CPIN
Syria: country policy and information notes
gov.uk change note: Added a new country policy and information note on criticism of the government.
Headline
The Home Office has published its first Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) on Syria for criticism of the government, assessing that critics are generally unlikely to face persecution under the new HTS-led administration.
Changes in detail
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New assessment category — No previous assessment → New CPIN covering criticism of government. This is an entirely new document addressing how Syrian government critics are treated under the Ahmad Al-Sharaa administration that took power in December 2024.
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General risk assessment — No previous position → "In general, individuals who criticise or oppose the government, and individuals who criticised or opposed HTS before the fall of the Al-Assad regime, are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise."
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Media freedom assessment — No previous position → Mixed assessment stating that "press freedom has increased significantly since the fall of the Al-Assad regime" but noting "some journalists have faced administrative and bureaucratic obstacles" and "uncertainty has led journalists to exercise caution and practice self-censorship."
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Arrest patterns — No previous position → "There have been cases of the authorities arresting and detaining journalists and activists who posted critical content on social media. However, they were generally released soon afterwards. The arrests occurred on a selective and inconsistent basis, and available information does not indicate that the government is pursuing a systematic policy of targeting and detaining critics."
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Protection and internal relocation — No previous position → "Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they are unlikely to be able to obtain protection. They are also unlikely to be able to internally relocate to escape the risk they face."
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Certification guidance — No previous position → "Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002."
Implications for practitioners
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Strengthened claims: The CPIN's assessment that most critics face no systematic persecution risk may weaken asylum claims from Syrian journalists, activists, and opposition figures who criticise the current government, as the Home Office now has guidance supporting the position that such individuals generally do not face persecution.
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Burden of proof: The explicit statement that "the onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise" places a higher evidential burden on applicants to show they face individual risk beyond the general assessment.
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Protection claims undermined: The assessment that state protection is unavailable and internal relocation impossible may actually support Article 3 ECHR or humanitarian protection arguments for those who can demonstrate individual risk.
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Sensitive topics exception: The CPIN notes that "a significant number of reported arrests resulted from social media posts about sensitive topics, particularly the government's treatment of religious and ethnic minorities" - this may support claims from critics who commented on sectarian issues.
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Minority critics: The assessment suggests "critics belonging to religious and ethnic minorities may be at greater risk than those from a Sunni Arab background" - this provides potential support for protection claims from non-Sunni critics.
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No clear unfounded certification: The guidance that refused claims are unlikely to be certifiable as clearly unfounded may assist with procedural protections and appeal timeframes.
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Country evidence sources: Practitioners should obtain sources cited including reports from SNHR, EUAA, Danish Immigration Service, and monitoring by ACLED for demonstrations data.
Diff
@@ -1,5 +1,49600 @@ -Country policy and information notes (previously known as country information and guidance reports) are used by UK Visas and Immigration officials to make decisions in asylum and human rights applications. - - - -The notes also give information on asylum seekers’ countries of origin. +Version 1.0, April 2026 + + + + +## Executive summary + + + +In November–December 2024, an Islamist rebel group called Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, led by Ahmad Al-Sharaa, launched a military offensive which culminated in the toppling of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. Since the fall of Al-Assad, Al-Sharaa has been the leader of Syria, and figures affiliated with HTS have been appointed to key positions of power in his government. + + + +Under this new government, space for freedom of expression, including criticism of the authorities, has expanded significantly, but there are limits. These limits are not clearly defined, and Syrians remain unsure of the government’s red lines when it comes to sensitive issues such as sectarian tensions and human rights violations against religious and ethnic minorities. + + + +At the time of writing, no organised political opposition groups have emerged in government-controlled areas. There is also no legal basis for the formation of political parties, although the government intends to pass a law to change this. + + + +In general, individuals who criticise or oppose the government, and individuals who criticised or opposed HTS before the fall of the Al-Assad regime, are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise. + + + +There have been cases of the authorities arresting and detaining journalists and activists who posted critical content on social media. However, they were generally released soon afterwards. The arrests occurred on a selective and inconsistent basis, and available information does not indicate that the government is pursuing a systematic policy of targeting and detaining critics. + + + +Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they are unlikely to be able to obtain protection. They are also unlikely to be able to internally relocate to escape the risk they face. + + + +Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. + + + +All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm. + + + +## Assessment + + + +Section updated: 16 March 2026 + + + +## About the assessment + + + +This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general: + + + +- a person faces a real risk of persecution/serious harm from the state because they criticise the government + +- the state (or quasi state bodies) can provide effective protection + +- internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm + +- a claim, if refused, is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. + + + + +Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts. + + + +This CPIN has been developed with assistance from Artificial Intelligence (AI). Where AI has been used, it has been reviewed by a human editor. + + + +## 1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals + + + +## 1.1 Credibility + + + +1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants). + + + +1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when one has not already been undertaken (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)). + + + +1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis). + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section + + + + +1.1.5 The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. + + + +1.1.6 The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section + + + + +## 1.2 Exclusion + + + +1.2.1 Under the Al-Assad regime, human rights violations were systematic and widespread. Civilians also suffered human rights abuses at the hands of other actors during the civil war. + + + +1.2.2 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons to apply one (or more) of the exclusion clauses. Each case must be considered on its individual facts. + + + +1.2.3 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status). + + + +1.2.4 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section + + + + +The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section + + + + +## 2. Convention reason(s) + + + +2.1.1 Actual or imputed political opinion. + + + +2.1.2 Establishing a convention reason is not sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of an actual or imputed Refugee Convention reason. + + + +2.1.3 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +## 3. Risk + + + +3.1.1 In general, a person who criticises or opposes the government is unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise. This includes journalists, activists, and protesters who publicly express critical views of the government and the security forces. It also includes those who criticised or opposed HTS before the fall of the Al-Assad regime. + + + +3.1.2 In December 2024, an Islamist group called Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) led a rebel offensive that resulted in the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. HTS leader Ahmad Al-Sharaa became President of Syria in January 2025, and other figures affiliated with HTS were appointed to key positions of power in the new government (for more information on events leading to the fall of Al-Assad, see the CPIN Syria: Returnees after fall of Al-Assad regime). + + + +3.1.3 In March 2025, the new government published a Constitutional Declaration which guarantees freedom of expression and a free press. However, it also includes a provision that these freedoms can be restricted for reasons of ‘national security, territorial integrity, public safety, the protection of public order and the prevention of crime, or the protection of public health or morals’. While comparable limitations exist in many democracies, including the UK, human rights organisations have raised concerns about the vagueness of this part of the Constitutional Declaration, the absence of clearly defined limits on freedom of expression, and the lack of robust judicial oversight. Another limitation on free speech is a clause in the constitution that criminalises ‘denying, praising, justifying or downplaying’ the Al-Assad regime’s crimes. In addition to the constitution, the government says it has suspended previous Assad-era laws that restricted media freedom (see Legal context). + + + +3.1.4 The interim constitution establishes a highly centralised presidential system, with no prime minister and limited institutional oversight. The president appoints all ministers, has a major role in the selection of members of parliament, can propose laws directly, and can declare a state of emergency for up to three months, among other things. Power is concentrated in the president and a small circle of key ministers, all of whom are associated with HTS (see Political system and Affiliation of key figures in government). + + + +3.1.5 As of March 2026, there are no officially registered political parties in Syria because there is still no law governing political parties. The interim constitution guarantees the right to form political parties, with the limitation that they must be formed on a national basis and not on a regional, ethnic or sectarian basis. It is unclear when the political parties law will come into force (see Political parties). + + + +3.1.6 CPIT was unable to find information about any organised opposition groups seeking to challenge or replace Al-Sharaa’s government. During violence in Suweida in July 2025 (see the CPIN Syria: Religious minorities for further information), activists launched the Syrian Centenary Initiative (SCI), which one source described as an emerging opposition to Al-Sharaa’s rule. However, available information suggests that the SCI does not aim to replace the government but rather to push it to adopt a more inclusive and democratic approach. CPIT was unable to find any information about the SCI’s activity since July 2025 (see Political