CPIN
Nigeria: country policy and information notes
gov.uk change note: Published an updated country policy and information note on separatist groups in the South-East.
Headline
The Home Office has published an updated Nigeria CPIN on South East separatist groups, significantly revising its assessment of risk to MASSOB members while maintaining that IPOB members face legitimate prosecution but may suffer persecution through disproportionate treatment.
Changes in detail
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MASSOB risk assessment — Previous position unclear → "Actual or perceived members or supporters of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereignty of 'Biafra' (MASSOB) or an affiliated group or faction are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise."
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IPOB legitimate prosecution — Previous position unclear → "The government has a legitimate interest in pursuing and arresting persons who are, or are suspected of being, involved with or supporting the group. In general, actual or perceived members or supporters of IPOB or an affiliated group or faction who are fleeing prosecution or punishment for a criminal offence are not likely to be refugees."
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IPOB persecution threshold — New assessment establishes that "Where a person is able to demonstrate that, because of their links to IPOB, affiliated groups or factions, or the ESN, they are likely to face prosecution or punishment which is disproportionate to the crime committed or discriminatory, or are likely to face detention in degrading or inhuman conditions or torture, then such treatment is likely to amount to persecution."
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Sur place activities — New assessment that "An actual or perceived member or supporter of a pro-'Biafran' group who has engaged in sur place activities is unlikely to be at risk on return to Nigeria. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise."
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Internal relocation and state protection — Where persecution from the state is established, "they will not, in general, be able to obtain protection nor be able to internally relocate to escape that risk."
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Certification guidance — New position that claims "are unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002."
Implications for practitioners
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MASSOB claims significantly weakened: The Home Office now assesses MASSOB members as generally safe, with limited evidence of recent arrests or state harassment. Practitioners will need strong individual evidence to overcome this presumption.
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IPOB claims face higher threshold: While acknowledging potential persecution through disproportionate treatment, the Home Office emphasises the state's legitimate interest in prosecution. Claims must demonstrate treatment goes beyond lawful prosecution to meet the persecution threshold.
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Sur place activities undermined: The assessment severely limits protection for diaspora activism, requiring claimants to prove their UK activities would genuinely attract adverse attention.
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Strong country evidence base: The CPIN cites extensive recent sources including 2025 reports from Amnesty International, Cedoca, and security analysts, providing practitioners with up-to-date evidence on detention conditions, enforced disappearances, and human rights violations.
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Article 15(c) claims: The detailed security situation analysis may support complementary protection claims given the complex violence involving separatists, criminal groups, and state forces in the South East.
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Exclusion considerations highlighted: Practitioners must carefully assess potential exclusion issues given IPOB's terrorist proscription and evidence of violence by affiliated groups.
Diff
@@ -1,5 +1,47985 @@ -Country policy and information notes (previously known as country information and guidance reports) are used by UK Visas and Immigration officials to make decisions in asylum and human rights applications. - - - -The notes also give information on asylum seekers’ countries of origin. +Version 4.0, April 2026 + + + + +## Executive summary + + + +The Igbo people, who live predominantly in the South East of Nigeria and are one of the country’s 3 main ethnic groups, have a history of struggle for self-determination. This includes declaration of an independent republic of ‘Biafra’ in 1967 followed by a 3-year civil war that ended with the republic’s reintegration into Nigeria. The Igbo people have continued to see themselves as marginalised, and since the late 1990s, separatist groups have revived the call for the region’s independence. + + + +Actual or perceived members or supporters of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereignty of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) or an affiliated group or faction are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise. Any risk of persecution will depend on the person’s profile and their activities on behalf of the group. + + + +MASSOB is banned but evidence suggests it is not proscribed as a terrorist organisation in Nigeria. It has become less active in recent years. There is limited evidence of recent arrests or intimidation of perceived members or supporters of MASSOB, and no recent information on any attacks on them by the state. + + + +The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a proscribed terrorist organisation in Nigeria and has been implicated in inciting and committing acts of violence against the state and other actors. The government has a legitimate interest in pursuing and arresting persons who are, or are suspected of being, involved with or supporting the group. In general, actual or perceived members or supporters of IPOB or an affiliated group or faction who are fleeing prosecution or punishment for a criminal offence are not likely to be refugees. Affiliated groups or factions include, but are not limited to, the Directorate of State and ‘Biafra’ Republic Government in Exile (BRGIE)/Autopilot factions and IPOB’s armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). + + + +There are allegations from some sources of human rights violations against perceived members of IPOB, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, detention in inhuman conditions and enforced disappearance. + + + +Where a person is able to demonstrate that, because of their links to IPOB, affiliated groups or factions, or the ESN, they are likely to face prosecution or punishment which is disproportionate to the crime committed or discriminatory, or are likely to face detention in degrading or inhuman conditions or torture, then such treatment is likely to amount to persecution. + + + +An actual or perceived member or supporter of a pro-‘Biafran’ group who has engaged in sur place activities is unlikely be at risk on return to Nigeria. