the promulgation of the new Country Guidance. - - - -1.1.2 For definitions of key terms, see Glossary of key terms. - - - -1.1.3 The Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) is referred to as the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) throughout this document. - - - -1.1.4 The term ‘feasible’ only refers to the physical process of being able to return someone to Iraq via air and does not take into account any circumstances or situations after arrival in Iraq. - - - - -Official – sensitive: Start of section - - - - -1.1.5 The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. - - - - -Official – sensitive: End of section - - - - -1.1.6 Decision Makers should be aware that whilst existing caselaw makes reference to the Qualification Directive, claims lodged after June 2022 should be considered in line with Part 11 of the Immigration Rules. - - - -1.1.7 There have been 5 country guidance cases concerning Iraq since 2015. - - - -(i) AA (Article 15(c)) (Rev 2) [2015] UKUT 544 (IAC), heard on 18-19 May 2015 and promulgated on 30 October 2015 (hereafter referred to as ‘AA’). This was a wide ranging-case which replaced all previous Country Guidance on Iraq, making findings on returns, documentation, relocation and security issues. In AA it was conceded by the respondent that a civilian with no distinguishing characteristics would, simply by virtue of his presence in one of the contested areas (the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al Din) be at real risk of suffering serious harm of the type identified in Article 15(c) of the Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive). For the reasons it gave at - - - -[101]-[106], the Upper Tribunal (UT) had no hesitation in endorsing that concession, noting that life in those areas (which were controlled at the time by Daesh) was characterised by systematic and widespread acts of violence and gross violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights. The UT also concluded that certain parts of the so-called Baghdad Belts were affected by an internal armed conflict of such intensity that there was a generalised Article 15(c) risk there. It was not accepted that the remainder of Iraq, including Baghdad City, was affected by such a level of internal armed conflict. - - - -In June 2017, the Court of Appeal, in AA (Iraq) vs Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 944 (‘AA 2017’), remade one specific Country Guidance point in AA regarding documentation and feasibility of return. The rest of AA’s findings were undisturbed. - - - -(ii) The second Country Guidance case was BA (Returns to Baghdad Iraq CG) [2017] UKUT 18 (IAC), heard on 24-25 August 2016 and promulgated on 23 January 2017 (hereafter referred to as ‘BA’). This case looked at the risk to those perceived as having collaborated with the West and the levels of violence in Baghdad City. The UT proceeded to give guidance which included a conclusion that the level of violence in Baghdad City remained significant but did not justify departing from the guidance in AA (Iraq). - - - -(iii) AAH (Iraqi Kurds – internal relocation) Iraq CG UKUT 212 (IAC), heard on 27-28 February 2018 and promulgated on 26 June 2018 (hereafter referred to as ‘AAH’), which supplemented Section C (about the Civil Status ID (CSID)) and replaced Section E (about return and relocation to the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR)) of the Country Guidance annexed to the CoA’s decision in AA 2017. - - - -(iv) SMO, KSP & IM (Article 15(c); identity documents) Iraq CG [2019] UKUT 400 (IAC), heard on 24-26 June 2019 and promulgated on 20 December 2019 (hereafter referred to as ‘SMO1’). This case looked at the levels of indiscriminate violence and the humanitarian situation across Iraq, identity documents and internal relocation. In relation to the security situation, the court considered whether return would expose an individual to a risk contrary to Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The court concluded that the situation did not generally give rise to such a risk although a fact-specific, ‘sliding-scale’ assessment will be necessary in all cases. The second issue, which has featured prominently in many if not all country guidance decisions on Iraq, concerned the identity documents an individual requires in order to live - - - -and function in Iraq, and how a replacement document could be obtained in the event that they lost the original. The court concluded a claimant might acquire a new document in a variety of ways and that most would be aided in this task by their likely memory of the volume and page reference of their entry in Iraq’s locally held Civil Status records, known as the ‘Family Book.’ - - - -(v) The most recent Country Guidance case was SMO & KSP (Civil status [documentation; Article 15) Iraq CG [2022 UKUT 110 (IAC), heard on 4-5 October 2021 and promulgated on 16 March 2022 (hereafter referred to as ‘SMO2’). The appellants SMO and KSP sought permission to appeal against the UT decision in SMO1 which was granted on 8 December 2020. On 16 February 2021 the appeals were remitted to the UT ‘“for determination of whether, given the importance of a Civil Status Identity Card, most Iraqi citizens will recall the volume and page reference of their entry in the Family Book.” The remaining findings were preserved “save that the Upper Tribunal is entitled to reconsider any such finding if and to the extent that it thinks it right to do so in the light of any developments” since the issuance of the first decision.’ (Para 4). - - - -There was no further consideration of the UT’s conclusions regarding Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, but both parties agreed that the UT should also consider questions concerning identity documentation and its acquisition as well as onward travel from Baghdad International Airport using a Laissez Passer and supporting letter (for more information see Para 7-8). SMO2 replaces all existing country guidance on Iraq. - - - -1.2 Credibility - - - -1.2.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. - - - -1.2.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants). - - - -1.2.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis). - - - - -Official – sensitive: Start of section - - - - -1.2.4 The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. - - - -1.2.5 The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. - - - - -Official – sensitive: End of section - - - - -1.3 Exclusion - - - -1.3.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. - - - -Each case must be considered on its individual facts and merits. - - - -1.3.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of Humanitarian Protection (HP) (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status). - - - -1.3.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave. - - - - -Official – sensitive: Start of section - - - - -1.3.4 - - - -1.3.5 The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. - - - - -Official – sensitive: End of section - - - - -## 2. Convention reason(s) - - - -2.1.1 People who cannot return and/or relocate because of a lack documentation but are not otherwise at real risk of persecution do not fall within the definition of the Refugee Convention. This is because the reasons for their fear of harm do not relate to their actual or imputed political opinion, race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group. - - - -2.1.2 In the absence of a link to one of the 5 Convention grounds necessary for the grant of refugee status, the question is whether the particular person will face a real risk of serious harm sufficient to qualify for HP. - - - -2.1.3 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. - - - -## 3. Consideration of issues - - - -3.1 Considering undocumented return - - - -3.1.1 The Civil Status Identity Card (CSID) is being replaced with a new biometric Iraqi National Identity Card – the INID. As a general matter, it is necessary for an individual to have one of these two documents in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Many of the checkpoints in the country are manned by Shia militia who are not controlled by the Government of Iraq and are unlikely to permit an individual without a CSID or an INID to pass. - - - -3.1.2 In deciding whether a person can travel internally within Iraq, decision makers must determine whether the person has or can acquire (or reacquire) identity documentation necessary to: - - - -- - - -make their return to Iraq feasible - - -- - - -travel within Iraq; and - - -- - - -access various public and private services. - - - - - -3.2 Assessment of risk arising from a lack of documentation - - - -a. Conditions on return for undocumented persons - - - -3.2.1 A person who is unable to retrieve their existing CSID/INID or obtain a new INID is likely to face significant difficulties in accessing services and thus risk being exposed to humanitarian conditions which are likely to result in destitution sufficient to amount to a breach of paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the ECHR. - - - -3.2.2 A person who can be feasibly returned (see Feasibility of return) and is at real risk of destitution because of a lack of documents should be granted HP (unless the person is excluded from such protection). - - - -3.2.3 Where a person is unable to obtain a CSID or INID within a reasonable time frame, consideration must be given to their other means of support (i.e. family members etc). While a family may be able to provide support, it may not be possible for the returnee to access it. As an example, while a wealthy family based in Mosul could provide an undocumented person with food and shelter, the undocumented person would not be able to travel internally from their airport of arrival to Mosul without being at risk of encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 ECHR at the various security checkpoints along the route. In cases such as these, a grant of Humanitarian Protection is appropriate (unless the person is excluded from such protection). - - - -3.2.4 For more information, see Absence of identity documents and the Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection. - - - -b. Conditions on return for documented persons - - - -3.2.5 The situation is different for documented persons returning to their home area. They would not, in general, face conditions which breach paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 ECHR. In considering whether it would be in breach of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR to return a documented person to their home area within the Formerly Contested Areas or Baghdad the UT in SMO1 held that: - - - -‘Nevertheless, we remind ourselves that the threshold is that in N v UK and we accept the respondent’s submission that the cumulative difficulties faced by a healthy, documented male returning to their place of origin in the formerly contested areas do not cross that threshold. Such an individual would be able to access food through the PDS or other humanitarian assistance programmes. They would have access to the limited employment options available. There is some primary healthcare available there. The risks of food insecurity and water scarcity, together with the risks from disease and unexploded ordnance, even in the worst affected areas and even in respect of those who would be required to live in a critical shelter arrangement, do not reach the high threshold required for us to conclude that there is a general risk of conditions which breach Article 3 ECHR, or engage Article 15(b) QD. A healthy, documented male returning to a home area in the formerly contested areas, therefore, will not generally be able to establish that theirs is a very exceptional case where the humanitarian grounds against removal are sufficiently compelling to require such protection.’ (paragraph 331) [emphasis added]. - - - -3.2.6 However the UT in SMO1 also held that: - - - -‘It is imperative to recall that the minimum level of severity required by Article 3 is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and the sex, age and state of health of the individual concerned: Saadi v Italy (2009) 49 EHRR 30. Although it is clear to us that a documented, healthy male would not, on return to a home area in the formerly contested areas, encounter conditions in breach of Article 3 ECHR, additional vulnerabilities including those considered under the ‘sliding scale’ of Article 15(c) might conceivably combine to cross the N v UK threshold. In considering any such submission, decision makers will nevertheless wish to recall that that the combination of factors in Said, including mental health problems and a lack of family support, offset by clan support and remittances from the UK, were held by the Court of Appeal to be so short of the N v UK threshold that remittal to the Upper Tribunal would serve no purpose: [32]-[33] refers.’ (paragraph 332) - - - -3.3 General approach to returns and internal relocation in Iraq - - - -3.3.1 In AA, the UT found that the assessment of whether a person would be at risk of destitution because of a lack of a CSID should only be made if return was feasible. However, this position was reversed by the Court of Appeal (CoA) in June 2017 (Annex: C9). Decision makers must now assess the risk arising from a lack of a CSID regardless of ‘feasibility of return’ (whether a person can be returned or not). - - - -3.3.2 In SMO2, the UT held that it is necessary for a person to have a CSID or INID in order to live in Iraq without encountering conditions contrary to Article 3 ECHR. They also held that it remains possible for a person to obtain the documentation required to make return to Iraq feasible (para 93-107). - - - -3.3.3 At paragraph 61 of SMO2, the UT held that ‘The process for applying for a CSID whilst in the UK was examined at [173]-[177] of AA (Iraq) and it was clear, even at that stage, that the Embassy did not issue the document itself; it would act as an intermediary by sending the completed application for a CSID to the General Directorate for Travel and Nationality…’ - - - -3.3.4 However, since the promulgation of SMO2, there are no longer any Civil Status Affairs (CSA) offices in Iraq producing and issuing CSIDs following the rollout of the INID system (see Annex D and Annex E). Nationals of Iraq are required to have biometrics taken (including a scan of their irises and fingerprints taken) in the initial application of an INID. Although CSIDs are no longer being issued, due to the delays in the rollout of the INID, CSIDs are still accepted as forms of identification at checkpoints, when obtaining other types of civil documentation and when accessing services. This development does not affect a person’s ability to return to Iraq but does affect their ability to travel internally as well as access services. - - - -3.4 Feasibility of return - - - -a. Return documentation - - - -3.4.1 If a person has a valid passport, an expired passport or a laissez-passer then return is feasible. If they do not have or cannot obtain either of these, - - - -then return is not feasible. - - - -3.4.2 The passport and laissez-passer (the term used by the Iraqis for an emergency travel document) are travel documents and should not be confused with civil documentation such as the INID and CSID cards which enables access to various services. - - - -b. Obtaining passports - - - -3.4.3 Available evidence indicates that to obtain a passport a person (who is 18 or over) needs to go to an Iraqi consulate and present: - - - -- - - -a Civil Status ID (CSID) or Iraqi National Identity Card (INID) and - - -- - - -an Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) and - - -- - - -a Residency card (for those outside Iraq) (see Documentation – Passport) - - - - - -3.4.4 The new ePassport is now available from Al-A’adhamiya, Al-Kadhimiya and Al-Mansour e-passport offices in Baghdad. It can also be obtained abroad (see ePassport/ Electronic Passport). The A-series passport is still available elsewhere. - - - -c. Obtaining Laissez Passers - - - -3.4.5 Laissez Passers are also known as ’Pass Doc’, ‘Passport Laissez’ or simply ‘Passport’. - - - -3.4.6 The UT in SMO1 held that a person ‘must simply be able to establish their nationality in order to obtain a Laissez Passer.’ (Para 375). - - - -3.4.7 An application for a Laissez Passer is considered on a case-by-case basis by the Iraqi Embassy in London. For the enforced return of a failed asylum seeker (FAS) there is no interview requirement providing they hold at least one of the following (copy or original, valid or expired) [a telephone interview may be requested by the Embassy in certain cases]: - - - -- - - -Passport - - -- - - -Birth Certificate - - -- - - -Marriage Certificate - - -- - - -Civil Status ID (CSID) - - -- - - -Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) - - -- - - -Iraqi National Identity Card (INID) - - -- - - -Iraq Citizenship certificate - - -- - - -Iraq residency card - - -- - - -Registration Document (1957) - - - - - -3.4.8 For those without supporting documents, a mandatory embassy interview is required. The embassy verification process tends to take 10-14 days. All categories of voluntary cases will be considered (including those without documents) but will usually require an interview face to face or by phone. - - - -3.4.9 The information obtained from Returns Logistics (see Annex B) further stated that family members in Iraq can present any of the documentation listed in the paragraph above to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Iraq in order to help prove the person’s nationality. Additionally, phone numbers or signed - - - -affidavits (a written statement of evidence) from family members in Iraq are also useful to the verification process. Once a person’s verification in Iraq is complete it is sent to the Iraqi Embassy in London to issue a laissez-passer, however straightforward verification of documents can be done locally at the Embassy in London. Verification takes between 10–14 days if done locally, however if enquiries are required in-country it could take up to 30+ days. - - - -3.4.10 Additionally, in SMO1, the UT held that ‘… once verified the individual will be issued with a document enabling the individual to return to Iraq… the resulting document is valid for six months and that it “permits a single entry into Iraq”.’ (paragraph 375) - - - -3.4.11 Foreign National Offenders (FNOs) who have completed their custodial sentence in the UK can be issued with a Laissez Passer after being enrolled onto an interview and documentation scheme run by the Home Office in conjunction with the Iraqi Embassy (see Returns Logistics information on the Iraq country page on Horizon and the Country returns guide (this guide is updated regularly)). - - - -3.4.12 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. - - - -d. Return routes by air - - - -3.4.13 Since 30 September 2020, the Home Office has been able to return Iraqis from the KRI to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports directly (i.e., without needing to travel via Baghdad). Before 19 August 2025, the Home Office was not able to return Iraqis previously resident outside the KRI directly to the KRI, but only to Baghdad airport. On 19 August 2025, the UK and the Government of Iraq signed an agreement allowing Iraqis previously resident outside the KRI to be returned to the KRI directly. - - - -3.5 Lack of return documentation - - - -3.5.1 A lack of documentation, in itself, is not sufficient to be granted HP. It is only where a person would be at real risk of serious harm because of a lack of documentation that a grant of HP would be appropriate. - - - -3.5.2 In SMO2, the UT concluded ‘In light of the Court of Appeal’s judgement in HF (Iraq) and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Departments ([2013] EWCA Civ 1276, an international protection claim made by P cannot succeed by reference to any alleged risk of harm arising from an absence of a current or expired Iraqi passport or a Laissez passer, if the Tribunal finds that P’s return is not currently feasible on account of a lack of any of those documents.’ [144(9)] - - - -3.5.3 A person returned without identity documentation is likely to be questioned at the airport and a family member asked to attend to confirm their identity (see Return of Iraqi nationals). - - - -3.6 Feasibility of internal relocation - - - -a. Process of return - - - -3.6.1 In SMO2, the UT held that: - - - -‘Where internal relocation is raised in the Iraqi context [i.e. within the areas controlled by the Government of Iraq and not the areas controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government], it is necessary to consider not only the safety and reasonableness of relocation but also the feasibility of that course, in light of sponsorship and residency requirements in operation in various parts of the country. Individuals who seek to relocate within the country may not be admitted to a potential safe haven or may not be permitted to remain there.’ [Paragraph 144(23)] - - - -3.6.2 Decision makers must start by considering (i) where the person would be returned to, (ii) where the proposed destination for internal relocation would be (if they cannot return to their home area), and (iii) the internal travel required to achieve that. - - - -b. Requiring a CSID or INID for onward travel - - - -3.6.3 In SMO2, the UT held that ‘As a general matter, it is necessary for an individual to have… either a [CSID or an INID]…in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Many checkpoints in the country are manned by Shia militia who are not controlled by the GOI [Government of Iraq] and are unlikely to permit an individual without a CSID or an INID to pass.’ [Paragraph 144(11)] - - - -3.6.4 Decision makers must therefore assess whether a person will be returned to Iraq in possession of the necessary civil documentation or could obtain a replacement INID in a reasonable timeframe. If the original documentation still exists and is held by family members in Iraq, the document can be provided by family members meeting them on arrival or sent by secure post to the person in the UK. - - - -3.6.5 Decision makers must read the Documentation section to determine whether a person can obtain civil documentation. The onus is on the person to show why they cannot reasonably obtain necessary documentation. - - - -3.6.6 Internal travel is possible for those persons who would arrive in Iraq either in possession of a CSID or INID or who would be able to be redocumented on arrival at the airport, or shortly after arrival at a location that does not require passing through a checkpoint. They would then be able to travel to their home governorate (or elsewhere) through the various security checkpoints and are, in general, unlikely to encounter treatment or conditions contrary to paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 ECHR. - - - -3.6.7 However, those who return to Iraq or the KRI without a CSID or INID, cannot obtain one via a family member on arrival and who would be required to travel internally to a CSA office in another area of Iraq or the KRI to obtain one would be at risk of encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the ECHR. In these cases, a grant of Humanitarian Protection is therefore appropriate (unless the person is excluded from such protection). - - - -c. Passports and Laissez Passers for onward travel - - - -3.6.8 The UT in SMO2 held that: - - - -‘…A valid Iraqi passport is not recognised as acceptable proof of identity for internal travel by land. - - - -‘Laissez Passers are confiscated on arrival and will not, for that reason, assist a returnee who seeks to travel from Baghdad to the IKR by air without a passport, INID or CSID. The Laissez Passer is not a recognised identity document for the purpose of internal travel by land. - - - -‘There is insufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence or utility of the “certification letter” or “supporting letter” which is said to be issued to undocumented returnees by the authorities at Baghdad International Airport.’ [Paragraph 144(17-19)] - - - -3.6.9 The UT in SMO2 held that that passports are not an accepted form of identification document for the purpose of confirming identities and passing through checkpoints [Paragraph 144(17)]. Therefore, only those who currently hold accepted forms of identification (i.e. a CSID, an INID) can pass through checkpoints without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 ECHR. - - - -3.6.10 In March 2023, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) indicated that a passport can be used to cross some checkpoints and that an additional valid identity document (CSID/INID) besides the passport may be required due to concerns over the reliability of passports (see Annex G). However, this is not sufficient to depart from the findings in SMO2 outlined in the paragraph above. - - - -3.7 Key civil documentation - - - -a. Iraqi National Identity Card (INID) - - - -3.7.1 The Iraqi National Identity Card (INID) replaces the Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) and the Civil Status ID Card (CSID). In 2023, the Danish Immigration service indicated that since 2017, the uptake of the INID has been slow but estimated that 85-90% of people in the KRI have now obtained the INID. INID uptake figures in the rest of Iraq could not be found in the sources consulted (see Bibliography). - - - -3.7.2 The INID is linked to a record of a person’s biometric data and can only be issued in person, in Iraq. It is valid for 10 years and after this, a person must return to their home governorate to receive a renewed document. When a person’s civil status has changed, e.g., through marriage or divorce, they must renew their INID through submitting a new application. - - - -3.7.3 UNHCR informed CPIT that not all checkpoints within Federal Iraq and the KRI have the necessary technological capabilities to validate a person’s identity through biometric records when presented with an INID (see Annex H). - - - -3.7.4 For more, see Documentation- Iraqi National Identity Card (INID). - - - -b. Civil Status ID Card (CSID) - - - -3.7.5 Whilst the INID replaces the CSID, it can still be used for passing through checkpoints and accessing services such as financial assistance, employment, education, housing and medical treatment. It is also still a gateway to obtaining other documents including the initial issuance of an INID (see Documentation - Civil Status Identity Card (CSID)). - - - -c. Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) - - - -3.7.6 The Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) is another important document, although not as important as the INID or CSID. - - - -3.7.7 The Upper Tribunal in AAH held that an INC ‘simply serves to confirm that the holder is an Iraqi citizen. It does not hold the practical significance of a CSID… An Iraqi in possession of a CSID can ordinarily use that document to obtain a replacement INC and in any event, the absence of an INC would not have any particular consequences for his ability to function in society. Conversely possession of an INC could assist the holder in replacing a lost CSID.’ (paragraph 95) - - - -3.7.8 For more information on how to obtain an INC see Documentation – Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC). - - - -d. Obtaining an INID in the UK - - - -3.7.9 At the time of publication, INIDs cannot beobtained while a person is in the UK unless replacing an in-date lost ID by proxy (see Issuing identity documents by proxy). The UT in SMO2 held that ‘In order to obtain an INID, an individual must personally attend the Civil Status Affairs (“CSA”) office at which they are registered to enrol their biometrics, including fingerprints and iris scans.’ [Paragraph 144(12) and (15-16)]. They must also do this for the purpose of renewing an INID after its 10 year period of validity. - - - -3.7.10 For more information on how to obtain an INID see Documentation – Iraqi Nationality Identity Card (INID). - - - -e. Obtaining a CSID in the UK - - - -3.7.11 In SMO2, the UT held that ‘We consider it more likely than not that CSIDs continue to be available through the Iraqi Embassy in the UK but only for individuals who are registered at a Civil Status Affairs office which has not transferred to the digital INID system.’ (Para 60). - - - -3.7.12 Since the promulgation of SMO2, the British Embassy in Baghdad and the Iraq Embassy have confirmed that there are no longer any CSID issuing offices in Iraq due to the rollout of the INID system (see Annex E and Annex F). CSIDs are therefore no longer attainable to Iraqi nationals in the UK. - - - -f. Obtaining a CSID or INID in Iraq - - - -3.7.13 The UT in SMO2 held: - - - -‘In order to obtain an INID, an individual must personally attend the Civil Status Affairs (“CSA”) office at which they are registered to enrol their biometrics, including fingerprints and iris scans. - - - -‘… Once in Iraq, it remains the case that an individual is expected to attend their local CSA office in order to obtain a replacement document. All CSA offices have now re-opened, although the extent to which records have been destroyed by the conflict with ISIL is unclear, and is likely to vary significantly depending on the extent and intensity of the conflict in the area in question. - - - -‘An individual returnee who is not from Baghdad is not likely to be able to obtain a replacement document there [in Baghdad], and certainly not within a reasonable time. Neither the Central Archive nor the assistance facilities for IDPs are likely to render documentation assistance to an undocumented returnee.’ [Paragraph 144(12) and (15-16)]. - - - -3.7.14 However, as noted in paragraph 3.7.12 CSIDs are no longer being issued in any Civil Status Affairs Offices and are therefore no longer attainable to Iraqi nationals within Iraq or the IKR (see Annex E and Annex F). - - - -3.7.15 According to the Danish Immigration Service, females under the age of 18 and estranged from their family will not be able to access documentation due to the need for their father’s presence and approval during the application process. Women, especially widowed or single women, have encountered issues of harassment when applying for identity documents (see Ability of women to obtain identity documentation). - - - -3.8 Impact of the security and humanitarian situation on onward travel - - - -a. ‘contested’ and ‘formerly contested areas’ - - - -3.8.1 Decision makers must consider the country’s humanitarian and security situation when assessing internal relocation. This is because it relates to the ability to travel to and/or through a particular place, as well as whether the place is suitable for living. For example whether the level of destruction of some of the cities (in particular Mosul) rendered them suitable for living. This was an issue considered by the UT in SMO1 (paragraphs 75, 330 and 402). - - - -3.8.2 The Tribunal in SMO2 held that any civilian returning to Iraq would, in general, not face a real risk of being subjected to indiscriminate violence amounting to serious harm with the exception of the small mountainous area north of Baiji in Salah al-Din (see Annex A). The UT found this area to remain under doctrinal control by Daesh [Paragraph 144(2)]. The UT in SMO2 held that ‘the living conditions in Iraq as a whole, including the Formerly Contested Areas, are unlikely to give rise to a breach of Article 3 ECHR or (therefore) to necessitate subsidiary protection… [However] any such circumstances require individualised assessment in the context of the conditions of the area in question.’ [Paragraph 144(6)]. - - - -3.8.3 However, the UT in SMO2 also held that ‘The situation in the Formerly Contested Areas (the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al-Din) is complex, encompassing ethnic, political and humanitarian issues which differ by region. Whether the return of an individual to such an area would be contrary to Article 15(c) requires a fact sensitive, “sliding scale” assessment…’ [Paragraph 144(3)] - - - -3.8.4 For information and a detailed assessment of risk due to the general country situation, see country policy and information notes, Iraq: Humanitarian situation and Iraq: Security situation. - - - -3.8.5 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be - - - -taken into account, see the asylum instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. - - - -b. Relocation within/to the Formerly Contested Areas - - - -3.8.6 In SMO2 the UT held: - - - -‘Where relocation within the Formerly Contested Areas is under contemplation… the ethnic and political composition of the home area and the place of relocation will be particularly relevant. In particular, an individual who lived in a former ISIL [Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant also known as Daesh] stronghold for some time may fall under suspicion in a place of relocation. Tribal and ethnic differences may preclude such relocation, given the significant presence and control of largely Shia militia in these areas. - - - -Even where it is safe for an individual to relocate within the Formerly Contested Areas, however, it is unlikely to either be feasible or reasonable without a prior connection to, and a support structure within, the area of question.’ [Paragraph 144(24)] - - - -3.8.7 Certain profiles (Single Sunni Arab men of fighting age and single women) may be treated with suspicion when passing through checkpoints in these areas and face questioning as well as having their names checked against security lists (see Security clearance permit). However, being treated with suspicion does not necessarily amount to facing a real risk of serious harm. - - - -c. Relocation within/to Baghdad - - - -3.8.8 The Tribunal in SMO2 held: - - - -‘Baghdad is generally safe for ordinary civilians but whether it is safe for a particular returnee is a question of fact in the individual case. There are no on-entry sponsorship requirements for Baghdad but there are sponsorship requirements for residency. A documented individual of working age is likely to be able to satisfy those requirements. Relocation to Baghdad is likely to be reasonable for Arab Shia and Sunni single, able-bodied men, Arab Shia and Sunni married couples of working age without children and without specific vulnerabilities. Other individuals are likely to require external support, i.e. a support network of members of his or her family, extended family or tribe, who are willing and able to provide genuine support. Whether such a support network is available is to be considered with reference to the collectivist nature of Iraqi society, as considered in AAH (Iraq) [para 96]’ [Paragraph 144(25)]. - - - -3.8.9 The UT held that a civil identity document (CSID or INID) is required to pass checkpoints and be admitted into Baghdad. Therefore, only those who are documented or who could obtain either original or replacement documents from a family member would be able to enter the Baghdad. For information see Entry and residency requirements in central and southern Iraq. - - - -d. Relocation within/to the IKR - - - -3.8.10 In general, Kurds who do not originate from the KRI can relocate to the region providing they pass residency requirements. Available country information suggests that ethnic Kurds are able to enter the KRI, depending on their ability to pass security requirements (see Security clearance permit). - - - -3.8.11 Available evidence indicates that a civil identity document (CSID or INID) are required to pass checkpoints and be admitted into the KRI. Therefore, only those who are documented or who could obtain either original or replacement documents (i.e. a CSID or INID obtained via proxy) from a family member would be able to enter the KRI (see Entry and residency requirements in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR)). The risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into account any additional factors that may increase this risk. - - - -3.8.12 The Tribunal in SMO2 also held: - - - -‘Once at the IKR border (land or air) P would normally be granted entry to the territory. Subject to security screening, and registering presence with the local mukhtar, P would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in any of the three IKR Governorates for Kurds. - - - -‘Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory. - - - -‘If P has family members living in the IKR cultural norms would require that family to accommodate P. In such circumstances P would, in general, have sufficient assistance from the family so as to lead a “relatively normal life”, which would not be unduly harsh. It is nevertheless important for decision- makers to determine the extent of any assistance likely to be provided by P’s family on a case-by-case basis. - - - -‘For Kurds without the assistance of family in the IKR the accommodation options are limited: - - - -(i) Absent special circumstances it is not reasonably likely that P will be able to gain access to one of the refugee camps in the IKR; these camps are already extremely overcrowded and are closed to newcomers. 64% of IDPs are accommodated in private settings with the vast majority living with family members; - - - -(ii) If P cannot live with a family member, apartments in a modern block in a new neighbourhood are available for rent at a cost of between $300 and $400 per month; - - - -(iii) P could resort to a “critical shelter arrangement”, living in an unfinished or abandoned structure, makeshift shelter, tent, mosque, church or squatting in a government building. It would be unduly harsh to require P to relocate to the IKR if P will live in a critical housing shelter without access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and clothing. - - - -(iv) In considering whether P would be able to access basic necessities, account must be taken of the fact that failed asylum seekers are entitled to apply for a grant under the Voluntary and assisted returns scheme, which could give P access to £1500. Consideration should also be given to whether P can obtain financial support from other sources such as (a) employment, (b) remittances from relatives abroad, (c) the availability of ad hoc charity or by being able to access PDS [Public Distribution System] rations. - - - -‘Whether P is able to secure employment must be assessed on a case-by- case basis taking the following matters into account: - - - -(i) Gender. Lone women are very unlikely to be able to secure legitimate employment; - - - -(ii) The unemployment rate for Iraqi IDPs living in the IKR is 70%; - - - -(iii) P cannot work without a CSID or INID; - - - -(iv) Patronage and nepotism continue to be important factors in securing employment. A returnee with family connections to the region will have a significant advantage in that he would ordinarily be able to call upon those contacts to make introductions to prospective employers and to vouch for him; - - - -(v) Skills, education and experience. Unskilled workers are at the greatest disadvantage, with the decline in the construction industry reducing the number of labouring jobs available; - - - -(vi) If P is from an area with a marked association with ISIL, that may deter prospective employers.’ [Paragraph 144 (30-34)] - - - -3.8.13 The Tribunal in SMO2 held the following in regard to non-Kurdish returnees’ ability to relocate to the IKR: - - - -‘The ability of non-Kurdish returnees to relocate to the IKR is to be distinguished [from Kurdish returnees]. […] Although Erbil and Sulaymaniyah are accessible for such individuals, particular care must be taken in evaluating whether internal relocation to the IKR for a non-Kurd would be reasonable. Given the economic and humanitarian conditions in the IKR at present, an Arab with no viable support network in the IKR is likely to experience unduly harsh conditions upon relocation there.’ [Paragraph 144(35)] - - - -3.8.14 For guidance on internal relocation and factors to be taken into account, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. - - - -3.8.15 For further information on residency requirements see Entry and residency requirements in the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) - - - -## 4. Certification - - - -4.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. - - - -4.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims). +This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general, a person can obtain effective protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) + + + +Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts. + + + +## Other points to note + + + +This note covers both the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), which consists of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok and Halabja governorates and is under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and federal Iraq, which includes all other governorates and is under the control of the Government of Iraq. + + + +Some sub-sections of this note are specific to either federal Iraq or the KRI, while others include information on both regions. Where possible – and particularly where there are significant differences in the situation – the note distinguishes between federal Iraq and the KRI. + + + +## 1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals + + + +## 1.1 Credibility + + + +1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants). + + + +1.1.3 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis). + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section + + + + +The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section + + + + +## 1.2 Exclusion + + + +1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts. + + + +1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status). + + + +1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section + + + + +The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section + + + + +## 2. Protection + + + +2.1.1 In both federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), a person’s access to protection depends on various factors, including gender, socio-economic status, family support, religious and/or ethnic identity, political party affiliation, the profile and influence of the actor from whom they need to be protected, and the type of crime from which they need protection. Whilst the law enforcement and justice systems are vulnerable to manipulation, the onus is on the person to demonstrate that they would not be