opposition). + + + +3.1.7 After the fall of the Al-Assad regime, the space for freedom of expression increased dramatically. Political discussions took place openly, civil society organisations (CSOs) held meetings freely, journalists were able to travel around the country and report without restrictions, and there was space to criticise the new government. However, sources indicate that this openness, which characterised the first few weeks after the fall of the regime, subsequently decreased. While the government does tolerate some criticism, sources describe a high level of uncertainty around the red lines for free speech, particularly concerning religious and political topics (see also 3.1.10 and 3.1.13). The lack of clear boundaries regarding freedom of expression has led people to exercise caution and self-censorship (see Comparison with Al-Assad regime and Limits on free speech). + + + +3.1.8 CSOs and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have significantly more freedom to operate than they did under the Al-Assad regime. Amnesty International described the ‘blossoming of civic space’ as one of the greatest achievements of the new Syria. However, CSOs still face challenges and restrictions. For example, anyone wishing to hold a public event must obtain permission from the authorities, and CSOs report that the criteria for approval are unclear, leading to seemingly arbitrary decisions on which events can and cannot go ahead. In addition, a law that allowed the Al-Assad regime to exercise tight control over CSOs remains in place. The government has said that it plans to repeal the law but has instructed CSOs to adhere to it for the time being. Sources indicate that CSOs working on political and human rights issues face greater challenges and restrictions than non-political CSOs (see Civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Demonstrations and public events, and Other relevant laws). + + + +3.1.9 Sources describe a newfound artistic freedom, with artists able to create freely in a way that would have been unthinkable under the Al-Assad regime. Sources mentioned one example of overtly political art: the Malas Brothers, who write and perform satirical plays. While they have generally been able to perform freely, the government suspended one of their shows after they posted on social media criticising the security forces’ attacks on Alawites and Druze. The Ministry of Culture claimed the suspension was down to a misunderstanding, but brothers insist they were censored. The authorities have reportedly removed content contradicting Islamic principles from translations of foreign books about philosophy and politics (see Arts and culture). + + + +3.1.10 Press freedom has increased significantly since the fall of the Al-Assad regime, with journalists able to travel and report with far fewer restrictions. However, some journalists have faced administrative and bureaucratic obstacles such as difficulties obtaining reporting permits. Sources provide differing assessments of the government’s level of tolerance for critical media coverage. Some indicate that journalists are generally free to criticise the government, while others state that there is some space for criticism but that the limits remain unclear. This uncertainty has led journalists to exercise caution and practice self-censorship to a certain extent (see Overview of press freedom and Media regulations and restrictions on reporting). + + + +3.1.11 The government reportedly gives preferential treatment to supportive media outlets, for example by granting them better access to government information or interviews with government figures. According to available information, the authorities do not directly tell journalists not to publish certain things, but they have imposed indirect restrictions such as denying access to certain areas. In particular, in the aftermath of the March 2025 violence against Alawites (see the CPIN Syria: Alawites and actual or perceived Assadists), many journalists who wanted to enter affected areas were not granted permits. Security forces arrested some journalists who reported from those areas without permits and forced them to delete their footage (see Overview of press freedom and Media regulations and restrictions on reporting). + + + +3.1.12 There is very little information available about the government’s treatment of political opposition groups. The lack of information is likely due to the fact that there are no organised opposition groups or political parties in government-controlled areas (see paragraph 3.1.5). The government dismissed the demands of the Syrian Centenary Initiative, which some sources describe as a form of political opposition, and reportedly launched smear campaigns against its members. CSOs indicate that political activities and events are subject to greater restrictions than civic ones. For example, a CSO reported that it did not obtain approval to hold a conference in Homs on political participation. It remains unclear how the government would respond to an organised political opposition posing a genuine threat to its rule because this kind of opposition does not exist at the time of writing (see Political opponents). + + + +3.1.13 The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project’s (ACLED) database indicates that hundreds of ‘protest events’ (defined as public demonstrations involving three or more participants) have taken place in government-controlled areas of Syria since the fall of the Al-Assad regime. Some of these protests involved criticism of the authorities, particularly regarding issues such as the cost of living, salaries, pensions and public sector redundancies. There are a small number of reports of security forces intervening in protests, as described in the following paragraph (see Demonstrations and public events). + + + +3.1.14 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that government forces used violence against peaceful protesters on several occasions. However, no major international media outlet or human rights organisation confirmed these reports. The most severe incident reported by SOHR was in December 2025, when it stated that government forces violently assaulted and arrested Alawite protesters in coastal areas. The government, meanwhile, said it arrested supporters of the Al-Assad regime who had targeted its forces or who were planning criminal acts. CPIT was unable to confirm either version of events. In December 2024, security forces arrested 9 women at a demonstration against the detention of men accused of belonging to Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir (see paragraph 3.1.19 for further information on the treatment of Hizb ub-Tahrir members). One of the arrested women, who was pregnant at the time, said she was released 13 days later (see Protesters). + + + +3.1.15 Sources reported several cases of arrest, detention and harassment of journalists and activists who criticised the government on social media. There have also been cases of security forces detaining relatives of individuals who had been summoned for criticising the government on social media in order to pressure them to hand themselves in. The authorities appear to monitor online activity to some extent, but available information does not indicate a systematic government policy of surveillance aimed at suppressing criticism. Incidents of arrest and detention have generally been inconsistent and selective. However, a significant number of reported arrests resulted from social media posts about sensitive topics, particularly the government’s treatment of religious and ethnic minorities, which suggests that individuals who comment on these topics are at greater risk of arrest. In addition, some sources indicate that critics belonging to religious and ethnic minorities may be at greater risk than those from a Sunni Arab background (see Journalists and activists, Limits on free speech and Critics belonging to religious and ethnic minorities). + + + +3.1.16 The authorities generally released detained journalists and activists after holding them for brief periods, usually lasting between several hours and several days. In some cases, their release came after public outcry or media campaigns forced senior officials to intervene. In a small number of cases, activists were held for weeks without access to a lawyer. There is one reported case of severe mistreatment during detention, involving the allegation that undisciplined security personnel tortured a detained activist and threatened to kill him if he spoke out about the treatment he received (see Journalists and activists). + + + +3.1.17 Sources indicate that journalists and activists critical of the government may face online harassment from pro-government social media users. Similarly, SOHR claimed it was the victim of a government-orchestrated smear campaign, but CPIT was unable to confirm this (see Journalists and activists). + + + +3.1.18 There is very little information available about the government’s treatment of or attitude towards critics and opponents outside Syria. Several sources indicated that the government monitors social media posts published by individuals both inside and outside Syria but provided no further details. According to other sources, however, the government does not have the capacity to systematically monitor social media (see Critics in other countries/sur place activities). + + + +3.1.19 Sources indicate that HTS cracked down heavily on critics and activists in its territory in Idlib before the fall of the Al-Assad regime, but there is very little information available about the new government’s treatment of or attitude towards such people. The only relevant information is that the government has not released members of Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir who were detained by HTS. These individuals have not been allowed to access a lawyer and have not been brought before a judge despite being detained for years. One source indicated that other opponents of HTS (i.e. other than Hizb ut-Tahrir members) also remain in detention but did not provide any examples. Considering the high level of international scrutiny towards Syria’s new government and the substantial increase in press freedom, it is reasonable to expect that systematic targeting of former opponents would be reported by media outlets or human rights organisations. CPIT was unable to find any such reporting (see Treatment of former opponents of HTS). + + + +3.1.20 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +## 4. Protection + + + +4.1.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they are unlikely to be able to obtain protection. + + + +4.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +## 5. Internal relocation + + + +5.1.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they are unlikely to be able to internally relocate to escape that risk. + + + +5.1.2 For further guidance on internal relocation and factors to consider, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +## 6. Certification + + + +6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. + + + +6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims). + + + +## Country information + + + +## About the country information + + + +This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment which, as stated in the About the assessment, is the guide to the current objective conditions. + + + +The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note. + + + +This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist. + + + +The COI included was published or made publicly available on or before 18 February 2026. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included. + + + +Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions. + + + +## 7. Legal context + + + +## 7.1 Constitutional and legal protections relating to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of information + + + +7.1.1 The new Syrian government suspended the previous constitution in January 2025[footnote 1] and published a document entitled ‘The Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic (referred to as the ‘Interim Constitution’ in some sources) in March 2025. The document stated: + + + +‘Article 13 – Expression, privacy, movement + + + +7.1.2 The State guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, information, publication and the press. … + + + +‘Article 14 – Political participation, assembly + + + +- The State shall protect the right to political participation and the formation of parties on national foundations according to a new law. + +- The state guarantees the work of associations and unions. … + + + + +‘Article 23 – Limitations + + + +‘The state shall protect the rights and freedoms set forth in this Chapter, and they shall be exercised in accordance with the law. Their exercise may be subject to limitations that constitute necessary measures for national security, territorial integrity, public safety, the protection of public order and the prevention of crime, or the protection of public health or morals.’