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise. + + + +Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they will not, in general, be able to obtain protection nor be able to internally relocate to escape that risk. + + + +Where a claim is refused, it is not likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. + + + +All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm. + + + +## Assessment + + + +Section updated: 2 April 2026 + + + +## About the assessment + + + +This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general: + + + +- a person faces a real risk of persecution/serious harm by the state because the person is a member or supporter of, or is perceived to be a member or supporter of, a group agitating for a separate state of ‘Biafra’ + +- internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm + +- a claim, if refused, is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 + + + + + +Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts. + + + +## Points to note + + + +‘Biafra’ was the name used by the former Eastern Region of Nigeria when it unilaterally declared independence from Nigeria in 1967. This action led to the Nigerian Civil War, which concluded in 1970. ‘Biafra’ is not a legally recognised area but is often invoked by those members of the Igbo people who support secession from Nigeria. The states in Nigeria with a majority Igbo population are Abia, Imo, Ebonyi, Enugu and Anambra, which form the South East geopolitical zone of Nigeria. + + + +Open source material cited in this note refers to ‘Biafra’. For consistency and clarity, this note will also use the term ‘Biafra’, although it is important to note the UK government’s consistent policy to respect the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and that use of the term ‘Biafra’ in this note does not in any way imply any shift in that policy. + + + +There are reported to be several groups agitating for the secession of ‘Biafra’. This Country Policy and Information Note focuses on the following 2 main groups: + + + +- the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) the Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB), including + + + + +## 1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals + + + +## 1.1 Credibility + + + +1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants). + + + +1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when one has not already been undertaken (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)). + + + +1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis). + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section + + + + +The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section + + + + +## 1.2 Exclusion + + + +1.2.1 IPOB is proscribed as a terrorist group in Nigeria, and members of the group and its paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN, established in December 2020), have reportedly committed human rights violations in Nigeria (see Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB)). + + + +1.2.2 MASSOB has been banned and membership of the group is illegal, but it does not appear to be proscribed as a terrorist group in Nigeria. It has reportedly been involved in violent clashes with the authorities (see Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB)). + + + +1.2.3 If a person has been involved with IPOB, ESN, MASSOB and/or an affiliated group or any other pro-‘Biafran’ group that incites or uses violence to achieve its aims, decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons to apply one (or more) of the exclusion clauses. Each case must be considered on its individual facts. + + + +1.2.4 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status). + + + +1.2.5 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section + + + + +The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section + + + + +## 2. Convention reason(s) + + + +2.1.1 Actual or imputed political opinion. + + + +2.1.2 Establishing a convention reason is not sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of an actual or imputed Refugee Convention reason. + + + +2.1.3 In the absence of a link to one of the 5 Refugee Convention reasons necessary for the grant of asylum, the question is whether the person will face a real risk of serious harm to qualify for Humanitarian Protection (HP). + + + +2.1.4 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +## 3. Risk + + + +## 3.1 Political and security context + + + +3.1.1 ‘Biafra’ is a loosely defined area in the South East of Nigeria that roughly corresponds to the states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo. The area is inhabited principally by Igbo (Ibo) people, who are one of the country’s 3 largest ethnic groups. The South East has an estimated population of 23.5 million (see Geography and demography and the Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Internal relocation). + + + +3.1.2 In the mid-1960s, newly independent Nigeria was affected by economic and political instability and ethnic friction. Violence erupted in the north, including in September 1966, when sources estimate that between 10,000 and 30,000 Igbo were killed. Attempts to resolve tensions failed and in May 1967, the Eastern Region unilaterally declared independence from Nigeria as the Republic of ‘Biafra’, triggering a civil war in which an estimated 500,000 to 3 million people died. ‘Biafran’ rebels were eventually overwhelmed by and surrendered to federal government forces in January 1970 (see Civil war and its aftermath). + + + +3.1.3 Since the 1990s, new ‘Biafra’ separatist movements have been established, reportedly driven by perceptions of unfair treatment and marginalisation among the Igbo people. While several groups have reportedly formed with the goal of achieving ‘Biafran’ secession, the main groups are the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB) (see Separatist groups/factions, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) and Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB)). Other ‘Biafran’ groups do not appear to have a significant presence in Nigeria (see Overview). + + + +3.1.4 During the early 2000s MASSOB was the foremost ‘Biafran’ group, but reports suggest it has become divided and less active. The internal fragmentation of MASSOB led to the emergence of IPOB, formed by Kenny Nwannekaenyi Okwu-Kanu (known as Nnamdi Kanu) between 2012 and 2014, which has since become the dominant ‘Biafran’ group. However, Kanu’s arrest in June 2021 on charges including treason and terrorism, followed by his continued detention, resulted in the group dividing into 2 factions, the Directorate of State (DOS) and a breakaway faction, the self-styled ‘Biafra’ Republic Government in Exile (BRGIE)/Autopilot. The fragmentation across the pro-‘Biafran’ movement as a whole, marked by both ideological and strategic divergences, is so pronounced that one source – the Atlantic Post, a Nigerian online news platform – describes the movement as ‘teetering on the brink of chaos’ (see Overview of separatist groups and methods, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) and Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB), and subsections 3.2 (MASSOB) and 3.3 (IPOB) of this assessment, below). + + + +3.1.5 Although both MASSOB and IPOB have advocated for peaceful change, often using civil disobedience as a tactic, they have also used rhetoric that may encourage violence and, in some instances, used violence directly against state agents. In 2020, IPOB established the Eastern Security Network (ESN), an armed wing that the group claims is a defensive force rather than an offensive militia. BRGIE/Autopilot is reportedly considered more violent than MASSOB and the DOS faction of IPOB, and since 2023, fighters under BRGIE/Autopilot have been linked to rising violence in the region. On some occasions, BRGIE/Autopilot has claimed responsibility for attacks on state agents (see Common aims and methods, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) and Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB). + + + +3.1.6 IPOB reportedly introduced weekly and ad hoc ‘sit-at-home orders’ (curfews as a form of civil disobedience) shortly after Kanu’s arrest in June 2021. Despite IPOB’s announcement later the same year that it was lifting the weekly orders, reports indicate that enforcement of them by IPOB and other armed actors has continued through violent means including beatings, floggings, targeted assassinations and beheadings, with deaths documented among both the security forces and the civilian population (see Governance and state security presence, Overview of separatist groups and methods and Sit-at-home orders). + + + +3.1.7 Sources indicate that between January 2021 and July 2025, violence in the South East claimed more than 3,000 lives. The Nigerian authorities reportedly blame the violence on IPOB and/or ESN and favour a predominantly security-led response which some sources describe as heavy-handed. Other reporting notes the complexity of the security context. IPOB’s DOS faction has repeatedly denied responsibility for violent attacks. Sources suggest the insecurity in the region is of a complex, hybrid nature involving not only state actors and separatists but also other non-state armed groups such as the