able to seek and obtain effective protection. + + + +2.1.2 The constitution guarantees equal treatment before the law, judicial independence, and the right to a fair trial. It prohibits torture, forced confessions, and arbitrary arrest and detention. There are laws criminalising corruption and providing for the operation of an independent human rights commission. However, in practice the state often fails to uphold the constitution and laws (see Constitution and laws). + + + +2.1.3 Anti-terrorism laws in both federal Iraq and the KRI are vague and broad, giving the authorities extensive powers to pursue people deemed to have assisted terrorist activities (including family members of suspects). The vagueness and breadth of the laws has contributed to widespread violations of the rights of terror suspects (see Anti-terrorism laws and Human rights abuses by security forces). + + + +2.1.4 The state security apparatus in federal Iraq includes the armed forces, the police, the Emergency Response Division, Provincial Emergency Police Battalions, Border Guards, the Counter-Terrorism Service, the National Security Service and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), among other entities. The armed forces (not including the PMF) have an estimated 200,000 personnel. Most units do not have sufficient training and funding to operate effectively. The police services have an estimated 230,000 personnel and also suffer from underfunding, making it difficult for them to carry out their duties. The PMF, a state-sponsored grouping of dozens of militias and the dominant security actor in certain areas of the country, is estimated to comprise at least 200,000 personnel. Although the PMF officially falls under the command of the Prime Minister, the government is generally unable to control it. The PMF is accused of numerous human rights abuses. CPIT was unable to find information indicating that the PMF is present in the KRI (see Security forces in federal Iraq and Human rights abuses by security forces). + + + +2.1.5 The main state security actors in the KRI are the Peshmerga (the armed forces), the Asayish (the internal security service) and the police. These actors are not unified across the KRI because of the influence of party politics. The two main parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), each have their own security apparatus. Different units and factions within the security forces, including the police, are usually affiliated with one of the two parties. The Peshmerga is estimated to have a total of around 150,000 personnel. Information on the size of other security actors was not available. Sources indicate that security forces in the KRI are generally better trained, funded and equipped than their counterparts in federal Iraq but are compromised by corruption and the influence of party politics (see Security forces in the KRI). + + + +2.1.6 CPIT was unable to find reliable data on the levels of crime, making it difficult to statistically assess the prevalence of criminality. However, one source did report a 15% decrease in crime rates between 2023 and 2024. Sources suggest that violent crime is common in federal Iraq and that organised crime – including drug and human trafficking – is also a significant problem. Militias and criminal gangs are involved in extortion and protection rackets, with one source describing this as a ‘growing problem’. The KRI also suffers from high levels of violent crime, but to a lesser extent than federal Iraq. Violent crime in the KRI is often related to tribal disputes or honour-based violence. The proliferation of firearms among civilians across the country contributes to the high levels of violent crime (see Types and rates of crime and the CPIN Iraq: Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence). + + + +2.1.7 Security forces in federal Iraq reportedly struggle to respond to crimes due to a preoccupation with terrorism and security incidents. In the KRI, security forces are generally more capable of responding to incidents than their counterparts in federal Iraq. Widespread corruption is a major obstacle to the effective operation of security forces across the country (see Effectiveness of security forces). + + + +2.1.8 Security forces in both federal Iraq and the KRI are responsible for human rights abuses, although the lack of reliable statistics makes it difficult to establish the scale and extent to which these human rights abuses occur. Torture is reportedly common, particularly of terror suspects including juvenile detainees, despite the existence of laws against it (see 2.1.4 and 2.1.5). Arbitrary and unlawful arrest and detention take place, as well as extended detention before trial and sometimes after a court has ordered release. Security forces have carried out extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) do little to address human rights abuses committed by their security forces, and there are examples of those involved in human rights abuses targeting law enforcement and judicial officials tasked with investigating their conduct (see Human rights abuses by security forces). + + + +2.1.9 The criminal justice systems in federal Iraq and the KRI are weak. Reasons for this include a lack of resources, corruption, preoccupation with Daesh-related cases, and pressure from political, sectarian, and criminal actors. Lengthy delays before and during trials are common, as are miscarriages of justice. Several issues hamper defendants’ right to a fair trial, including a lack of adequate legal representation. Convictions based on confessions obtained under torture are reportedly common, especially in terrorism cases (see State justice system, Judiciary and Trials and legal representation). + + + +2.1.10 Prison conditions across the country are very poor. Prisons are overcrowded, operating at an average of 200-300 percent capacity, and diseases are widespread. Inmates have died in prisons and pretrial detention facilities because of the harsh conditions. There are many reports of torture in prisons as well as other human rights violations, such as the alleged sexual abuse of inmates, including children. The death penalty can be applied for a wide range of crimes, though most executions in recent years have involved people found guilty of terrorism offences. The KRG continues to issue death sentences but does not carry out executions, with the last executions taking place in 2015 or 2016. In federal Iraq, almost 400 executions have taken place since 2016, with 30 of these occurring between January and July 2024 (see Prison conditions and Death penalty). + + + +2.1.11 Informal tribal justice systems operate alongside the official state justice system. The relationship between state and tribal justice is complicated, involving a mixture of cooperation and conflict. Tribal justice aims to maintain stability and order, preserve collective honour, and prevent the escalation of conflict. Many kinds of disputes and crimes can be referred to a tribal justice system, from murder to land disputes to medical negligence. Sources highlight major issues with tribal justice, such as the lack of standardisation, the risk of the system being manipulated, the fact that decisions are influenced by the power and connections of the parties involved, and violations of the rights of women. However, in some cases people prefer tribal justice over the formal justice system, for reasons including a lack of trust in and/or a lack of access to the formal justice system. Nevertheless, tribes cannot, in general, be considered willing and able to provide effective protection (see Tribal justice system and the CPIN Iraq: Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence). + + + +2.1.12 Sources describe corruption as widespread and pervasive at all levels of Iraqi society. People often have to pay bribes to obtain basic services. Embezzlement, nepotism, and other forms of corruption are deeply ingrained in government institutions. The government has made efforts to combat corruption, but these have had limited success (see Corruption). + + + +2.1.13 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. @@ -891,7 +203,7 @@ -This contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment which, as stated in the About the assessment, is the guide to the current objective conditions. +This contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment. @@ -903,1908 +215,1911 @@ -Decision makers must use relevant country information as the evidential basis for decisions. - - - -## 5. Return of Iraqi nationals - - - -5.1.1 The Inspection Report on Country of Origin information, Iraq and Myanmar (Burma) undertaken by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI), published June 2023 (ICIBI report June 2023), quoting Dr Rebwar Fateh, an expert witness on the Middle East, stated: - - - -‘If a failed asylum seeker is returned to Iraq without an ID document, they will be detained at the airport. - - - -a) The returnee will then be interviewed to give some indication of whether they are from their claimed governorate or region (through dialect, accent etc.). From the returnee’s Kurdish or Arabic dialect, the officer will be able to tell whether the returnee is from Iraq or not. - - - -b) At this time, the returnee’s claimed name and address will also be cross referenced against suspect names in possession of the security services. - - - -c) Next, the returnee will be asked to phone their immediate family to bring their ID. - - - -d) If they claim to have no immediate family, the returnee will be asked to contact a paternal uncle or cousin for their ID. - - - -e) If this is negative too, another relative will come to the airport with their own IDs to act as a guarantor for the returnee. This would allow the returnee a seven-day residency permit pending proof of identity. - - - -f) During this period, the returnee needs to obtain their own ID or provide evidence that they are in the process of obtaining an ID – such as a letter from the nationality department to show that their ID is pending via the usual procedure. - - - -g) If the returnee has no such luck, they must find a local Mukhtar [local chief or village elder] by the seventh day who can provide a letter in exchange for a small fee which states that the person is who they say that they are, that they are from the claimed neighbourhood, and that they are in the process of obtaining an ID. - - - -h) If the Mukhtar cannot identify the returnee, they will need two witnesses to come forward who know them and can provide evidence on their identity. - - - -i) The returnee then needs to apply in writing to the nationality department. Here, they will be interviewed by the chief and the witnesses will ned [sic] to give evidence under oath, stating how they know the returnee. - - - -j) Once the chief has been convinced, the process of obtaining the ID will start. Once these steps have been completed, the returnee needs to communicate back to the security services at the airport, or their guarantor will face legal consequences.