[footnote 2] + + + +7.1.3 BBC Monitoring’s ‘Media Guide’ for Syria, updated in February 2026, stated: + + + +‘Freedom of opinion, expression and the press have been explicitly guaranteed by [Article 13 of] the constitutional declaration guiding the five-year transition period. + + + +‘But the declaration also forbids “denying, praising, justifying or downplaying [the Assad authorities’] crimes”. It says freedoms are not absolute and that the boundaries of permissible speech remain open to interpretation. + + + +‘In a September 2025 interview, President Sharaa said that while no authority can silence people, media regulations were needed to prevent sectarian incitement and to protect citizens. He added that such rules should be few and clear. + + + +‘Sharaa said it was the responsibility of the information ministry and parliament to establish media and political regulatory frameworks. + + + +‘Information Minister Hamza al-Mostafa said in July 2025 that many Assad-era laws restricting media freedom had been suspended, particularly provisions on “undermining the prestige of the state” or “weakening nationalism,” which had been used to charge dissidents. + + + +‘He said the ministry was drafting new legislation, beginning with a “detailed code of ethics”, in consultation with media professionals. The code will eventually become law. + + + +‘He said the authorities had adopted the concept of “responsible journalism” which holds that freedom must be balanced with the demands of the transitional period. “Responsible journalism” should prioritise the realities of the transition while supporting the government’s efforts.’[footnote 3] For further information on the code of ethics, which was published in February 2026, see Media regulations and restrictions on reporting. + + + +7.1.4 In July 2025, ETANA, an ‘independent organisation’ which ‘serves as a civil and diplomatic service for Syrians who want to live with freedom, dignity and justice’[footnote 4], published a report entitled ‘Study: Between Symbolism and Substance: Syria’s Transition at 6 Months’ (the July 2025 ETANA report). The report stated: + + + +‘Previous papers from ETANA in addition to reporting from Human Rights Watch have flagged problematic language in the interim constitution that conditions media freedoms on undefined principles of “morality” and “national unity.” Such provisions grant discretionary power to the executive, particularly in the absence of judicial independence or institutional safeguards. Without concrete legal instruments or oversight mechanisms to uphold press freedom, the protections outlined in Article 13 remain largely theoretical.’[footnote 5] + + + +7.1.5 In September 2025, Fadel Abdulghany, executive director of ‘independent human rights organization’[footnote 6] Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) published a paper ‘which presents a critical reading of the Syrian Constitutional Declaration’.[footnote 7] It stated: + + + +‘… [A]rticle [23] allows for broad restrictions to be imposed on fundamental rights and liberties on the basis of nebulous grounds, such as “national security, territorial integrity, public safety, the protection of public order and the prevention of crime, or the protection of public health or morals,” while neither clearly defining the criteria of necessity and proportionality nor establishing clear mechanisms for judicial review … Regarding rights and freedoms, Article 23 of the constitutional declaration in its current form lacks necessary safeguards, using vague terms such as “national security”, “public order”, and “public morals”, which allows for arbitrary interpretations that could be used to curtail fundamental freedoms.’[footnote 8] + + + +7.1.5 The same source also stated: + + + +‘… [T]he constitutional declaration contains no explicit reference to fundamental concepts and principles that one would expect in a document intended to guide democratic transition. Most notably, it does not mention popular sovereignty, a principle that formed the cornerstone of previous Syrian constitutions and is a key foundation of modern democratic theory … In addition, the word “democracy” is found nowhere in the declaration’s text, raising questions about the genuineness of the commitment to democratic principles. This linguistic omission is coupled with a clear disregard for many basic democratic rights, such as the right to assemble and demonstrate peacefully, the right to strike and form independent labour unions, the right to access government information, and the right to effective political participation through genuine elections. Absent these rights, a truly democratic system cannot exist. The declaration further ignores the need to establish participatory mechanisms that ensure real popular participation in drafting the country’s permanent constitution, whether civic education programmes, broad popular consultations, or public referendums.’[footnote 9] + + + +## 7.2 Other relevant laws + + + +7.2.1 In February 2026, German state-owned international broadcaster[footnote 10] Deutsche Welle (DW) published an article entitled ‘How an Assad-era law is threatening Syrian civil society’ (the February 2026 DW article) which stated: + + + +‘Bashar Assad may be gone from Syria, but one of the more damaging laws that existed throughout his family’s rule over the country lives on. + + + +‘Law No. 93 of 1958, or the law on associations and private institutions, was used for decades by the Assad regime … to control civil society organizations that might be critical of it, whether they were human rights monitors, charities or women’s rights groups. + + + +‘The law allowed the state to simply dissolve organizations for loosely defined reasons, such as disturbing “public order or morals” or deciding there was “no need” for their services, without any judicial oversight or any way to appeal. + + + +‘The law also gave the government control over an organization’s political participation, events it wanted to hold, its joining of international associations, its registration, board members and employees, and even its funding, especially money from abroad. + + + +‘The regime was ousted at the end of 2024. But – despite the new, interim Syrian government’s stated plan to repeal it – Law No. 93 is still in effect. Late last year, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor announced that for the time being, Syrian civil society organizations should adhere to it. + + + +‘There are thought to be over 2,000 different civil society organizations working in Syria today, and many have called for the law to be repealed and for new rules to be formulated. + + + +‘“Laws designed to control, restrict and securitize civil society do not become benign simply because the political leadership changes,” said Amna Guellali, research director at the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, or CIHRS, … “Their continued presence on the books creates a standing legal toolset that can be activated at any time.” + + + +‘The CIHRS reached out to the Syrian government recommending the law be repealed, but said they had no response. A query from DW asking when the law might be repealed also went unanswered.’[footnote 11] + + + +7.2.2 CPIT was unable to find any additional information to indicate that the government had repealed Law No. 93 at the time of writing (see Bibliography). + + + +## 8. Political context + + + +## 8.1 Political system + + + +8.1.1 In July 2025, the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) published a COI report on Syria (the July 2025 EUAA report) which stated, citing various sources: + + + +‘The Constitutional Declaration establishes a strong presidential system without a prime minister, granting the president sweeping powers with minimal oversight. The president appoints all ministers, vice presidents, and judges of the Higher Constitutional Court, and selects all members of parliament, one third by direct appointment and the rest selected by a “high committee” he forms. The president can also issue executive orders, propose laws, declare states of emergency for up to three months (with approval from a National Security Council he appoints), and serves as head of the armed forces. + + + +‘On 13 March [2025], several sources reported the establishment of a National Security Council tasked with overseeing Syria’s national security affairs and political policies. The council is chaired by President Ahmad al-Sharaa and includes the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Defence, and intelligence chief, along with three other seats. The council’s duties and operational mechanisms will be defined by directives issued directly by the president. + + + +‘… On 29 March [2025], the interim President announced the formation of a transitional government composed of 23 ministers from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, including Alawite, Christian, Druze, and Kurdish representatives. One woman was appointed to the post of Minister of Social Affairs and Labour. + + + +‘… The Constitutional Declaration asserts judicial independence but does not include specific safeguards to ensure it. Article 47 permits the president to appoint all seven members of the Higher Constitutional Court without parliamentary or external oversight. Human Rights Watch assessed that, in the absence of mechanisms to guarantee judicial independence or establish an independent body for overseeing judicial appointments, promotions, discipline, and removals, the judiciary’s ability to hold the president accountable may be constrained.’[footnote 12] + + + +8.1.2 In December 2025, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a US-based ‘bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges’[footnote 13], published an article entitled ‘Syria’s Promise and Challenges One Year After Assad’s Fall’ (the December 2025 CSIS article) which stated: + + + +‘… [P]ower in the new transition government is centered in the presidency and certain key ministries. A small circle at the top of government wields a huge amount of power. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has emerged as a key locus of power. MOFA has placed its representatives in every ministry as well as in governorates and districts across the country, prompting one observer’s concern that an embryonic successor to the Ba’ath party is forming. Although government officials speak of their plan to establish a more inclusive political system, civil society activists described the National Dialogue Conference held in February 2025 and parliamentary elections as a “farce.”’[footnote 14] + + + +## 8.2 Affiliation of key figures in government + + + +8.2.1 The July 2025 EUAA report stated, citing various sources: + + + +‘Prominent HTS [Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham] figures have been appointed to the positions of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defence (MoD) Ministry of Interior (MoI) and head of the General Intelligence Directorate. + + + +‘… The government is dominated by ministers associated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). It also includes technocrats, civil society leaders and ministers who served in the Assad government before 2011. None of the ministers from ethno-religious minorities are affiliated with any known political faction, prompting criticism that their inclusion is tokenistic and lacks genuine political representation. The Kurdish and Druze appointees in the government are not affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) nor represent the Druze spiritual leadership or Sweida’s armed factions.’