Umuoma/’unknown gunmen’, Fulani herdsmen, cultists and criminal gangs seeking to exploit local fear and confusion, particularly in areas where state governance is weak. In some instances, gang members reportedly claim to be acting for IPOB or ESN, thus blurring the distinction between actors driven by ideology and those with criminal motives (see Political and administrative context, Security situation and governance in the South East, General state treatment of pro-‘Biafran’ separatists, Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB) and Treatment of IPOB). + + + +## 3.2 Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) + + + +3.2.1 Actual or perceived members or supporters of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereignty of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) or an affiliated group or faction are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise. + + + +3.2.2 Any risk of persecution will depend on the person’s profile and their activities on behalf of the group (see General state treatment of pro-‘Biafran’ separatists and Treatment of MASSOB). MASSOB members may be perceived to be members of IPOB (see Arrests and detention, and for risk for perceived IPOB members, see Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB)/Eastern Security NetworkIndigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB)/Eastern Security Network (ESN), below). + + + +3.2.3 In the early 2000s, MASSOB was banned and membership of the group was made illegal. DFAT reported in 2020 that it had not been proscribed as a terrorist group in Nigeria and that it continued to conduct public activities. However, a 2025 police statement quoted in a newspaper report referred to MASSOB as ‘proscribed’, but this information is not corroborated by other sources (see Legal status). + + + +3.2.4 Sources indicate that MASSOB is agitating for the secession of ‘Biafra’ in accordance with what it describes as non-violent principles. The group has reportedly become less active in recent years (see Separatist groups/factions and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB)). MASSOB has 2 main factions, the Biafra Independent Movement (BIM)/MASSOB, led by Ralph Uwazuruike, and MASSOB, led by Uchenna Madu. Membership figures and membership procedures for the overall MASSOB group or its factions are not known, but one source reported in 2025 that, when arrested, a MASSOB member was in possession of an ‘operational identity card’. The existence of membership or ID cards is not corroborated by other sources (see Membership and documentation). + + + +3.2.5 After its formation in the late 1990s, MASSOB clashed with the security forces on numerous occasions. Sources report that more than 2,000 members had been killed in clashes by 2008, usually during protests. There were mass arrests of MASSOB members in 2018 and 2022, but there is no evidence of clashes resulting in deaths of MASSOB members since 2 individuals were killed in 2019 (see Background). In September 2023, 8 people were arrested on suspicion of MASSOB membership at a police squad office. The arrests reportedly occurred after the individuals stormed the office in connection with another matter (see Arrests and detention). + + + +3.2.6 Sources report that in 2023, the BIM/MASSOB faction accused the police of indiscriminate arrests and extortion of MASSOB group members, but in some instances, such arrests were reportedly made because the MASSOB members were perceived to be members of IPOB (see Arrests and detention). A 2025 MASSOB statement quoted in a newspaper article reports that MASSOB members have been harassed and that a local MASSOB official was acquitted after being arrested and detained for MASSOB membership, but the information is not corroborated by other sources. Sources suggest that pro-‘Biafran’ separatists in general have been forcibly disappeared after being arrested or abducted, but none of the cases set out in a 2025 Amnesty International report that provides more than 20 examples of alleged enforced disappearance mentions suspected MASSOB membership (see Enforced disappearances). + + + +3.2.7 According to reports, possession of ‘Biafra’ flags or insignia may result in arrest or abduction, but, with the possible exception of the arrest of a MASSOB member in 2025 mentioned in paragraph 3.2.4, there is no information in the sources consulted to suggest that actual or perceived MASSOB members specifically have been arrested or abducted for this reason (see Arrests, detention and enforced disappearances (general) and Arrests and detention (MASSOB)). There is no information in the sources consulted for this note to indicate that any MASSOB-related arrests were made at all in 2024 (see Bibliography and Arrests and detention). + + + +3.2.8 Sources providing information not specific to MASSOB suggest that the state closely monitors, both online and offline, high-profile individuals who are most strongly supportive of the ‘Biafran’ cause but is unlikely to have the capacity to monitor all supporters (see Monitoring and tracking). + + + +3.2.9 BIM/MASSOB faction leader Ralph Uwazuruike was reportedly summoned to attend the Imo State police anti-kidnapping unit on 20 October 2025, a move that the faction noted may have been aimed at preventing him from attending protests against IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu’s detention that were scheduled for the same day (see Discrimination and harassment). + + + +3.2.10 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +## 3.3 Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB)/Eastern Security Network (ESN) + + + +3.3.1 The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a proscribed terrorist organisation in Nigeria and has been implicated in inciting and committing acts of violence against the state and other actors. The government has a legitimate interest in pursuing and arresting persons who are, or are suspected of being, involved with or supporting the group. In general, actual or perceived members or supporters of IPOB or an affiliated group or faction who are fleeing prosecution or punishment for a criminal offence are not likely to be refugees. Affiliated groups or factions include, but are not limited to, the Directorate of State and ‘Biafra’ Republic Government in Exile (BRGIE)/Autopilot factions and IPOB’s armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). + + + +3.3.2 However, prosecution may amount to persecution if it involves victimisation in its application by the authorities, for example, if it is the vehicle or excuse for persecution or if only certain groups are prosecuted for a particular offence and the consequences of that discrimination are sufficiently severe. Punishment which is cruel, inhuman or degrading (including punishment which is disproportionate to the offence committed) may also amount to persecution (see the section on prosecution in the Asylum Instruction on Assessing credibility and refugee status). + + + +3.3.3 Where a person is able to demonstrate that because of their links to IPOB or an affiliated group or faction, they are likely to face prosecution or punishment which is disproportionate to the crime committed or discriminatory, or are likely to face detention in degrading or inhuman conditions or torture, then such treatment is likely to amount to persecution (see the Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Actors of protection for information about the criminal justice system, including detention conditions). + + + +3.3.4 Each case must be considered on its individual facts, taking into account the person’s activities, profile and role in the group (see General treatment of pro-‘Biafran’ separatists and Treatment of IPOB). + + + +3.3.5 IPOB was proscribed as a terrorist group in Nigeria in 2017, and a total of 14 individuals and businesses allegedly linked to IPOB have been designated as ‘terrorism financiers’, thus attracting financial sanctions. One consequence of the group’s proscription is that it is not permitted to stage rallies (see Proscription/legal status). + + + +3.3.6 Membership figures for IPOB, its factions or ESN in Nigeria are not known but sources suggest IPOB is the most active and influential of the pro-‘Biafran’ separatist groups, having eclipsed MASSOB (see Overview