[footnote 1] - - - -5.1.2 It should be noted that the above information was presented to and considered by the Upper Tribunal in SMO2 and as such cannot be used to depart from the Country Guidance findings. - - - -## 6. Documentation - - - -6.1 Legal Context - - - -Section updated: 20 October 2023 - - - -6.1.1 In October 2021 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) published a report written by Protection Cluster Iraq (PCI) entitled ‘Protection Analysis Report – Right to identity and civil documentation’ which stated: - - - -‘The right to legal identity is the right to be recognized by the State as a person before the law, which allows the person to access further rights, benefits and responsibilities in the country. In practice, one’s legal identity is established through the issuance by the State of identity documents, which provide official recognition of someone’s nationality and identity. - - - -Consequently, identity documents (Civil Status ID Card, Iraqi Nationality Certificate, Unified ID Card [also known as the Iraqi National Identity Card INID)]) are different from, but a requirement for, civil documents (Birth, Death or Marriage Certificates). In Iraq, the right to a legal identity and to civil documentation is enshrined in various bodies of law, including the Constitution of the Government of Iraq of 2005, the Civil Status Law No. 65 of 1972, the Civil Status System Law No. 32 of 1974 and the Iraq Nationality Act No. 26 of 2006.[footnote 2] - - - -6.2 Civil registration system - - - -6.2.1 A paper published in the Canadian Studies in Population (CSIP) in 2014, based on a United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) funded field visit to Iraq, explained that all births, deaths, marriages and divorces are updated on the family registry. The source explained that family records were held locally at the daa’ira (local civil registration office), where a new event, for example a birth, marriage or divorce, would be manually inputted onto the family register[footnote 3]. - - - -6.2.2 The same source noted that the registrar would record the following information: serial number, name, title, father’s name, mother’s name, sex, relationship to head of household, occupation, literacy, religion, date of birth, place of birth, and date of registration[footnote 4]. - - - -6.2.3 The paper explained the precise way in which family records were maintained, based on three unique information markers: the sijil (family record) number; sahifa (family page) number and daaira (local civil registration office). As the source explained: - - - -‘All vital events occurring to any member of the family are entered into this “family page”. This is done until the child gets married and establishes his own family, in which case a new “family page” is started for him. Through this innovative system, it can take as little as five minutes to locate anyone’s records. From this ID system, three pieces of ID are produced: the civil registration ID, nationality ID, and residence ID (location of house). The retention period for the documents in the local offices is 20 years.[footnote 5] - - - -6.2.4 The source commented that when the register was full (each register contains around 200 families), the document would be sent back to the head office for scanning, after which it would be returned to the local office for archiving. It was also noted that at head office ‘separate archives exist for records from 1934–1947’, whilst information from 1948–1957 had been scanned and stored on CDs. For records from 1958 to the time of writing (2011) scanned images were stored on an external hard drive, with one hard drive for each governorate[footnote 6]. - - - -6.2.5 CPIT was unable to find any information regarding how information is currently archived in the sources consulted (see Bibliography). - - - -6.2.6 A letter from the British Embassy in Baghdad, dated 7 April 2012 (available on request), explained that there was an extensive civil status (CSA/CAD) office network across Iraq, with each district (sub-governorate) or Nahyas (sub-district) having a local ID office. A list of these offices is available upon request. The source reaffirmed that information was retained by the Civil Status Office’s local records and that information was referenced using a “book page number”, which was also written on the CSID or INID (see Civil Status Identity Card (CSID), Iraqi National Identity Card (INID)). In the case of marriage, the civil record for the wife was transferred to be inserted with the husband’s record (on his family’s page)[footnote 7]. - - - -6.2.7 A Landinfo report dated 16 December 2015 also confirmed that all personal data was entered onto a family registry at the local population registration office (CSA office) near the family’s residence. The source stated there were over 300 population registration offices (unofficially called Civil Status Offices or Civil Status Departments, or Jinsiya[footnote 8]). The report stated that each family had their own registration number, which was listed on the personal identity cards. The source also confirmed that any Iraqi could obtain a copy of their page in the family registry[footnote 9]. - - - -6.2.8 The family registry had several synonymous names in the unofficial English translation: family book; family census and family registry 57 (after the 1957 law which introduced civil registration in Iraq following the 1957 census)[footnote 10]. - - - -6.2.9 See Annex I for an example of a page in the family book. - - - -6.2.10 In 2021, The Centre of Excellence for CRVS Systems, a ‘global knowledge hub on civil registration and vital statistic (CRVS) systems[footnote 11], published a report entitled ‘Documenting Life and Death: Women’s experiences during conflict in Syria and Iraq’ which stated that ‘All personal data which is entered into the population registry is collected in a large family registry at the local population registration offices near the family’s place of residence. Iraqis can obtain a copy of their entry in the family registry.’[footnote 12] - - - -6.3 Importance of identity documents - - - -6.3.1 The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (now called the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)) published a report entitled ‘Iraq – Key socio-economic indicators for Baghdad, Basrah and Sulaymaniyah’ in November 2021, citing various sources. The report stated that proper civil documentation is: - - - -‘… [R]equired to access the rights stipulated by the law, e.g., healthcare, education, and freedom of movement within the country, the state justice system, and social welfare. In addition, possession of a legal identity enables access to humanitarian assistance for displaced persons… [They are] used in all contact with public authorities. It is necessary to access health services, social welfare services, schools and for buying and selling a home and a car. In addition, it must be presented when applying for other official documents, such as passports. Stateless persons who were not able to register for ID cards were reported to be unable to register marriages and to gain access to some government services without ID cards.’[footnote 13] - - - -6.4 Ability of women to obtain identity documents - - - -6.4.1 In March 2023, The Danish Immigration Service (DIS) published a report entitled ‘Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) – Issues regarding single women, documents and illegal exit’ which stated: - - - -‘If a single woman is under the age of 18, she will need her father’s approval and presence when applying for different types of official documents, especially when applying for a passport. If the minor’s mother is the guardian of the child, the father’s approval is still needed in order to get at least a passport. - - - -‘… A single, unmarried woman who does not live with her family cannot in any way obtain a Housing Card for herself. - - - -‘… A single woman who is not the head of a household and thus does not have a Housing Card on her own will face difficulties in obtaining official documents if she is in conflict with her family.’ [footnote 14] - - - -6.4.2 The Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) report ‘Life in the Margins: Re- examining the needs of paperless people in post-conflict Iraq’ published in September 2022 stated ‘In some cases, women who do attempt the process to (re)issue their documentation have reported instances of harassment and exploitation – including sexual harassment and exploitation - in accessing related offices and in associated travel.[footnote 15] - - - -6.5 Ability of children to obtain identity documents - - - -6.5.1 Simaet Bhatha, a digital communication and information platform launched under the Signpost project in Iraq[footnote 16], published an article entitled ‘The Importance of Civil Documentation for Children in Iraq’ in April 2023 which detailed the importance for children to have a national ID card to access healthcare and enrol in school. It is a requirement that all Iraqi citizens have civil documentation, including children[footnote 17]. - - - -6.5.2 CPIT has not been able to find information on the process of taking biometric data for children and babies or whether the 10 year issuance period of INIDs still applies in the sources consulted (see Bibliography). - - - -6.5.3 Norweigan Refugee Council report ‘Barriers from birth: Undocumented - - - -children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins’ from April 2019 said: - - - -‘…About 45,000 children displaced in camps today do not have Iraqi-state issued birth certificates or other civil documents proving their legal identity. This is depriving them of their most basic rights as Iraqi citizens. - - - -The majority of children in Iraq impacted by civil documentation challenges that have arisen in the aftermath of IS are currently under five years old, born during the period the group was in control.