[footnote 15] + + + +8.2.2 The December 2025 CSIS article stated: + + + +‘The rapid collapse of the Assad regime at the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) prompted the influx of HTS’s Idlib-based bureaucrats. Thousands of Idlibi local government workers descended on Damascus, taking up positions across various ministries. They have formed their own power center within the transition government. In this emerging system, power accrues to some without formal titles or portfolios, leading many to describe it as a “shadow government.” In some ministries, real authority resides with these “shadow” elements. For example, Syria’s economic restructuring is reportedly run by a secret committee made up of individuals operating under pseudonyms, rather than those with formal positions.’[footnote 16] + + + +## 8.3 Political parties + + + +8.3.1 In May 2025, Syrian non-profit media organisation[footnote 17] Enab Baladi published an article entitled ‘Syria awaits a political parties law’ which stated: + + + +‘The era of the Arab Socialist Baath Party ended after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024. On January 29 [2025], the General Command announced the dissolution of the ruling Baath Party in Syria under the previous regime, along with the parties of the National Progressive Front and related organizations, institutions, and committees, prohibiting their reformation under any other name and returning all their assets to the Syrian state. + + + +‘… [T]he constitution stipulates a provision ensuring the right to form parties on national bases, according to a new law [which had not come into effect at the time of writing]. + + + +‘The specific law governing the work of political parties cannot be issued without a legislative council, thus priority now lies in forming a temporary legislative council to issue laws. + + + +‘The constitutional declaration established one rule for parties: they must not be formed on regional, ethnic, or sectarian bases, but rather on a national basis. The special law for parties will take this principle into account. + + + +‘The law specific to parties will detail the procedures, mechanisms for submitting parties, licensing conditions, and internal regulations. The constitutional declaration only lays down a general principle, and the law will provide detailed regulations. + + + +‘… According to [journalist and political researcher Firas] Allawi, the new party law will annul all previous parties and require their re-licensing in accordance with what is issued by the legislative council.’[footnote 18] + + + +8.3.2 An Al Jazeera article published in October 2025 indicated that there was still no law on political parties, meaning that it was not possible for parties to register and operate.[footnote 19] + + + +8.3.3 According to the December 2025 CSIS article, ‘[t]he government has given no indication of when it will legalize political parties’.[footnote 20] + + + +8.3.4 Using the sources consulted, CPIT was unable to find information indicating that the law on political parties had been passed at the time of writing (see Bibliography). + + + +## 8.4 October 2025 parliamentary elections + + + +8.4.1 In October 2025, ‘independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank’[footnote 21] the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) published an article about the first parliamentary election of post-Assad Syria which stated: + + + +‘On Sunday, 5 October [2025], a new parliament was elected in the “new Syria” led for nearly a year by President Ahmed Al Sharaa, the first since the end of the Assad family’s long-standing rule, marking a historic moment for the country. However, not all Syrians of voting age were able to cast their ballots: only a restricted group, selected by the authorities in consultation with local communities, was allowed to take part. A hybrid, indirect voting system was used to elect the 210 members of the People’s Assembly. Of these, 140 seats were open to election, while the remaining 70 will be directly appointed by President Al Sharaa. + + + +‘In the end, 119 MP’s [sic] were elected, as voting could not be held in two regions – the area still partially controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the north-east and the mainly Druze region of Suwayda – due to security conditions. The electorate that chose the 119 members consisted of approximately 6,000 voters gathered in “electoral colleges,” whose names were reviewed by local electoral subcommittees and by the Higher Committe [sic] for the People’s Assembly Elections (the latter appointed by Al Sharaa). + + + +‘On Sunday [5 October 2025], members of the electoral colleges voted across 49 electoral districts in 11 governorates, selecting from more than 1,500 candidates – all of whom were themselves members of the colleges and had submitted their candidacies on 27-28 September [2025]. None of these candidates belonged to any political party, as parties were dissolved earlier this year, and are expected to be formed in the upcoming stage. Although each candidate presented an individual political platform, what mattered most were their ties to local communities, as well as “revolutionary” legitimacy. Thus, the new deputies have no formal political affiliation; only six are women, and very few represent the country’s ethnic and religious minorities. In theory, when appointing the remaining 70 deputies, Al Sharaa is expected to address these imbalances and include figures from underrepresented segments of the population. + + + +‘The new parliament will perform ordinary legislative duties, ratify international treaties, and approve the state’s general budget.’[footnote 22] + + + +8.4.2 According to an article published by pan-Arab news outlet[footnote 23] Asharq Al-Awsat, the remaining seats for the People’s Assembly had not yet been filled as of February 2026, and the People’s Assembly had not yet held its first session.[footnote 24] + + + +## 8.5 Political opposition + + + +8.5.1 In October 2025, the EUAA published a response to a COI query on Syria (the October 2025 EUAA COI response). Citing an August 2025 article published by The Economist, it stated: ‘In July 2025, during the violence in Sweida, activists launched the Syrian Centenary Initiative [also called Syrian Centennial Initiative in some sources[footnote 25]], seen as an emerging opposition to Sharaa’s government. It called for a ceasefire and revisions to the March Constitutional Declaration to allow political parties and strengthen civil society protections. The founders include former prisoners of the Assad era.’[footnote 26] + + + +8.5.2 An August 2025 article published by The Syrian Observer, an online news service that covers Syria[footnote 27], described the Syrian Centenary Initiative as ‘the first coordinated political resistance to his [Ahmad Al Sharaa’s] rule.’[footnote 28] + + + +8.5.3 In August 2025, Welat TV, a ‘multidimensional platform for Syrian and Kurdish issues’ based in Erbil, Iraq[footnote 29], published an article based on a TV interview with one of the organisers of the Syrian Centenary Initiative. The article stated: + + + +‘Journalist and media coordinator of the “Syrian Centennial” initiative, Hazem Dakel, affirmed that Syria is going through a deep crisis that requires a comprehensive national project and transparent institutions to manage the next phase. He emphasized that the initiative aims to be a unifying national voice that excludes no Syrians. + + + +‘In an interview with “Welat TV” on Tuesday, July 29, 2025, Dakel said, “The events in Suwayda have revealed the depth of the crisis Syrians are experiencing,” adding that “there is a state of shock and widespread anger inside Syria,” which requires a radical solution to the current situation. + + + +‘“People’s trust in the interim administration has declined due to its crisis management and unilateral decision-making,” Dakel said, adding that “governing alone has become a danger to the unity of the country,” which requires “a change in the political approach that is not limited to a change in faces and positions.” + + + +‘… “The Syrian Centennial initiative is an independent, participatory, Civil Initiative that emerged after the country is slipping into a dangerous situation,” he said, explaining that “the goals of the initiative are to halt the collapse, propose a national road map and open the door to negotiation between Syrians instead of drowning deeper in blood and division.” + + + +‘Dakel stated that “the initiative seeks understanding with the authorities, not confrontation or escalation,” noting that “the new administration needs reflection and a stand with Syrians to improve the situation.”’[footnote 30] + + + +8.5.4 Using the sources consulted (see Bibliography), CPIT was unable to find further information about political opposition groups in government-controlled areas. For information about the political situation of the de facto autonomous region in Suweida governorate, see the CPIN Syria: Religious minorities. + + + +## 9. Freedom of expression and civil liberties + + + +## 9.1 Comparison with Al-Assad regime + + + +9.1.1 In May 2025, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a COI report on Syria (the May 2025 Netherlands MFA report) which stated, citing various sources: ‘After the fall of the Assad regime, there was more openness and room for public criticism. Political discussions took place in public, which had previously been impossible. Civil society organisations were generally able to hold meetings without permission from higher authorities. It was possible to criticise the interim administration and the transitional government (for example, out of dissatisfaction with the pace of economic recovery).’[footnote 31] + + + +9.1.2 In December 2025, the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) published a COI report entitled ‘Syria: Situation of Certain Groups’ (the December 2025 DIS report). Citing interviews with NGOs, the report stated: + + + +‘After the fall of the former government, freedom of expression in Syria initially expanded, with people openly criticising the new authorities. However, this openness has gradually declined. Generally, criticising the interim government is possible, and many complaints or concerns can be expressed in the public domain without direct repercussions. However, the overall space for free expression has become increasingly constrained, though it remains less restricted than under the former government.’[footnote 32] +For details about the constraints on free expression, see paragraph 9.2.2. + + + +9.1.3 The December 2025 CSIS article stated: + + + +‘In mid-November [2025], we [the authors] spent a few days in Damascus and its environs, meeting with a broad range of stakeholders, including Syrian transition government officials and representatives from Syrian civil society groups, stabilization and humanitarian organizations, the United Nations and the Gulf, and Syrian journalists and investors. The Syrians we met included some who stayed in Damascus throughout the conflict, some who moved to the capital from Idlib after Assad’s ouster, and others who returned from neighboring countries and the wider diaspora. + + + +‘… Returning to Damascus for the first time since 2011, we were struck by an overwhelming freedom of expression, without fear of repercussions or a sense that the mukhabarat (secret police) were lurking everywhere. Everyone we met spoke openly about their hopes and disappointments in the current government.’[footnote 33] + + + +## 9.2 Limits on free speech + + + +9.2.1 The May 2025 Netherlands MFA report stated, citing various sources: ‘It … remained unclear where the red lines lay with regard to the possibilities for criticising the transitional government. After many years of repression, some people were cautious and remained wary of testing the boundaries. According to one source, people felt that they were still in a phase of exploration.’