and Funding, membership and documentation). + + + +3.3.7 ESN was established in 2020 with the stated aim of protecting the Southeastern region from Fulani herdsmen and other armed groups. However, reports suggest its activities have increasingly expanded to include clashes with the security forces and guerrilla-style attacks against police and military installations (see Eastern Security Network (ESN)). + + + +3.3.8 During IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu’s continued detention following his arrest in 2021, IPOB split into 2 factions. The Directorate of State (DOS) faction reportedly has a governing council, the DOS, overseeing day to day operations, with Kanu above it as the supreme decision-making authority and a hierarchy of officials in Nigeria and overseas below it (see Background and Structure and leadership). The other faction is the Biafran Republic Government In Exile (BRGIE), also known as ‘Autopilot’. BRGIE, formed by Finland-based Simon Ekpa in 2022, is diaspora-based, but funds and directs fighters in the South East, including members of the ‘Biafra’ Liberation Army (BLA). In November 2024, the faction reportedly self-declared ‘independence’ for the ‘United States of ‘Biafra’’ (USB), territory comprising Igbo and some non-Igbo areas of southeastern Nigeria. Ekpa was convicted of terrorism and other charges in Finland in September 2025 and sentenced to 6 years in prison, and was replaced as ‘prime minister’ of the group by Ogechukwu Nkere in January 2026 (see ‘Biafra’ Republic Government in Exile (BRGIE)/Autopilot faction). + + + +3.3.9 According to reports, the DOS faction has repeatedly disassociated itself from BRGIE/Autopilot and rejected the formation of the ‘government in exile’ and the USB. However, sources suggest the authorities regard Simon Ekpa as part of IPOB or affiliated with it (see Relationship to IPOB and the Directorate of State faction). + + + +3.3.10 Reports indicate IPOB has recently dialled down its once-violent rhetoric and has instead focused its messaging on establishing ‘Biafra’ through peaceful means. However, this is reportedly less of an ideological shift than a tactical move aimed at softening IPOB’s image to bolster local and international support for Kanu and the ‘Biafran’ cause (see Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB)). + + + +3.3.11 The military has reportedly conducted airstrikes on suspected IPOB/ESN hideouts, with the latest having occurred in 2023. Sources do not provide casualty figures (see Airstrikes). IPOB’s DOS faction has denied that the group has hideouts, camps or terror cells (see Other activities and methods). + + + +3.3.12 In 2024, pro-‘Biafra’ agitation in the South East reportedly claimed 379 lives, ‘many’ of whom were IPOB/ESN members killed in the security forces’ special operations. Between January and March 2025, the army was reportedly responsible for at least 200 deaths as part of the ‘neutralisation’ of IPOB/ESN members (see Other attacks and killings). + + + +3.3.13 Sources report that IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu was found guilty of terrorism, treason and involvement with an outlawed movement on 20 November 2025 and sentenced to 4 life sentences, among other terms, to be served concurrently. Prior to his conviction, a statement issued on behalf of his family noted that his detention conditions had negatively affected his mental and physical health and that he had been restricted from seeing his legal team. Reports indicate that after Kanu was sentenced, he was transferred to a detention centre in Sokoto in accordance with an order by the trial judge citing a recent jailbreak in Abuja. The transfer reportedly makes it harder for Kanu and his lawyers to prepare and lodge an appeal (see Detention, conviction and sentencing of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu). + + + +3.3.14 Reports indicate that high-profile supporters of IPOB – the group’s lawyer, the brother of Nnamdi Kanu and a prominent human rights activist – were among at least 14 people arrested at protests demanding Kanu’s release on 20 October 2025 and subsequently released on bail. The sources consulted for this note do not indicate the identities and profiles of the other people arrested (see Bibliography and Other arrests, detention, convictions and acquittals). Reports suggest there were isolated clashes at the protests and that police used gunshots, tear gas, water cannon and electric barriers to disperse the crowds. In the sources consulted, there were no reports of police presence or arrests when IPOB rallies calling for Kanu’s release were held in 3 states in January 2026 (see Bibliography and Protests and rallies). + + + +3.3.15 Sources are not consistent about whether non-violent, low-profile members or supporters of IPOB or their family members are arrested by the authorities. Examples from 2024 and 2025 suggest most arrests relating to the group take place at suspected IPOB/ESN camps or hideouts. In December 2023, police arrested 50 people wearing IPOB caps at a funeral, but a federal high court judge reportedly struck out the case due to a lack of credible evidence linking them to the group (see Other arrests, detention, convictions and acquittals and Other activities and methods). + + + +3.3.16 Other reports suggest that some actual or suspected ‘Biafra’ supporters have been detained without charge, sometimes for years and often in inhumane conditions in military facilities, with their families subjected to extortion. Those arrested have reportedly often been held incommunicado, with family members and lawyers sometimes denied access even once the person arrested is located. Some security agents reportedly extract confessions through torture (see Arrests, detention and enforced disappearances, and for information on general detention conditions, see the Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Actors of protection). In some cases, IPOB members who have been acquitted have not immediately been released from prison (see Arrests, detention and enforced disappearances). + + + +3.3.17 Sources indicate that more than 20 people arrested or abducted by the security forces in 2021 and 2022 over their suspected IPOB/ESN membership were forcibly disappeared. This figure includes at least 3 who have now been released and one who died in detention, reportedly after being denied medical care (see Enforced disappearances). + + + +3.3.18 There are some indications of efforts by the Tinubu administration to address issues affecting suspected members of IPOB/ESN who have been arrested and detained. A review is reportedly being undertaken of cases inherited by the new director-general of the Department of State Services (DSS), Oluwatosin Adeola Ajayi, with the stated aims of ensuring compliance with the rule of law and providing rapid access to justice. Sources report that as part of the review, 3 people in detention on suspicion of IPOB/ESN membership were released in July 2025, while another suspected IPOB/ESN member detained in July 2022 was released in December 2025 (see Other arrests, detention, convictions and acquittals). + + + +3.3.19 Prominent individuals who strongly support the ‘Biafran’ cause are reportedly considered ‘individuals of concern’ by the security system and are monitored very closely both online and offline. However, the authorities reportedly lack the resources to track all supporters of the cause. A member of the DOS faction directorate has claimed that the security forces pay villagers in Abia State to spy on and expose IPOB members, but this could not be independently corroborated in the sources consulted (see Bibliography and Monitoring and surveillance). + + + +3.3.20 The government has reportedly asked social media companies to block IPOB on their platforms. Internet service providers sometimes block content at the request of the Nigerian Communications Commission (see Internet censorship (general) and Internet censorship (IPOB)). + + + +3.3.21 Sources indicate that journalists reporting on separatism-related violence have been harassed and arrested. A journalist with French news agency Agence France-Presse was reportedly arrested at the protests against Kanu’s detention on 20 October 2025 but released shortly afterwards (see Journalists covering