[and have not been issued with Birth certificated due to ISIS control of their territory, being a child born of rape or their parents not having an official marriage certificate] - - - -Registering children in Iraqi schools requires several types of civil documents, including the ID of the student, as well as the IDs of both of his or her parents. Sitting exams or obtaining graduation certificates is often not allowed without a civil ID. In the case of a deceased or missing father, an official death certificate must be provided to the school administration proving the circumstances of the death. Families who do not possess these documents today almost immediately raise questions or suspicions of association with IS group, stigmatising them within their own community.[footnote 18] - - - -6.6 Forged identity documents - - - -6.6.1 In February 2016, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRBC) published a paper on fraudulent passports which stated: - - - -‘The IOM [International Organisation of Migration] Director in Baghdad…stated that identification documents have “some security features,” but that “they do not seem to be very effective,” adding that passport features “can be fairly easy to reproduce” - - - -‘The IOM Director in Baghdad similarly said that ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] is a huge player on the black market; they can now create passports and [they have] also stole [sic] thousands of original … Iraqi passports. But it is impossible to say how far they have hit the market, what is the prevalence of passports or other fake documents they produce compared to those introduced by other criminals on the black market. We have no statistics on ISIS and the false documents they produce. (IOM 25 Jan. 2016)[footnote 19] - - - -6.6.2 On 16 January 2023 the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) published a country information report on Iraq which stated: - - - -‘Fraudulent documents are cheap and commonly available. Genuine documents obtained through fraudulent means are also common, mostly obtained by paying bribes to officials. Documents issued under religious procedures such as marriage, divorce and custody certificates have weak or no security features. The forms of documentation superseded by the National Identity (ID) Card [INID] have weaker security features than the biometric ID cards and may have been issued according to antiquated or unreliable procedures.[footnote 20] - - - -6.6.3 The DIS March 2023 report stated that: - - - -‘According to three sources consulted for this report, forgery of documents in KRI is very limited. - - - -‘…Women’s Legal Assistance Organization (WOLA) had previously heard of cases of people in KRI getting documents with manipulated information regarding name, date, place of birth and place of issuance. However, the source had not heard of such cases in KRI in recent years. The consulted lawyer, Bilbas, had not seen cases of manipulated official documents obtained by means of bribe in the seven years he had been working on legal issues in KRI.[footnote 21] - - - -6.7 Iraqi National Identity Card (INID) - - - -6.7.1 The Iraqi National Identity Card (INID) is also known as the Unified National Card or, Unified Card or Unified National Card in several sources. - - - -6.7.2 The EASO report, citing various sources, published in November 2021 stated: - - - -‘In September 2015, the issuance of new electronic and biometric unified national cards (also called new national card, new ID card, al-bitaqa al- wataniya al-muwahhada, al-bitaqa al-wataniya al-jadida) started in Iraq. The unified national card is supposed to replace the civil status ID and make the nationality certificate and ultimately the residency card obsolete, so that Iraqis will eventually have only one official ID document. - - - -‘… According to a diplomatic source in Amman interviewed by Landinfo…[the INID is] issued at the local offices of the Directorate of National Card Affairs, situated all over the country and were referred to as Civil Affairs Directorate (CAD) offices [Note: CPIT and the Home Office refer to these as Civil Status Affairs’ offices]. This directorate is part of the Directorate of Civil Status, Passports and Residencies of the General Directorate of Nationality which belongs to the Ministry of Interior. The offices can be found in most cities and in the provincial capitals. Both types of ID cards [INIDs and CSIDs] could only be issued in the district where the family was registered…. - - - -‘…Individuals applying for the unified national card had to book an appointment with the local office via the website of the Directorate of National Card Affairs and download an application form, which had to be completed and taken to the appointment. In addition, they had to submit their civil status ID and their nationality certificate. The website of the Directorate of National Card Affairs also requested applicants to submit their residency card with the application and it stated that the original documents needed to be presented. - - - -‘… It is mandatory for applicants to appear in person to submit their application, because a photo, an iris scan and fingerprints will be taken. Subsequently, the application is sent to a central office in Baghdad together with the biometrics, where the information is checked. It costs 5,000 Iraqi dinars (IQD) (£2.92 GBP[footnote 22]) to get the unified national card issued, both at the first issuance and upon renewal after the expiration of the validity period. - - - -Should the card be damaged or get lost, the issuance of a new card costs 10,000 IQD (£5.83 GBP[footnote 23]) and 25,000 IQD (£14.58 GBP[footnote 24]), respectively. In accordance with the Act on National ID Cards of 2016 a new unified national card has to be issued in the event of loss or damage to the card. All newborns will be given the unified national card provided that they are registered in an area where the population registration office has the necessary equipment. - - - -‘… With a few deviations, the aforementioned procedure applies for the KRI [Kurdistan Region of Iraq]. According to Abdulrahman Ismael Azaz, Director of the Directorate of Nationality and Civil Status in Erbil, which belongs to the Ministry of the Interior of the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government], interviewed in 2018 by Landinfo and DIS [Danish Immigration Service], in Erbil, people did not need to make an appointment via the website, because many people did not have internet access. Applicants needed to present their civil status ID, their nationality certificate and their residency card with the application. The documents handed in were first checked at the Directorate of Nationality and Civil Status and only after the document check was finished, they were sent to the main servers in Baghdad, where the personal identification number was produced. According to Director Azaz, the applicants’ fingerprints of all ten fingers had to be taken as well. - - - -‘…The card was valid for ten years but, when the civil status changed, e.g., through marriage or divorce, a renewal was required by submitting a new application for the issuance of a new unified national card.[footnote 25] - - - -6.7.3 In July 2021, Simaet Bhatha published an article entitled ‘Iraqi Official Identification Documents: What are they and how do I get them?’ which stated: ‘The national card is accepted by governmental and non- governmental agencies to prove the identity of its owner and identifying their Iraqi nationality. It is an alternative to the Iraqi Nationality Certificate, civil status card and the Residence Card. The Unified National Card Law was enacted in order to unify the Iraqi nationality certificate, the ID card, and the Residence Card form in one document, within a one integrated network of civil information.[footnote 26] - - - -6.7.4 In February 2023 Simaet Bhatha noted that ‘The unified card is valid for 10 years from the date of its issuance and must be renewed after that’.[footnote 27] - - - -6.7.5 The DFAT report published in January 2023 stated: - - - -‘The Iraqi National ID card is an electronic biometric card issued by the Ministry of Interior, which holders are required to carry at all times. The National ID card is a credit card-sized plastic card with an embedded radio frequency identification (RFID) chip. It is covered with multi-coloured guillochés (an ornamental pattern formed of two or more curved bands that interlace to repeat a circular design). All information on the card is in Arabic and Kurdish. The front side of the card shows the coat of arms of Iraq and the words “Republic of Iraq”, “Ministry of Interior” and “General Directorate of Nationality”. It also contains the photograph of the holder, the holder’s 12- digit national identification number, the 9-alphanumeric digit access number for the RFID chip, the holder’s given name, father’s, mother’s and paternal grandfather’s names, tribe and the holder’s sex and blood type. The rear side contains the issuing authority, dates of issue and expiry, date and place of birth (city or town), 18-alphanumeric digit family number, and machine- readable zone. - - - -‘The process to obtain a new electronic ID card involves first making an appointment with the local civil status office via the website of the directorate for national ID cards. The applicant can download an application form from the same website and must complete it before meeting the local civil status office. The applicant must bring their current ID card, proof of citizenship, proof of residence, ration card, and the IQD 5,000 (approximately AUD 6) (£2.92 GBP[footnote 28]) fee. The civil status office will retain these documents, which will be invalidated when the new card is issued. All applicants must attend the office in person for the photo, iris scan and fingerprint registration. The local civil status office sends the application form and biometric data to the central office in Baghdad where the information is checked and the card personalised before being returned to the local civil status office.[footnote 29] - - - -6.7.6 eRegulations Baghdad, a website which provides step-by-step guides on administrative procedures in Baghdad[footnote 30], published the following image of the front and rear of an INID card: - - - - -Image of front and rear of an INID card - - - -[footnote 31] - - - -6.7.7 The DIS March 2023 report on women in the KRI, stated,‘According to a consulted lawyer, Bilbas, around 85-90% of all people in KRI have obtained the new National ID Card… while the national ID-cards in KRI are issued locally, all data in these cards come from central databases in Baghdad.