[footnote 34] + + + +9.2.2 The December 2025 DIS report stated, citing interviews with various sources: + + + +‘After the fall of the former government, freedom of expression in Syria briefly expanded but has since narrowed under the interim authorities. Criticism is tolerated to a degree, yet uncertainty about ‘red lines’ fuels fear and self-censorship, especially regarding political or religious issues. Arrests and harassment of activists, journalists, and online critics occur selectively, varying by region and background. + + + +‘… A Syrian human rights organisation stated that the lack of clear boundaries on freedom of speech has created uncertainty, fear, and self-censorship. Individuals often remain silent out of fear of arrest, torture, or disappearance. + + + +‘Syrians have gradually discovered which issues are “red lines” for the interim authorities, especially those related to the Defence, Interior, or Foreign Affairs ministries. + + + +‘… Under the interim government, which is influenced by Salafist ideology, public criticism of leaders is regarded as divisive (fitna). + + + +‘… Certain sensitive issues may lead to repercussions if addressed publicly. People who raise concerns about abuses against Alawites or Druze risk arrest, abduction, torture, or even death. A Syrian human rights organisation state that it has become dangerous to describe events on the coast or in Suweida as “massacres”; such incidents are expected to be referred to as crimes by “unidentified actors”, while praising government efforts to find those responsible. However, according to activist Nada Aswad, there have been cases of individuals inside Syria who have criticised the authorities without being arrested, and some well-known Syrians have described coastal events as massacres without facing repercussions.’[footnote 35] + + + +The source did not provide examples of individuals facing arrest, abduction, torture or death after raising concerns about abuses against Alawites or Druze. Using the sources consulted (see Bibliography), CPIT found several reports of arrests (see Government response to criticism and opposition) but was unable to find any reports of abduction, torture or death of individuals who criticised the government’s treatment of Alawites or Druze. + + + +## 9.3 Civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) + + + +9.3.1 In December 2025, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published an article entitled ‘Syria: One Year Since Assad’s Fall’ which stated: + + + +‘Interim Syrian authorities have shown greater openness to engagement with international and independent humanitarian organizations, as well as allowing civil society to operate more independently. However, humanitarians and civil society activists have told Human Rights Watch that their ability to work is not without restrictions. Civil society cited difficulty in getting approvals for registration, harassment, and threats. Aid workers said the government required aid delivery through the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and cited bureaucratic delays.’[footnote 36] + + + +9.3.2 In December 2025, Amnesty International published an article entitled ‘Syria: A year after Assad’s fall, the rights of survivors and families must guide transition’ which stated: + + + +‘One of the greatest achievements of the past year is the blossoming of civic space inside many parts of Syria, including areas controlled by the former government, with Syrian civil society groups organizing themselves into registered NGOs or informal associations. + + + +‘However, civil society organizations reported that challenges remain, including the authorities requesting prior approvals to host public events, as well as the lack of clarity and consistency in the process for obtaining approvals, including across governorates.’[footnote 37] + + + +9.3.3 In December 2025, an independent, progressive think tank[footnote 38] called the Arab Reform Initiative published an article entitled ‘Syria’s Expanding but Fragile Civic Space: Opportunities and Risks in the Post-Assad Transition’. The article stated: + + + +‘Some civic actors, particularly those with a long history of operating in former opposition-held areas in northwest Syria, have gained greater access and cooperation from local authorities. At the same time, others remain vulnerable to arbitrary restrictions, opaque procedures, prolonged approval processes, and abrupt policy reversals. As a result, civic space varies widely across regions, sectors, and types of activity. + + + +‘Multiple factors shape these variations, including the nature of the work being done, the local security environment, administrative processes, risk tolerance among civic actors, and the attitudes of local officials. These elements rarely operate in isolation. Instead, they interact in complex ways, creating a civic landscape that is dynamic, contested, and often contradictory. The uncertainty caused by this fluid environment disproportionately affects the most vulnerable civic groups – especially those whose political or human rights positions diverge from those of the transitional authorities – intensifying their concerns about the absence of legal protection.’[footnote 39] + + + +9.3.4 In December 2025, the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), which provides ‘free safety and security services to NGOs’[footnote 40], published an article about its work in Syria since the fall of the Al-Assad regime which stated: + + + +‘Many NGOs have experienced significant changes to their operations over the last year. Since December 2024, many NGOs have merged offices, removing firewalls that had become a hallmark of the Syria response where NGOs were operating across multiple areas of control and allowing greater collaboration and contact between various regions of Syria. + + + +‘For some NGOs, this shift allowed NGOs to establish programmes within Syria for the first time. + + + +‘… Alongside the improved access within Syria, NGOs have also seen a change in their ability to enter and get staff into the country. “The improvement in the visa processes also allowed us to move staff from Lebanon and Jordan to Syria after the fall of the regime” adds Fuad Deputy Country Director for Humanitarian Access and Security for Premier Urgence Internationale. + + + +‘… Changes to the approval process for NGO projects since December 8th, 2024, has created additional uncertainty for many NGOs, impacting aid delivery. The introduction of new requirements alongside a lack of clarity on the various roles of different ministries and bodies has sometimes created delays and concern among NGOs.’[footnote 41] + + + +9.3.5 The December 2025 CSIS article stated: ‘A diverse group of civil society groups meets regularly for lively discussions in a “salon” at Beit Farhi, a nineteenth-century home of a prominent Damascene Sephardic Jewish family in the old city.’[footnote 42] + + + +9.3.6 The February 2026 DW article stated: + + + +‘So far, though, the law [Law No. 93 – see Other relevant laws] appears to have been applied rather randomly, Hiba Ezzideen, head of Syria-based organization Equity and Empowerment which focuses on women’s rights, told DW. + + + +‘That’s confirmed by the dozens of interviews the CIHRS did with civil society actors for their report. They told the CIHRS that sometimes the law is used, other times decisions are simply made orally, usually with little explanation. For example, one group told the CIHRS, an event on transitional justice in the Syrian capital, Damascus, was canceled unexpectedly but then similar events were allowed to go ahead later. + + + +‘The Syria Campaign, a UK-based rights organization, has heard similar stories – for example, where local authorities have required they be involved in who gets hired by civil society organizations. + + + +‘“We’ve also had reports about restrictions on meetings, especially by political movements,” the organization’s executive director, Razan Rashidi, said, “although we can’t say it’s been a pattern for all meetings of such nature.” + + + +‘As a result of all the confusion, there’s a question that keeps coming up: Are these obstructions deliberate policy by Syria’s interim government, a possible sign the country is heading back toward authoritarianism? + + + +“We want to have hope, we want to believe this isn’t deliberate,” said the founder of a Syrian human rights monitor, speaking to DW off-the-record because they’re still trying to register in Syria. “We know that the state doesn’t have full control of everything. But it seems unnecessarily complicated…” + + + +‘“It’s true there is complexity and bureaucracy. They [the government] should be more transparent and this law does need to be changed,” said Fadel Abdul Ghany, head of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, or SNHR, which has been reliably documenting abuses on all sides since the beginning of Syria’s civil war. “But that happens everywhere. We also faced difficulties registering our organization and were unable to open a bank account in France,” he explained. + + + +‘SNHR is now registered in Syria, works freely and is able to be critical of the state, Abdul Ghany said. And he pointed out that it was important to consider context. + + + +‘“Syria is still devastated from conflict and look at what we inherited from the Assad regime – corruption, lack of funding, lack of experience, destroyed institutions,” he told DW. “I’ve met with ministers, I’ve visited the ministries and they all say they want reform. But it’s not easy.” + + + +‘Guellali at the CIHRS believes the current problems are due to a combination of factors. + + + +‘“On one hand, capacity constraints are real,” she said. “The interim government is facing challenges … But structural and political factors can’t be ignored. The deliberate retention of restrictive Assad-era legislation – including Law No. 93 – raises legitimate concerns about political will. Transitional authorities committed to democratic inclusion typically prioritize early legal reforms that enable civic participation and protect associational freedoms.” + + + +‘Women’s rights activist Ezzideen agreed. “What we are most likely seeing is the result of multiple factors and it’s important not to jump to conclusions about intentions,” she told DW. “But that doesn’t negate the need to address those challenges clearly and systematically.” + + + +‘“Civil society, whether in exile or inside the country, plays a vital role in keeping the struggle for freedom, justice and inclusivity in Syria alive,” said Rashidi from The Syria Campaign. Despite the criticisms about rules and lack of reform, she noted that “since the fall of the Assad regime, many civil society actors, including victims’ groups, were able to officially open offices in Syria – that’s like a dream come true.”’[footnote 43] + + + +9.3.7 An article published by The Syrian Observer in February 2026 indicated that authorities did not grant permission to the Syrian Political Feminist Movement to hold a conference in Damascus. The article stated: + + + +‘Maznah Dreid, a member of the Syrian Political Feminist Movement, told the UN Security Council in New York on Friday [13 February 2025] that the movement was forced to relocate its seventh general conference to Beirut after failing to obtain official approval in Damascus. She said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not grant the required authorization. + + + +‘… [T]he movement said it had submitted all necessary requests but received no approval, describing this as a denial of its right to engage in political activity inside its own country.’[footnote 44] + + + +## 9.4 Demonstrations and public events + + + +9.4.1 ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data) is a US-based non-profit that describes itself as an ‘independent, impartial global monitor that collects, analyses, and maps data on conflict and protest’.[footnote 45] ACLED’s database recorded 907 ‘protest events’ in Syria between 1 January and 31 December 2025.[footnote 46] ACLED’s methodology defines ‘protest events’ as ‘an in-person public demonstration of three or more participants in which the participants do not engage in violence, though violence may be used against them’.[footnote 47] The vast majority of these protests took place in government-controlled areas. It should be noted that the data includes all protests, not just those involving criticism of the authorities. For example, a significant proportion of the protests related to support for Palestine and/or opposition to Israel. + + + +9.4.2 The May 2025 Netherlands MFA report stated, citing various sources: + + + +‘Demonstrations took place almost daily in the transitional government’s area of control. These demonstrations were directed against a variety of issues, including irregular salary payments and pension benefits, mass redundancies in the public sector and the constitutional declaration, as well as for a transition to a secular democratic state. In most cases, the transitional government permitted these demonstrations and did not intervene.’