separatist violence). + + + +3.3.22 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +## 3.3 Sur place activities + + + +3.3.1 An actual or perceived member or supporter of a pro-‘Biafran’ group who has engaged in sur place activities is unlikely to be at risk on return to Nigeria. + + + +3.3.2 However, each case must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to show that they would be at real risk of serious harm or persecution on account of their actual or perceived membership or support of a pro-‘Biafran’ group. Factors to take into account include: + + + +- the legal status and profile of the group/organisation to which the person belongs and its activities + +- whether the group/organisation has a presence in Nigeria as well as outside the country and any evidence that it is being monitored by the government + +- the person’s profile and political activities (including those online) and relevant documentary or other evidence + +- whether the person would wish to continue their activism if returned to Nigeria (and if not, why not) + +- past treatment of the person + +- any evidence that their activities in the UK may have come to the attention of the Nigerian security agencies + + + + +3.4.3 Pro-‘Biafra’ groups exhibit a varied online presence in the form of websites, radio broadcasts and social media activity. However, the scale of the support within a large and established diaspora living in the UK is not clear (see Separatists outside Nigeria). + + + +3.4.4 Sources suggest that pro-‘Biafran’ protests have been held in the UK. However, there is no evidence in the sources consulted to indicate that there is significant ongoing pro-‘Biafran’ activity in the UK (see Bibliography and UK pro-‘Biafran’ groups/supporters and sur place activities). + + + +3.4.5 Available evidence suggests that the Nigerian government closely monitors, online and offline, prominent individuals in Nigeria who are strongly supportive of the ‘Biafran’ cause, who are considered ‘individuals of concern’ by the security system (see Monitoring and tracking). There is also some evidence to suggest that the Nigerian government monitors the activities of members of the diaspora, including ‘militants’ identified via informants (see Monitoring and tracking of pro-‘Biafra’ groups/supporters). It may also have blocked websites featuring content relating to ‘Biafra’ (see Internet censorship). However, there is no specific information in the sources consulted to indicate that the Nigerian government monitors the activities of members of the Nigerian diaspora in the UK, including supporters of pro-‘Biafran’ separatist groups (see Monitoring and tracking of pro-‘Biafra’ groups/supporters). + + + +3.4.6 There was some limited evidence from 2022 to indicate that pro-‘Biafran’ separatists returning to Nigeria face may indiscriminate arrest and/or other human rights abuses, but there was no more recent information in the sources consulted to suggest this practice has continued, nor that it is systematic and widespread (see Bibliography and Treatment of returnee pro-‘Biafran’ separatists). + + + +## 4. Protection + + + +4.1.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they are unlikely to be able to obtain protection. + + + +4.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +## 5. Internal relocation + + + +5.1.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they are unlikely to be able to internally relocate to escape that risk. + + + +5.1.2 For further guidance on internal relocation and factors to consider, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. + + + +## 6. Certification + + + +6.1.1 Where a claim from an adult male is refused, it must be considered for certification under section 94(3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as Nigeria is listed as a designated state in respect of men only. Such a claim must be certified under section 94(3) if you are satisfied it is clearly unfounded. + + + +6.1.2 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. + + + +6.1.3 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims). + + + +## Country information + + + +## About the country information + + + +This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment which, as stated in the About the assessment, is the guide to the current objective conditions. + + + +The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note. + + + +This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist. + + + +Information quoted in this note from the 2025 report ‘Nigeria: Security Situation in the South East’, published in French by Cedoca, the research unit of the Office of the Belgian Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, has been translated using an online translation tool except where indicated. + + + +The COI included in this note was published or made publicly available on or before 27 January 2026. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included. + + + +Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions. + + + +## 7. ‘Biafra’ background + + + +## 7.1 Civil war and its aftermath + + + +7.1.1 The Editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica stated that ‘Biafra’ was a ‘… secessionist western African state that unilaterally declared its independence from Nigeria in May 1967. It constituted the former Eastern Region of Nigeria and was inhabited principally by Igbo (Ibo) people. Biafra ceased to exist as an independent state in January 1970.’[footnote 1] + + + +7.1.2 The same source provided the following short history of ‘Biafra’: + + + +‘In the mid-1960s economic and political instability and ethnic friction characterized Nigerian public life. In the mostly Hausa north, resentment against the more prosperous, educated Igbo minority erupted into violence. In September 1966, some 10,000 to 30,000 Igbo people were massacred in the Northern Region, and perhaps 1,000,000 fled as refugees to the Igbo-dominated east. Non-Igbos were then expelled from the Eastern Region. + + + +‘Attempts by representatives of all regions to come to an agreement were unsuccessful. On May 30, 1967, the head of the Eastern Region, Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Odumegwu Ojukwu, with the authorization of a consultative assembly, declared the region a sovereign and independent republic under the name of Biafra. General Yakubu Gowon, the leader of the federal government, refused to recognize Biafra’s secession. Fighting began in July [1967]. Biafran troops were at first successful, but, as the Nigerian Civil War proceeded, the numerically superior federal forces began to press Biafra’s boundaries inward from the south, west, and north. Biafra shrank to one-tenth its original area in the course of the war. By 1968 it had lost its seaports and become landlocked; supplies could be brought in only by air. Starvation and disease followed; estimates of mortality during the war generally range from 500,000 to 3,000,000. + + + +‘The Organization of African Unity, the papacy, and others tried to reconcile the combatants. Most countries continued to recognize Gowon’s regime as the government of all Nigeria, and the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union supplied it with arms. On the other hand, international sympathy for the plight of starving Biafran children brought airlifts of food and medicine from many countries. Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania, and Zambia recognized Biafra as an independent state, and France sent Biafra weapons. + + + +‘Biafran forces were finally routed in a series of engagements in late December 1969 and early January 1970. Ojukwu fled to Côte d’Ivoire, and the remaining Biafran officers surrendered to the federal government on January 15, 1970. Biafra, on the point of total collapse, thereupon ceased to exist.’