[footnote 32] - - - -6.7.8 CPIT was unable to ascertain INID uptake figures for areas of Iraq outside of the KRI in the sources consulted (see Bibliography). - - - -6.7.9 On 19 January 2023, the Iraqi Embassy in London confirmed that the process for renewing an INID can be commenced from the UK but would need to be retrieved by a person acting as power of attorney, who would then send the INID to the UK or meet the returnee on arrival with the renewed INID (see Annex D). The correspondence received from the Iraqi Embassy stated: - - - -a) The Iraqi citizen shall report the loss to the local police and an official notification report shall be issued, and submit it to the Iraqi Consulate to be certified by the Consul. - - - -b) The Iraqi Consul organizes an official lost report that includes the citizen’s signature and fingerprint. - - - -c) A written undertaking shall be made by the Iraqi citizen that he did not give up the Iraqi nationality. - - - -d) The application has to be sent to MOFA (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). - - - -e) A power of attorney shall be made for someone to follow up with competent authority to issue a new INID.[footnote 33] - - - -6.7.10 CPIT was unable to ascertain if scanned copies of the lost INID are required in order to replace it in the sources consulted (see Bibliography). It should also be noted the process to assign power of attorney from the UK requires the person to attend the Iraqi Embassy and show some other form of ID (see Issuing identity documents by proxy). - - - -6.8 Civil Status Identity Card (CSID) - - - -6.8.1 In February 2019 EASO published a report, citing various sources, entitled ‘Iraq: Internal mobility’ which stated that the CSID is called ‘bitaqat hawwiyat al-ahwal al-shakhsiya[footnote 34] in Arabic. The same source additionally stated that CSIDs are: - - - -‘… [I]ssued in the district where a person is registered and on the basis of information in the person’s family register. Family registers (also known as family book, or family census or sijilla al-qayd or sijil al ahwal al-shakhsiyya) are kept manually and created locally in approximately 300 civil status registration offices across Iraq and information is updated with birth, death, marriages, and changes to civil status. Landinfo stated that “the family register forms the basis for the issuing of national ID cards and nationality certificates, which in turn form the basis for the issuing of passports”.[footnote 35] - - - -6.8.2 The Landinfo report published in December 2015 stated that a CSID must include the following data: - - - -- - - -Personal name - - -- - - -Name of father and paternal grandfather - - -- - - -Surname - - -- - - -Name of mother and maternal grandfather - - -- - - -Gender - - -- - - -Signature of authorised representative - - -- - - -Date of issue - - -- - - -Signature of issuer - - -- - - -Full name of issuer - - -- - - -Date of birth in digits and letters - - -- - - -Place of birth - - -- - - -Marital status - - -- - - -Name of spouse - - -- - - -Religious affiliation - - - - - -‘The right-hand side of the card’s front page contains the name of the issuing regional office, a register number indicating the number of the family book in which the person is registered, as well as the page number in the family book. The serial number is entered on the top left-hand side. The font of the serial number is serif, and the figures increase in size. These digits and the signature of the issuer give an indication of the authenticity of the card.’[footnote 36] - - - -6.8.3 The July 2021 article by Simaet Bhatha published the following image of a CSID[footnote 37]: - - - - -Image of a CSID - - - -6.8.4 According to the British Embassy in Baghdad (Annex E) and the Iraqi Embassy in London (Annex F), CSIDs are no longer being issued in Iraq due to the rollout of the new INID system. - - - -6.8.5 The ICIBI report June 2023, quoting Dr Rebwar Fateh, stated: - - - -‘In September 2022, the Director General of Citizenship in Erbil informed me that the issuing of CSIDs in the IKR has stopped. However, the document remains valid for all legal and administrative purposes while individuals are waiting to receive their INID. Moreover, an individual working for the Iraqi Independent Election Commission confirmed that no CSA office is [sic] Iraq is issuing the CSID or INC. They are all now issuing the INID. However, the long waiting time, due to the shortage of cards, means that the INC and CSID continue to be valid.[footnote 38] - - - -6.9 Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) - - - -6.9.1 In November 2021 EASO stated: - - - -‘A nationality certificate is issued to all Iraqi nationals upon application. Children normally obtain them around the age of 12. In practice, both the ID card and nationality certificate were required to obtain certain services such as health services or education access. - - - -‘Referring to information obtained in 2013 from IOM [International Organization for Migration], the Canadian immigration authorities reported that Iraqis living in Iraq needed to present a nationality certificate from the father or a brother, their own ID card, their own or their father’s residency card, their own or their father’s PDS [Public Distribution System] card and four passport photos against a white background in order to be issued a nationality certificate.[footnote 39] - - - -6.9.2 The July 2021 article published by Simaet Bhatha stated: - - - -‘The Iraqi Nationality Certificate is a document proving the nationality of the Iraqi citizen and is considered as a formal document in governmental and non-governmental institutions. It is granted under the Iraqi Nationality Law (No. 26 of 2006) by the Travel and Nationality Directorates of the Ministry of Interior. - - - -‘Requirements to obtain it: - - - -- - - -Visit the Nationality Department in person (it is not acceptable for agency or representation to visit the nationality departments, and this includes even newborns). - - -- - - -Complete application form to obtain the Iraqi Nationality Certificate. - - -- - - -Attach the supporting documents: - - - - - -- - - -Father’s Nationality Certificate (in the event that the father’s nationality certificate is not present or damaged, the person must bring the Nationality Certificate of the brother, mother, grandfather or uncle) - - -- - - -Residence card - - -- - - -Two recent photos of the citizen[footnote 40] - - - - - -6.9.3 The Simaet Bhatha article also included the following image of an INC[footnote 41]: - - - - -Image of an INC - - - -6.9.4 The same source further outlined the Nationality Departments in Baghdad and the procedures for those in Iraq without identification: - - - -‘Nationality Departments in Baghdad: - - - -- - - -Iraqi Nationality Certificate Department/Baghdad/Rusafa/General Department - Karada, near the shrine of Sayed Idris - - -- - - -Iraqi Nationality Certificate Department/Baghdad/Rusafa/Al-Waziriya Al-Maghrib Street - - -- - - -Iraqi Nationality Certificate Department/Baghdad/Rusafa/Sadr City - - -- - - -Iraqi Nationality Certificate Department/Baghdad/Al-Karkh/Al-Mansour - - -- - - -Iraqi Nationality Certificate Department/Baghdad/Al-Karkh/Mahmoudiya - - - - - -‘As for the governorates, the relevant department is the nationality certificate department in the governorate itself, and the above departments are visited according to the beneficiary’s residence card [i.e. residents of the above areas of Baghdad can use these Nationality Departments]. - - - -‘There are special cases that require a person to travel between governorates, such as those of some returnees whose Iraqi nationality has been revoked, or people who do not have identification papers proving their Iraqi identity, which require travel to Baghdad to obtain the required identification papers from the General Directorate in Baghdad and located on Rasheed Street. Iraqi nationality is granted to a child born to an Iraqi mother just as it is granted to a child born to an Iraqi father, according to (Article Three of the Nationality Law No. 26 of 2006).[footnote 42] - - - -6.10 Passport - - - -6.10.1 Landinfo’s 2015 report on travel documents, citing various sources, stated: ‘In order to be issued a passport, the applicant must, in addition to the - - - -completed application form, present the following documents: - - - -- - - -A national ID Card (Bitaka Shakhsiyeh/Jinsiya/Hawiya). - - -- - - -An Iraqi nationality certificate (Shahadet Jinsiyaa). - - -- - - -A certificate of residence (Bitaka Sakan/Zanyari). This applies to applicants living in Iraq. Applicants who live outside Iraq must enclose their residence permit from the country they live in. Only heads of households must present a certificate of residence (GDN [General Directorate for Nationality], meeting in Baghdad April 2012). According to the Director-General of GDN, it is not strictly necessary to present this card, but it will be required if there is any doubt about the place of residence. - - -- - - -Two colour passport photos (three for persons applying from abroad) against a white background. In addition, 25,000 Iraqi dinars (or an amount equivalent to USD 20 (approximately £14.58 GBP[footnote 43]) must be included, and fingerprints must be given upon submission and collection.[footnote 44] - - - - - -6.10.2 The July 2021 article published by Simaet Bhatha stated: - - - -‘The Iraqi passport is an official document issued by the government to verify the identity and nationality of an individual for the purpose of traveling across international borders. It provides information about the holder, including name, place and date of birth, photograph, signature, and other relevant identifying information. - - - -‘How to get an Iraqi Passport: - - - -1. Pay the application legal fees (25,000 Iraqi dinars) (approximately £14.58 GBP[footnote 45]) and obtain a certified receipt from any bank approved by the Central Bank of Iraq. (Note: approximate total fees with banks fees and photocopies could reach 50,000-55,000 IQD) - - - -2. Visit the Passport Department in your governorate and fill out the application form for obtaining a new passport. - - - -3. Attach the support documents to the application including: - - - -a) The original documents (not to be submitted but have to be available through the whole procedure) and colour copies to be submitted of: Civil Status ID or the Unified National Card, Iraqi Nationality Certificate, Residence Card and Ration Card. - - - -b) Passport size photos (with white background) - - - -c) Passport fee receipt - - - -4. The Passport Department staff should then take your fingerprints (biometric information). - - - -5. Obtain a date for receiving the passport.[footnote 46] - - - -6.10.3 The DFAT report published in January 2023 stated: - - - -‘The Ministry of Interior’s Passports Directorate issues “A” series passports to ordinary passport holders; “D” passports to diplomat