[footnote 48] + + + +9.4.3 The October 2025 EUAA COI response stated, citing various sources: + + + +‘Few protests have been reported in areas under the control of the transitional government. In March 2025, in Damascus, pro-government demonstrators clashed with activists mourning civilians killed in the coastal violence, prompting security forces to intervene and disperse the gathering. In mid-July 2025, civil activists protesting in Damascus to demand an end to the violence in Sweida were reportedly attacked by other civilians, while security forces failed to intervene to protect them.’[footnote 49] + + + +The significant difference in the numbers of protests reported by the EUAA and ACLED is likely to be the result of the different methodologies and purposes of these two sources. ACLED defines a ‘protest event’ as a public demonstration involving three or more participants (see paragraph 9.4.1) and aims to provide comprehensive quantitative data about the total number of events, including small protests only reported by local media outlets and social media.[footnote 50] The EUAA report does not explicitly define the number of people who need to be present for an event to be considered a ‘protest’ but appears to focus on major demonstrations, particularly those related to sensitive topics such as the government’s treatment of religious and ethnic minorities. + + + +9.4.4 Citing an interview with a Syrian NGO, the December 2025 DIS report stated: + + + +‘In addition to limits on freedom of expression, civil liberties – such as forming associations and organising events – also remain restricted in Syria. Civil society organisations are formally permitted to operate, but their work takes place under strict supervision. Local authorities act as gatekeepers, deciding which topics can be discussed, which events can be held, and who may participate. Almost every public activity, such as meetings and cultural events, requires prior approval. Topics related to transitional justice, accountability, or human rights are considered politically sensitive and may only be addressed if approved by the authorities. One human rights NGO interviewed for this report stated that it had experienced such restrictions and interference’.[footnote 51] + + + +## 9.5 Arts and culture + + + +9.5.1 In March 2025, ‘independent, nonprofit media and training organization’[footnote 52] Syria Direct published an article which stated: + + + +‘Down a winding, stone-gray alleyway in Damascus’s ancient city center, a small door opens to a large, sunny atrium. Inside, nearly 200 Syrian artists gather: musicians, actors, dancers, singers and even a clown. + + + +‘… In post-Assad Syria, many artists are experiencing a kind of artistic freedom they have never known. New galleries are opening, with artists displaying works banned or restricted under the former regime for the first time. + + + +‘For decades, the Assad regime tightly controlled Damascus’s vibrant cultural hub, particularly concerned with art deemed even remotely political. Cultural events required complicated permissions and bypassing these procedures was dangerous. + + + +‘The artists’ gathering, held on February 6 [2025], was organised by Ettijahat, a Syrian cultural organization founded in exile. It was the first in-person event Ettijahat was able to organize in the Syrian capital in 13 years, Ettijahat’s director, Abdullah al-Kafri, told Syria Direct. “Today, merely a few months after the fall of the regime in Syria, the need for cultural and artistic entities is more crucial than ever,” he says. + + + +‘On February 24 [2025], a day before the Syrian National Dialogue Conference – held to pave the way for a new constitution and form a new government – its preparatory committee held a separate session on arts and culture, inviting around 40 Syrian artists and actors to raise their concerns. + + + +‘The meeting was “fruitful,” Syrian director Rasha Sharbatji told the Syria TV channel in an interview, with many participants “raising questions, amid a clear desire from everyone to contribute to bringing about real change.” + + + +‘… Momtaz Shoaib, 48, said he had decided to test the waters, and display his sculptures in a gallery. “The situation [after the regime’s fall] pushed me to assert that we are here. We want to establish our presence before any other force tries to take this away from us,” he told Syria Direct. + + + +‘Shoaib…said the exhibition was “bold”, but “by taking this step, which involves a level of risk, it could open the way for other [artists].” So far, the exhibition has not received any negative reaction from the society or new authorities, the gallery’s manager … told Syria Direct.’[footnote 53] + + + +9.5.2 In December 2025, London-based ‘progressive, non-partisan’ news outlet[footnote 54] The New Arab published an article entitled ‘“Syria has regained its voice”: One year after Assad’s fall, public life and creativity flourish after a decade of fear’ which stated: + + + +‘Artists whose work was once censored or banned are now stepping into the public eye. Theatres that once operated under the cover of night are drawing larger audiences, staging bold satirical plays on corruption, security forces, war, and authority – performances that would have been considered reckless before liberation. + + + +‘Independent film festivals are also making a comeback, screening stories of detainees, survivors, refugees, and the women who endured the conflict’s heaviest toll. + + + +‘The first summer after liberation saw the cities and squares of Damascus, Homs, and Hama come alive with festivals and celebrations that had been absent for years. + + + +‘… Families, children, students, and vendors filled the square, their presence a celebration in itself. [50-year-old Hama resident] Youssef noted that for the first time since the war began, the stage was lit at night, local bands performed openly, and poets recited without a list of “permitted and prohibited” words.’[footnote 55] + + + +9.5.3 In February 2026, PEN International, an organisation that ‘promotes literature and freedom of expression’[footnote 56], published an article entitled ‘Syria: One year on, a transition marked by bloody repression sparks grave concern for the country’s future’ which stated: + + + +‘In August 2025, a theatrical production by prominent twin stage actors, the Malas Brothers, was suspended in the coastal city of Tartus, following their criticism of the transitional government’s attacks against Alawi and Druze communities on social media. Although the transitional government’s Ministry of Culture claimed the suspension was a misunderstanding and that the ministry respects artistic freedoms, the twin artists state they were censored.’[footnote 57] + + + +9.5.4 In December 2025, Turkish state-owned news outlet[footnote 58] Anadolu Agency published an article entitled ‘Breathing free: A year after Assad, Syrians test newfound freedoms’ (the December 2025 Anadolu Agency article) which stated: + + + +‘The wave of freedom has also reached Syria’s cultural and artistic spheres, where suppressed voices are reemerging after decades of restrictions. + + + +‘Abir Nahhas, a Syrian novelist and head of the Homs branch of the Arab Writers’ Union in Syria, told Anadolu that literature has always held up a mirror to a nation’s identity. + + + +‘She said writers can now speak clearly about justice, amnesty and accountability, insisting that literature must provide “genuine literary observation” of what happened during the Syrian uprising – tracing the roots of conflict and portraying a recovering society through balanced characters. + + + +‘According to Nahhas, Syria’s cultural circles “buzz with events” today – a revival she sees as a chance to “reorder the Syrian cultural house.” + + + +‘She recalls being invited to a cultural festival at Damascus’s national library – formerly al-Assad Library – as both a strange and joyful experience, marking a return to spaces once denied to cultural figures under the Baath regime. + + + +‘Visual artist Rama al-Dakkak expressed a similar sense of transformation.’[footnote 59] + + + +9.5.5 Citing an interview with an international NGO, the December 2025 DIS report stated: ‘In cultural fields, censorship has been applied; for example, the Ministry of Culture has edited translated works by foreign authors in philosophy and political science, removing content that contradicts Islamic principles.’[footnote 60] + + + +9.5.6 In February 2026, Reuters published an article about a book fair in Damascus which stated: + + + +‘Held for the first time since Bashar al-Assad was ousted, this year’s Damascus International Book Fair reflects deep changes in Syria since its nominally secular order was overthrown by Islamist rebels led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. + + + +‘In addition to once forbidden Islamist texts, there are titles by secular critics of the ousted government and a section dedicated to Kurdish culture and language, which was banned under Assad’s Baathist state but recently recognised as a national tongue by Sharaa. + + + +‘“In the new Syria, it’s a fair where no book is banned,” said Zuhair al-Barri, the event coordinator, adding that the country had been in “intellectual and cultural darkness” under Assad. + + + +‘All books are permitted, he said, except for those that are at odds with “civil peace and social cohesion”, that “violate the values and customs of Syrian society”, or that glorify the Assad regime. + + + +‘Veteran rights campaigner Haitham Maleh, whose memoirs were on sale, said the Baathist state had suppressed thought and writing, allowing only books that supported their viewpoint. + + + +‘“This exhibition represents the beginning of an openness to ideas and global thought,” said Maleh, who was jailed by Assad. + + + +‘It was, he said, “a step forward”.’[footnote 61] + + + +## 10. Media environment + + + +## 10.1 Overview of press freedom + + + +10.1.1 Citing various sources, the May 2025 Netherlands MFA report stated: + + + +‘During the reporting period [27 November 2024 – 30 April 2025], the implications of the takeover for the media landscape in Syria remained unclear. According to one source, the freedom of movement and rules for journalists changed weekly. According to another source, journalists were given a great deal of freedom in the first chaotic weeks after the takeover in Syria, as little had been regulated by the interim administration at that time. At that time, foreign journalists could enter Syria without much difficulty and report and film unhindered in many places. After a few weeks, international media had to request prior permission from the Ministry of Information, and it became more difficult to obtain visas and travel to Syria. Journalists also had to register with the Ministry of Information. Furthermore, they had to request permission from this ministry to attend large gatherings, such as the National Dialogue Conference.’[footnote 62] + + + +10.1.2 In May 2025, Freedom House, a US-based NGO that monitors freedom and democracy throughout the world[footnote 63], published a report covering events in Syria in 2024 which stated: + + + +‘After the Assad regime was overthrown in December 2024, at least one detained journalist was released. Previously exiled Syrian journalists and foreign reporters were increasingly able to report in Syria that month, including in areas formerly held by the regime. Several news stories focused on journalists’ newfound ability to access information about and report on regime crimes, such as those that took place at the notorious Sednaya prison complex.’[footnote 64] + + + +10.1.3 The July 2025 ETANA report stated: + + + +‘Despite formal guarantees, access to the media space remains uneven and heavily mediated by political considerations. Independent journalists and outlets report multiple barriers, including visa denials, surveillance, reported regional access restrictions, particularly in coastal areas, with cases of informal intimidation extending to smear campaigns. These patterns have contributed to fear and self-censorship. + + + +‘In parallel, state-aligned influencers and well-funded external outlets such as Al Jazeera, Syria TV, and Al Araby enjoy privileged access to government briefings and high-visibility platforms. Several citizen journalists previously aligned with governance structures in Idlib have been absorbed into formal media institutions. While some present as independent voices, questions persist around professional standards and impartiality, with many amplifying narratives aligned with the interim authorities. This has contributed to growing concerns about media pluralism and the risk of loyalty-based information systems. + + + +‘… Repressive [government] tactics also appear to be returning. On 6 February 2025, the interim authorities dissolved the General Conference of the Journalists’ Union and replaced it with a temporary council appointed by the government, in what Syria Untold saw as a step toward institutionalising loyalty and limiting media autonomy. These actions suggest that censorship is no longer an emergency measure, but part of a broader strategy of monopolising meaning-making and aligning public perception with the new interim authorities.’