[footnote 2] + + + +7.1.3 BBC News, in an article dated 15 January 2020, provided the following timeline: + + + +- ‘January 1966 - Nigerian government overthrown in what was seen as an “Igbo coup” led by junior army officers + +- January 1966 - Lt Col Odumegwu-Ojukwu appointed military governor of Eastern Region + +- July 1966 - Second coup masterminded by Murtala Muhammed, Lt Col Yakubu Gowon becomes head of state + +- June to October 1966 - Riots in northern Nigeria targeted at Igbos, killing many and forcing up to a million to return to south-eastern Nigeria + +- May 1967 - Ojukwu declares independence of the Republic of Biafra + +- July 1967 - War begins + +- October 1967 - Biafran capital Enugu falls + +- May 1968 - Nigeria captures oil-rich Port Harcourt + +- April 1969 - Umuahia, new Biafran capital falls to Nigerian forces + +- January 1970 - Ojukwu flees Nigeria + +- January 1970 - Biafra surrenders’[footnote 3] + + + + + +7.1.4 Anthony Hamilton Millard Kirk-Greene, JE Luebering and Toyin O Falola, in the ‘Nigerian Civil War’ entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, updated 1 January 2026, stated in relation to the immediate aftermath of the war: ‘[Then head of state Yakubu] Gowon was able, through his own personal magnetism, to reconcile the two sides so that the former Biafran states were integrated into Nigeria once again and were not blamed for the Nigerian Civil War.’[footnote 4] + + + +7.1.5 Ngozika Anthonia Obi-Ani, lecturer at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka[footnote 5], in a paper dated 18 December 2024 (Obi-Ani 2024), based on various sources including an online survey, in-person interviews in the South East and secondary sources, stated: ‘The subsequent generation … refused to accept the prevailing status quo, feeling aggrieved by the shared memories and perceived injustices perpetrated by the Nigerian state in contemporary times. Consequently, the ranks of Biafran agitators swelled among the populace. This bottled-up anger exploded in the late 1990s and early 2000s into renewed agitation for secession, mostly by Igbo youths who were born after the Biafran war.’[footnote 6] + + + +7.1.6 HumAngle is an Abuja-based, investigative media platform that covers Africa’s conflict, humanitarian and development issues with the support of the HumAngle Foundation, a non-governmental, not-for-profit organisation.[footnote 7] In an article dated 25 October 2024 (2024 HumAngle article), it reported: ‘Decades [after the Nigerian Civil War], the cracks that led to the war and the new ones created by it are still present, and the calls for secession still ripple across the South East.’[footnote 8] + + + +7.1.7 For information on the history of pro-‘Biafran’ separatist groups, see History and overview. + + + +## 7.2 Geography and demography + + + +7.2.1 NOTE: The maps in this section are not intended to reflect the UK Government’s views of any boundaries. + + + +7.2.2 For general information on geography and demography, see the Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Internal relocation. + + + +7.2.3 According to projections published by the Nigerian National Population Commission in July 2020, the 2022 populations of the 5 states that comprise the South East geopolitical zone were projected to be as follows: + + + +- Abia State – 4.13 million[footnote 9] + + +- Anambra State – 5.95 million[footnote 10] + + +- Ebonyi State – 3.24 million[footnote 11] + + +- Enugu State – 4.70 million[footnote 12] + + +- Imo State – 5.46 million[footnote 13] + + + + + +7.2.4 The University of Reading, in an entry in their online archives dated 22 October 2021, featured a map, reproduced below[footnote 14], of the former state of ‘Biafra’, showing its boundaries at 3 stages of the Nigerian Civil War: 30 May 1967, the end of 1967 and mid-1969. The map also shows ‘Biafran’ raids, in which the ‘Biafran’ air force carried out attacks on Nigerian targets such as oil installations[footnote 15]: + + + + + +7.2.5 The Council for Foreign Relations, a US-based ‘independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher’[footnote 16], in an article dated 3 August 2021 (2021 CFR article), provided a map, reproduced below[footnote 17], showing the South East geopolitical zone and part of the South South zone as comprising the ‘Biafra territorial claim’: + + + + + +7.2.6 An undated entry on the [Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’] IPOB Worldwide website featured a map showing the 25 provinces of ‘Biafra’, which is reproduced below[footnote 18]: + + + + + +7.2.7 The 2021 CFR article featured a map showing the distribution of Nigeria’s ethnic groups, which is reproduced below[footnote 19]: + + + + + +7.2.8 The same article reported: ‘Most supporters of Biafra are ethnically Igbo.’[footnote 20] It further stated: ‘… [C]laims by Biafran separatists include Ijaw [ethnic group] territory in the South South …’[footnote 21] + + + +7.2.9 Cedoca, the research unit of the Office of the Belgian Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, published a report in French on 30 September 2025 (2025 Cedoca report), based on various sources including a meeting with an expert on the security situation in Nigeria working for an international peacebuilding organisation. Information from the report quoted in this note has been translated using an online translation tool except where indicated. Noting that the states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo form the South East geopolitical zone, the 2025 Cedoca report observed: ‘Biafra comprises the five aforementioned states, predominantly Igbo and claimed by Biafran secessionists, as well as five non-Igbo states (Delta, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, and Rivers) which partially form the South-South geographical area.’[footnote 22] + + + +7.2.10 An undated entry on the IPOB website stated: ‘IPOB … are the original inhabitanst [sic] and owners of the Lands and Communities of Biafra and Biafraland …They are presently located in the areas called South East, some parts of South South and Middle Belt of Nigeria.’[footnote 23] + + + +7.2.11 Regarding ‘Biafrans’ cultural and religious heritage, an undated entry on the IPOB Worldwide website stated: ‘Biafrans are Hebrews. With the advent of colonialism under the British, many of our people were cajoled forced [sic] to convert to Christianity, but our Judeo cultural roots remained.’[footnote 24] + + + +7.2.12 For more information on IPOB’s aims, see Aims and on Nnamdi Kanu’s conviction, see Background and Conviction of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu + + + +## 7.3 ‘Biafra’ emblems and anthem + + + +7.3.1 An undated entry on the IPOB Worldwide website featured an image of the ‘Biafra’ flag, which is reproduced below[footnote 25]: + + + + + +7.3.2 An undated entry on the website of IPOB Ontario, Canada, stated: + + + +‘The Biafra flag consisting of 3-colored horizontal stripes name Red, Black, Green with a golden 11 rays of a rising sun engraved in the black section. The 3-colored Pan-African renassance [sic] flag which was designed by Jamaican revolutionary, Marcus Garvey in support for Africa’s struggle against colonialism and slavery with the “Red” signifying the blood shed on the African continent by the invaders including those lot in resistance, the “Black” signifying the African continent and peoples all over the world, while the “Green” signifies the wealth of Africa in human as well as natural resources and vegetation, was adopted by the Biafran leader, Dim Chukwuemeka Ojukwu as a staunch Pan-African. + + + +‘In the Biafran context, the Red signified the lives lost during the pogroms of 1966-70 before Biafra ultimate withdrawal from Nigeria, the “Black” signifying the consistency of the Biafra as a African nation, the “Green” signifies the rich landscape of the Biafra nation in natural, vegetative and human resources while the 11 rising rays of sun engraved in the black section signifies first 11 provinces created upon the declaration of independence on May 30th 1979, and the geographical position of the Biafra nation in the East part of West Africa, a natural gift which has earned it the title of being often addressed as “land of the rising sun”.’[footnote 26] + + + +7.3.3 The American Historical Association (AHA), ‘the largest membership association of historians in the world’[footnote 27], in an entry on their website dated 1 May 2004, posted the lyrics to the national anthem of Biafra, written by Nnamdi Azikiwe.