[footnote 65] + + + +10.1.4 Citing interviews with various sources, the December 2025 DIS report stated: + + + +‘Journalists face restricted access to official sources; they are not allowed to contact public officials directly and must submit questions through the Ministry of Information, which may decide what information can be released. + + + +‘There is no formal censorship or direct restrictions on journalists. According to Enab Baladi, in practice, there is some space to report and even to criticise senior officials, including the head of state [President Ahmad Al Sharaa]. Moreover, media outlets continue to operate and maintain their editorial lines, focusing particularly on infrastructure, economic, and service-delivery issues. + + + +‘However, uncertainty about what may be tolerated has led journalists to exercise self-censorship, avoiding language that could be perceived as provocative by the authorities or by extremist actors, particularly among those from minority communities who often refrain from expressing views that might expose them to reprisals. + + + +‘In response to this environment, some outlets employ strategies that allow for more cautious reporting. According to Enab Baladi, sensitive topics are typically contextualised through analytical writing, and direct accusations are avoided. For example, when Enab Baladi reported on the waves of violence in the coastal region in March 2025, descriptions such as “massacre” were attributed to eyewitnesses or experts rather than the media outlet itself. + + + +‘According to Enab Baladi, although a degree of media freedom exists, its future remains uncertain. It is unclear whether this current media environment reflects a deliberate policy of tolerance or rather stems from the interim authorities’ limited capacity to control information, as their institutions and security apparatus are still weak and fragmented. It is uncertain whether greater governmental capacity would result in increased restrictions or a more structured approach to limiting media freedom.’[footnote 66] + + + +10.1.5 In December 2025, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), an ‘independent, nonprofit organization that promotes press freedom worldwide’[footnote 67], published an article entitled ‘A year after Assad’s fall, Syrian journalists enjoy freedom but also new risks’ (the December 2025 CPJ article) which stated: + + + +‘CPJ’s interviews with 20 journalists and press groups found conditions have dramatically improved. All media outlets are able to travel and report freely, including coverage critical of the government, though the foundations of genuine press freedom are not yet secure. + + + +‘“The first and most important difference is freedom of movement, which is the basis of any journalistic work,” said the digital NoonPost’s reporter Hamza Abbas. + + + +‘Interviewees’ opinions were heavily influenced by their politics, religion, and location, and their outlets’ coverage of Syria’s patchwork of competing authorities and communities. + + + +‘The country remains fractured as President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government seeks to integrate multiple groups seeking regional autonomy, from the northeastern Kurdish-led Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) [sic – the correct name is the Syrian Democratic Forces[footnote 68]] and the coastal Alawites to the southern Israeli-backed Druze.’ + + + +‘… Latakia-based freelancer Kamal Shahin, who contributes to the online outlet Syria Untold, said the media has experienced a sharp shift in the last year. + + + +“There is no censorship at this moment or limits,” said Shahin, a veteran investigative journalist who recently reported on the new government’s failure to provide security. + + + +‘Although relieved to be free from the repression of the al-Assad era, Shanin was cautious, warning that the new system “does not contain democratic factors that allow us to bet on the future.”’ [footnote 69] + + + +10.1.6 The same source also stated: + + + +‘Ali Eid, editor-in-chief of the independent news site Enab Baladi and director of the investigative platform Syria Indicator, agreed there were “encouraging developments,” such as government censors no longer reviewing journalists’ content pre-publication. + + + +‘“I am working freely. There is no red line, no one blocked us from reporting, no one asked us to not write harshly,” he said, …’[footnote 70] + + + +10.1.7 Citing CPJ, an article published in July 2025 by The New Arab stated: + + + +‘Responding to a question about whether it knew of other journalists who had been detained [other than Noor Suleiman – see paragraph 11.4.14], CPJ said it has not documented any other systematic or widespread campaign of arrests targeting journalists by the new Syrian government. + + + +‘“However, there have been a few isolated incidents involving assaults or detentions by security personnel, which, in most cases, Syrian authorities have responded to and resolved promptly,” it said.’[footnote 71] + + + +## 10.2 Media regulations and restrictions on reporting + + + +10.2.1 The May 2025 Netherlands MFA report stated, citing various sources: + + + +‘On 7 February 2025, the Ministry of Information published a notice on its Facebook page warning Syrian media channels not to publish interviews or statements from people associated with the former Assad regime. The interim administration also took measures against journalists who had worked under Assad. On 13 December 2024, the interim administration announced that media personnel who had contributed to Assad’s crimes would be prosecuted. Furthermore, the interim administration dissolved the Syrian Journalists’ Union on 6 February 2025. According to one source, media channels operating under Assad had to post drafts of all new stories in an online chat so that a government official [from the new government] could approve them.’[footnote 72] + + + +10.2.2 In May 2025, Syria Untold, an ‘independent and non-profit outlet [aiming] to tell Syrian stories that are otherwise pushed to the margins’[footnote 73], published an article entitled ‘Press in Transition in Syria: Constitutional Promises Amid a Climate of Crisis’ which stated: + + + +‘… [In] the aftermath of the massacres in the coastal region in March 2025…both international and Syrian reporters were barred from entering the area. Those who circumvented the bureaucracy and entered without permission were arrested and forced to delete their footage by General Security officials under the interim government’s Ministry of Information. A worrying tendency is the detention and harassment of journalists. An independent freelance journalist who spent four days documenting the aftermath in Latakia in late March [2025] told me that he was arrested, detained for five hours, and released only after being forced to delete his footage. “We cannot build a country like this”, he recounted telling the officials.’[footnote 74] + + + +10.2.3 In June 2025, ‘independent digital media platform’ Daraj, whose ‘goal is to offer Arabic speakers an alternative kind of journalism, free from political funding and influence’[footnote 75], published an article entitled ‘Journalism in Post-Assad Syria: Freedom, Chaos and Renewed Restrictions’ (the June 2026 Daraj article). The article, translated from Arabic by a member of CPIT, stated: + + + +‘“Sometimes the authorities insist on a General Security escort under the pretext of ‘security reasons’. As a result, people hesitate to speak to us freely, and at times we’re prevented from speaking to certain people,” a French journalist covering Syria told Daraj … She preferred not to reveal her name, explaining that she fears that publicly identifying herself might jeopardise her ability to enter the country again or continue reporting. + + + +‘The same sentiment is echoed by Samer (a pseudonym), a Syrian journalist who described feeling unsettled by the close monitoring carried out by the government’s security services … + + + +‘… [These journalists’] reluctance to speak openly indicates a growing sense of caution and mistrust… + + + +‘… Samer, who works with an international media organisation, faces difficulties related to the periodic permit required by the Ministry of Information. The permit lasts only two weeks, does not grant access to all areas of Syria, requires exhausting bureaucratic procedures, and is limited to public places, wasting journalists’ time and effort. + + + +‘Rama (a pseudonym), an independent journalist, explained: “To obtain the permit, I have to tell them exactly where I’m going and why. Some topics – especially those related to ministries or government bodies – the authorities prefer you not to cover, especially if you’re an independent journalist. Permit requests are often rejected, or we’re required to go to a specific place instead of the one we want to go to. Sometimes they insist on knowing everything I’ve done and even ask me to send them my interviews.” + + + +‘… [Government institutions] schedule interviews and appointments only after requesting very precise details [from journalists]. + + + +‘… Another restriction is the need to obtain a separate permit for each governorate. For example, when Samer wanted to work in Homs or Suweida to follow up on recent sectarian killings, he was told to contact the local media offices there and was bombarded with questions: Why? Who will you work with? How many days will you stay? What is the goal? Samer said: “This isn’t just vetting – it’s drowning us in details to confuse us.” + + + +‘Some journalists believe this is a deliberate strategy aimed at obstructing their work, while others think the government still lacks the proper tools to deal effectively with the press. + + + +‘According to both Samer and Rama, these bureaucratic procedures act as an indirect method of restriction, but they often turn into direct restriction. Samer explained: “There are two levels: First, some ministries don’t allow interviews at all. Second, after the massacres on the coast, and even after the roads were reopened, no permits were granted to work in governorates such as Tartus and Latakia, or even in small towns like Jabal Baniyas.” He added: “Security forces would follow us around. They wouldn’t explicitly say ‘don’t work,’ but they would give veiled signals such as: ‘Don’t go to this particular street because the situation is unstable.’” + + + +‘He continued: “They told us ‘Don’t go to that area because supporters of Al-Assad are there.’ Someone would show up every half hour to ask us ‘What are you doing here?’, which created an atmosphere of constant tension and insecurity. In many cases, they asked us to avoid certain neighbourhoods or streets.” + + + +‘Maria (a pseudonym for a French journalist working in Syria) said: “… Since January [2025], the Foreign Ministry has refused to grant accreditation to journalists wishing to travel to the coast without giving reasons … The Foreign Ministry informed us that traveling to a city without official accreditation could later result in the denial of a new visa, which did in fact happen to many [journalists] after the wave of violence. + + + +‘… Maria [said]: “It seems that the authorities – through the Ministry of Information – review what we publish and then base their treatment of us on its content. However, no one has stopped me from publishing. + + + +‘… Both Rama and Maria agreed that foreign journalists receive comparatively better treatment … By contrast, Syrian journalists feel vulnerable to harassment simply because they are Syrian. Rama recounted an incident in Homs: “I was accompanying Italian journalists as an interpreter. We tried to enter Alawite neighbourhoods that were closed off for security reasons by walking through Sunni neighbourhoods to avoid checkpoints. A local official stopped us and began questioning us aggressively because he thought we were Syrians. I had to pretend to be an Italian Syrian who didn’t speak Arabic, using my colleague’s passport. Once they believed me, they treated me completely differently.’