[footnote 28] + + + +7.3.4 In undated entry on the IPOB Worldwide website featured an image of the ‘Biafra’ coat of arms, which is reproduced below[footnote 29]: + + + + + +## 8. Political and administrative context + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section + + + + +The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section + + + + +8.1.2 Folorunso Gideon Ibukuntomiwa, Celestina Ekene Chukwudi and Chisom Peace Asom, of Covenant University in Ogun State, and Tmitope Damilola Oyebajo, of Lead City University in Ibadan, in a paper dated March 2025 (Ibukuntomiwa and others 2025), reported: + + + +‘Nigeria is a multiethnic and multicultural nation with over 250 ethnic groups, and federalism was adopted as a form of administration to manage the ethnic and regional variations of the country. There are several issues with federalism in Nigeria, such as the concentration of power at the center, corruption, and unequal resource distribution. The IPOB drive for self-determination reflects the problems with federalism in Nigeria, especially in the southeast, where the group has attracted many supporters. The group maintains that Nigeria’s federal system has failed to solve systemic disparities and injustices faced by the Igbo people and that the only answer is to form an independent state of Biafra. The Nigerian government, on the other hand, sees IPOB’s call for independence as a danger to national unity and territorial integrity.’[footnote 30] + + + +8.1.3 Ekeledirichukwu C Njoku, lecturer at Kingsley Ozumba Mbadiwe University in Imo State, in a paper dated August 2025 (Njoku 2025), based on various sources, observed that reasons given by the government for its approach to IPOB: + + + +‘… include the need to preserve national unity, uphold state sovereignty, prevent ethnic conflict, safeguard economic stability, and maintain internal security. IPOB’s self-assertion, which manifests in its symbolic use of flags, public declarations of autonomy, and parallel governance rhetoric, is viewed by the state as an affront to Nigeria’s constitutional authority and territorial integrity. Consequently, the government frames repression not as an act of suppression, but rather as a legitimate strategy to assert control and avert the establishment of alternative power centres within its territory. Drawing from the traumatic memory of the Nigeria-Biafra civil war, the state contends that permitting IPOB’s activities and separatist discourse risks reviving national fissures and threatening cohesion. Actions such as protests, sit-at-home directives, and confrontations with security forces are construed as subversive acts capable of inciting broader unrest. Furthermore, the establishment of the Eastern Security Network (ESN) – IPOB’s paramilitary wing-has intensified state anxieties. The government accuses ESN of orchestrating violent attacks against security personnel and infrastructure, and this reinforces its rationale for adopting pre-emptive repression to forestall what it perceives as an impending large-scale conflict.’[footnote 31] + + + +8.1.4 For more information on IPOB and ESN activities, see Sit-at-home orders and Other activities and methods. + + + +8.1.5 Regarding the approaches of different administrations to ‘Biafran’ separatism, Deutsche Welle, Germany’s international broadcaster[footnote 32], in an article dated 14 July 2023, stated: + + + +‘Kanu was arrested and detained in 2021 under the leadership of former Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari … + + + +‘“Part of the issue that aggravated the agitation was a disposition of the immediate past government led by President Buhari towards that [South East] region, where he regarded that region as 5% and those who voted for him as 95%. You don’t do that as a leader, as a leader, you must regard the entire country as your constituency,’ [lawyer and political analyst Eric] Omari explained.’[footnote 33] + + + +8.1.6 The article also stated: ‘“The immediate past administration took the agitation for Biafra too personally,” [IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu’s brother] Prince [Emmanuel] Kanu said.’[footnote 34] The article did not provide details of other reasons for the growth of the agitation or the scale of the growth. + + + +8.1.7 Regarding the presidency of Bola Tinubu, who took office on 29 May 2023[footnote 35] and was the incumbent at the time of writing, Kingsley Ozumba Mbadiwe University’s Njoku and Christopher I Obiukwu of Alvan Ikoku Federal University of Education, Owerri, Imo State, in a paper dated May 2025 (Njoku and Obiukwu 2025), based on various sources, noted: ‘The government has significantly relied on a military-centric approach against secessionist movements [among other things] but it has failed to produce lasting solutions to these challenges … [T]he government has failed to identify that these threats are driven by deep-seated economic problems, deprivation, socio-economic grievances, multidimensional poverty and all-time neglect by successive Nigerian governments.’[footnote 36] + + + +8.1.8 For information on development initiatives, including projects in the South East, see the government’s Renewed Hope Agenda website. + + + +8.1.9 Bertelsmann Stiftung, a German private foundation that supports evidence based non-profit projects, publishes the Transformation Index (BTI). The BTI 2024 is based on country expert analysis of Nigeria’s progress towards democracy and a market economy covering the period 1 February 2021 to 31 January 2023 (during the administration of then-President Buhari). Regarding Igbo perceptions of marginalisation, it reported: + + + +‘For many Igbos, an acceptable reconciliation agreement to conclude the Biafra war civil war (1967-1970), in which an estimated one million mostly easterners died, has not been achieved. The repression of separatist movements and the two main political parties’ unwillingness to present an Igbo presidential candidate continue to fuel perceptions of marginalization in the southeast.’[footnote 37] + + + +8.1.10 The Sun, a privately-owned Nigerian newspaper[footnote 38], in an article dated 1 December 2024, commented: + + + +‘A major sore point in Nigeria’s trajectory is the palpable marginalization of the Igbo nation. Despite being one of Nigeria’s most influential ethnic groups, the Igbo people have faced systemic marginalization that touches nearly every aspect of national life from successive governments as if it is a state policy. This pattern of marginalization is not just historical; it remains a painful, everyday reality for millions of the Igbo, particularly in the South-east of Nigeria. + + + +‘One of the most glaring symbols of Igbo marginalization is the political structure of Nigeria itself. Only the South-east region is composed of five states, the fewest of any of Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones. By contrast, the North-west, a predominantly Hausa-Fulani region, has seven states. The ripple implications of this imbalance are obvious, as it significantly affects federal resource allocation, representation in the National Assembly, and access to political power. In Nigeria’s system of governance, states serve as units of political influence; fewer states mean fewer senators, fewer representatives, and reduced federal resources. As a result, the South-east region receives a disproportionately smaller share of federal funding and political appointments. + + + +‘Also, despite being home to some of Nigeria’s most industrious populations, the South-east suffers from severe infrastructural neglect. Roads, bridges, and public facilities across Igbo states are in near total disrepair, with little or no attention paid to revitalisation projects compared to other regions. This infrastructural decay not only stifles economic growth but also reinforces a sense of abandonment among the Igbo population, who feel excluded from national development priorities, even though these are sponsored by loans they also contribute to repaying … + + + +‘Beyond political and economic marginalisation, the Igbo often feel culturally excluded from the national narrative. National appointments rarely reflect ethnic balance, with Ndigbo [Igbo people] frequently underrepresented in key federal leadership positions, including the military, judiciary, and security services. Mainstream media narratives sometimes portray Igbo self-determination movements as inherently violent or destabilising, which deepens societal divides and alienates a population that feels misunderstood by the rest of the country.’