[footnote 76] + + + +10.2.4 The December 2025 CPJ article stated: ‘Omar Haj Ahmed, the information ministry’s director general of press affairs, … dismissed as inaccurate complaints reported to CPJ about the issuance of temporary, rather than permanent, media licenses and allegations that journalists seeking press cards underwent invasive background checks, saying his ministry would soon start issuing cards with “no security vetting.”[footnote 77] + + + +10.2.5 The same source also stated: ‘Anas Idrees, a journalist since Syria’s 2011 revolution and now a reporter for Istanbul-based Syria TV, told CPJ that “a very big change” had taken place as the new authorities do not interfere with reporting unless “a journalist incites violence.” The Homs-based journalist has stopped using a pseudonym because he feels safer under the new government.’[footnote 78] + + + +10.2.6 BBC Monitoring’s ‘Media Guide’ for Syria, updated in February 2026, stated: ‘Given the political upheaval, it is unclear how and which media regulation laws and mechanisms are being applied. The new authorities have said they intend to reverse some of the restrictive Assad-era regulations, which were tightened following the 2011 uprising. However, it is unclear how the media will be regulated in practice, given the HTS’s history of media restrictions in areas it controls.’[footnote 79] + + + +10.2.7 In February 2026, The Syrian Observer reported: + + + +‘Syria’s Ministry of Information on Saturday [14 February 2026] unveiled the Professional and Ethical Code of Conduct for the media sector, introducing what officials described as a comprehensive framework for regulating journalism and content creation … + + + +‘Speaking at the ceremony, Ali Eid, representative of the National Independent Committee for the Professional and Ethical Code of Conduct for Journalists and Content Creators, stressed that the document is intended as more than a symbolic declaration. + + + +‘“The code embodies a clear commitment and the beginning of a serious attempt to protect freedom,” Eid said, calling for “free, accurate, and fair media that respects humanity and restores society’s trust.” + + + +‘He underscored that the code is designed as a self-regulatory tool rather than a substitute for legislation. “Self-regulation represents the highest form of freedom protection,” he noted. “Freedom without standards descends into chaos. True independence in media work requires responsibility and professionalism.” + + + +‘… Minister of Information Hamza Al-Mustafa announced that the code is one of the region’s most extensive media initiatives, the product of contributions from more than one thousand journalists over fifteen months. + + + +‘“This is a starting point, not a passing document,” Al-Mustafa said, confirming that the code applies to all Syrian journalists. He also revealed plans for an annual conference where journalists will review and update the code in response to rapid changes in the media landscape. + + + +‘… He warned that media activity without clear standards “will inevitably descend into chaos,” arguing that ethical and professional reference points have become a necessity amid accelerating technological change. + + + +‘… The launch has also sparked criticism. Journalists and social media users voiced objections, arguing that professional codes of conduct should be drafted by independent syndicates rather than government bodies. + + + +‘Satirist Muhammad Al-Salloum, who received an invitation to the event despite their critical stance, wrote on Facebook: “Every code of conduct issued by the authorities is rejected. Professional codes are the work of syndicates, not the work of the authorities – a real syndicate, not the Ba’ath Party syndicate that pleases you and that you follow.” + + + +‘… The code takes effect in 2026, though the Ministry of Information has yet to announce implementation mechanisms or oversight procedures.’[footnote 80] + + + +10.2.8 In February 2026, ‘independent Syrian news agency’[footnote 81] North Press Agency reported: + + + +‘The Syrian Journalists Association rejected on Saturday an announcement by Syria’s Ministry of Information about launching what it described as a “professional code of conduct” on February 15, saying the move contradicts legal and professional standards during the transitional phase. + + + +‘… The group considered the ministry’s attempt to impose a “code of conduct” from the executive authority as a circumvention of both the spirit and the text of the constitutional declaration. It warned that such a move would reproduce forms of administrative oversight that contradict Syrians’ aspirations for a free and responsible media environment. + + + +‘The association said that democratic transition requires a clear separation between the executive role of the government and the professional role of independent unions. It added that setting professional and ethical standards for journalistic work is “a purely union matter” to be handled by bodies representing journalists, foremost among them the Syrian Journalists Association and the Syrian Journalists Union. + + + +‘It warned that interference by the Ministry of Information in this field would undermine the principle of professional self-regulation and open the door to politicizing ethical standards and using them as tools of administrative control. + + + +‘The association also cautioned against turning the Ministry of Information into an “ethical watchdog” over journalists, saying such a role would effectively restore systems of censorship and undermine the prospects of building a free investigative media capable of monitoring the executive authority.’[footnote 82] + + + +## 10.3 State media + + + +10.3.1 The July 2025 ETANA report stated: + + + +‘The launch of the official Syria TV channel [a state-owned channel also known as Al-Ikhbariyah Al-Suriyah – see paragraph 10.3.2] was met with widespread criticism among Syrians, particularly regarding its quality, editorial freedom, and hiring practices. The selection of staff has been seen as highly selective, with many experienced journalists excluded, while the channel’s messaging remains rigid and tightly controlled. This has come as a major disappointment and shock to journalists and media activists both inside and outside the country, who had hoped for a more open and professional media landscape in the post-Assad era.’[footnote 83] + + + +10.3.2 BBC Monitoring’s ‘Media Guide’ for Syria, updated in February 2026, stated: + + + +‘State-run outlets, whose operations were disrupted by the transition, have re-emerged with fresh branding and promises of a new orientation. + + + +‘The TV news channel Al-Ikhbariyah al-Suriyah relaunched in May 2025, having been off the air for months, offering a glimpse into the new leadership’s image-making. Female presenters now appear both veiled and unveiled, projecting a carefully calibrated balance, while male colleagues often sport beards in line with the new rulers’ pious aesthetic. But the channel avoids overt religious programming. + + + +‘The state news agency Sana relaunched in August 2025 with new branding, vowing to move on from its Assad-era role as a propaganda mouthpiece. Sana’s director, Zyad Mahameed, a former official in the HTS media team, pledged a shift from an Assad-era model in which “journalists waited for instructions, to field reporters checking facts and reporting professionally”.’[footnote 84] + + + +10.3.3 The same source also stated: + + + +‘Online platforms and social media have become central to the new authority’s rebranding efforts, serving both as news sources and as channels for messaging. A network of influencers and loyalists, who have large followings on social media, has been mobilised to amplify the government’s narrative, supported by a dedicated department within the information ministry which assists influencers and content creators. + + + +‘… The Reuters Institute report [published in March 2025] said the interim authorities gave preferential treatment to pro-government social media influencers and citizen journalists, with whom they had worked in the north-west, under HTS rule.’[footnote 85] + + + +## 11. Government response to criticism and opposition + + + +## 11.1 General treatment of critics + + + +11.1.1 The April 2025 edition of SNHR’s monthly report on arrests and detentions in Syria stated: + + + +‘… [W]e recorded arrests of individuals over their voicing criticism of the current transitional government on social media, with these arrests being concentrated in [r]ural Hama governorate. The Ministry of Interior’s General Security also arrested civilians to pressure their fugitive relatives into surrendering themselves, with these cases being concentrated in Hama governorate [see paragraph 11.1.5 for further information].’[footnote 86] The source did not say how many individuals were arrested, nor did it provide details about their treatment by the authorities. + + + +11.1.2 The July 2025 EUAA report stated, citing various sources: ‘There is very limited information on the treatment of individuals opposing or perceived to be opposing the new government. [In an online interview with the EUAA in June 2025], SJAC [Syria Justice and Accountability Centre[footnote 87]] indicated that it has not observed any targeting by the interim government based on journalistic activities, activism, or membership in political parties.’[footnote 88] + + + +11.1.3 The December 2025 CSIS article cited the following examples to demonstrate the striking change in freedom of expression compared to the situation under the Al-Assad regime: + + + +‘At a conference for Syrian influencers, one content creator responded to a call from a government official for influencers to show Syria’s progress by saying it was not his job to “beat the drum for the government” but to show the real Syria and its challenges. Walking through Souq Hamidiyeh in Damascus one evening, a Syrian friend berated black-clad security forces wielding big guns who had blocked the path to a famous historical site, given the presence of a high-level official. “Why are you blocking the way? We didn’t get rid of one dictator to have another one,” he told them. They politely rebuffed his complaint, and we went on our way to dinner. In Assad’s Syria, all these individuals would likely have been arrested, perhaps never to be seen again.’[footnote 89] + + + +11.1.4 Citing various sources, the December 2025 DIS report stated: + + + +‘Individuals who voice criticism of the authorities may face repercussions. Arrests have been reported, including arrests by entities linked to the Ministry of Interior and the Internal Security Command, especially in Hama. In some cases, individuals – especially activists – have been temporarily detained at security checkpoints in Homs Governorate and released after brief questioning. + + + +‘… Individuals who voice strong criticism of the new Syrian authorities are often subjected to online harassment or publicly accused of treason by those seen as supporters of the interim government. Influential people may use their connections to pressure or intimidate critics. In some cases, coordinated smear campaigns have been directed against individuals, human rights organisation and activists who have expressed criticism.’[footnote 90] The source did not provide further details about these smear campaigns nor specify whether the government was involved in them. + + + +11.1.5 Citing various sources, the same source stated: + + + +‘According to sources, no systematic policy exists to target critics; instead targeting appears selective and inconsistent, depending on local conditions and the discretion of individual officials. As a result, tolerance towards criticism varies by region. In Damascus, people may discuss social issues as long as they avoid political questions, whereas in Idlib, restrictions on free speech are significantly tighter and criticism is more likely to lead to arrest or intimidation. In Aleppo and Damascus, officials operate under stronger oversight, while Rural Damascus remains marked by arbitrary behaviour and weak control by the authorities. + + + +‘… Security forces have reportedly exerted pressure on citizens by arresting relatives o