[footnote 39] + + + +8.1.11 Obi-Ani 2024 observed: + + + +‘The Igbo people have been in political limbo since their defeat in the Nigeria-Biafra war in 1970. There appears to be a glass ceiling politically and bureaucratically for the Igbo parvenu. The generation that experienced the war appears to bear the consequences of defeat stoically: those born after the war are exasperated by their second-class status. To them, either they are accepted as full citizens or allowed the quest for an independent Biafra … + + + +‘The secondary victims are fighting the Nigerian culture of silence and are revisiting the hegemonic memory narrative through different social media platforms. In this way, the past shared by the older generation, apart from being experienced, is also learned and interpreted … The survivors’ children are found among the different Biafra movements that have evolved.’[footnote 40] + + + +8.1.12 Obi-Ani 2024 also noted: ‘Post-war Igbo youths, who are part of this social media generation, are deeply concerned by several of Nigeria’s official policies, such as the federal character, quota system, educational disadvantages, and the unequal distribution of government appointments. This perceived marginalization has eroded their faith in a unified Nigeria.’[footnote 41] + + + +8.1.13 Njoku 2025 stated: ‘IPOB alleges systemic discrimination [against the Igbo people] …’[footnote 42] The paper also observed that IPOB ‘has reignited demands for an independent Biafran state, citing systematic exclusion and marginalisation of the Igbo people.’[footnote 43] + + + +8.1.14 In reference to separatist agitations in general in Nigeria, Njoku 2025 noted: ‘… [D]espite decades of repression, separatist agitations in Nigeria have not subsided … The [state’s] continued reliance on coercion, such as military deployments, arrests, surveillance, and legal suppression, has failed to address the fundamental grievances of marginalisation, political exclusion and identity-based discrimination. If anything, state repression has often reinforced the legitimacy of these movements in the eyes of their supporters, deepening distrust between citizens and the state.’[footnote 44] + + + +8.1.15 The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) published a report, ‘Nigeria: Country Focus’, on 3 November 2025 (2025 EUAA country report), based on various sources, including an EUAA online interview conducted on 30 July 2025 with a Nigerian senior security adviser working for an international research organisation that monitors conflict dynamics across the world. The report stated that the adviser ‘… described the attitude by the Nigerian government and its agents towards separatist agitation as “very negative, combative and repressive”. The same source noted that authorities are especially sensitive towards the Biafran agitation given its longer history and the consequences that led to the war between 1967 and 1970.’[footnote 45] + + + +8.1.16 The 2025 Cedoca report identified the following as the main factors fuelling resurgence of the ‘Biafra’ claim among Igbos in the South East: + + + +- economic deficits, including neglected infrastructure and economic stagnation + +- administrative disadvantages + +- political marginalisation + +- cultural and religious differences + +- a belief that independence would achieve faster development for the South East[footnote 46] + + + + + +8.1.17 An article published on 3 October 2025 on the website of This Day, a Nigerian privately-owned newspaper[footnote 47], stated: + + + +‘Three United States-based advocacy groups have criticised President Bola Ahmed Tinubu over his recent Independence Day speech in which he reportedly equated the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) with the Boko Haram insurgency. + + + +‘In a joint statement yesterday, … the organisations – Advocates for Victims of Injustice and Discrimination (AVID), Rising Sun, and Ambassadors for Self-Determination, faulted … Tinubu’s comments, describing the remarks as “reckless, prejudicial and subjudice.” The groups stressed that comparing IPOB, which, according to them, is a non-violent self-determination movement, with a globally recognised terrorist organisation like Boko Haram, was both “inflammatory and irresponsible.” + + + +‘The statement said: “It is deeply unfortunate that a sitting president would make such a false and inflammatory statement while judicial proceedings are ongoing. This utterance is not only subjudice but a blatant attempt to prejudice the course of justice and poison the atmosphere of fair trial.”’[footnote 48] + + + +8.1.18 The Premium Times, a Nigerian privately-owned media outlet[footnote 49], in an article dated 26 October 2025, reported: + + + +‘The Joint Committee of the National Assembly on the Review of the 1999 Constitution has approved the creation of an additional state in the South-east geopolitical zone, a move aimed at addressing long-standing agitation over the region’s perceived marginalisation in Nigeria’s political structure. The decision, … if ratified, will increase the number of states in the South-east from five to six … + + + +‘The South-east is currently the only geopolitical zone in Nigeria with five states, compared to seven in the North-west zone and six in the remaining four zones. The disparity has, over the years, fuelled demands for a new state to ensure equitable representation in federal appointments, resource distribution, and legislative representation.’[footnote 50] + + + +8.1.19 The International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR), a Nigerian independent, non-profit news agency[footnote 51], in an article dated 26 October 2025, stated that under the Constitution, formal creation of a new state would require approval of two-thirds of both chambers of the National Assembly and endorsement by at least two-thirds of the 36 State Houses of Assembly.[footnote 52] + + + +8.1.20 There was no reference to a vote having been held at the national or state level, in the sources consulted for this note (see Bibliography). + + + +8.1.21 The Sun, a Nigerian privately-owned news outlet[footnote 53], in an article dated 14 December 2025, reported: + + + +‘Minister of Works David Umahi has called on Igbo people across the world to lay aside every lingering agitation for the creation of a separate Biafran nation, stressing that national inclusion has addressed the age-long agitation. + + + +‘Umahi said President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has already given Ndigbo what they sought for decades, not through secession, but through unprecedented inclusion in the national grid of governance and development. He made this assertion during his inspection tour of the ongoing Enugu–Anambra Road mega projects, where he addressed stakeholders, contractors and community leaders. + + + +‘He explained that the historical push for Biafran secession was born out of years of neglect, exclusion, and underrepresentation at the federal level. “But today, that narrative has shifted dramatically under President Tinubu,” he said. + + + +‘“Every sector in Nigeria now carries a visible imprint of Igbo interest,” Umahi noted, stressing that appointments, policy inputs and infrastructural priorities now reflect true federal balance. He highlighted that the South East has received its full quota in national appointments, citing his own emergence as Minister of Works, along with several other strategic and “juicy” positions given to Igbo sons and daughters in the current administration. + + + +‘Umahi further pointed out that life-changing projects are springing up across all states in the South East, many of which were considered impossible in previous administrations. + + + +‘… “When a people are fully integrated, respected and empowered within the structure of the nation, then the dream they once chased through agitation has already been achieved through cooperation. Biafra was never about breaking Nigeria; it was about being counted in Nigeria. And today, through inclusion, equity and concrete development, Ndi-Igbo are no longer spectators in the Nigerian project, they are co-authors of its future. …”’[footnote 54] + + + +8.1.22 In an article dated 20 December 2025, the Daily Post, a Nigerian privately-owned newspaper[footnote 55], reported that a coalition of Igbo rights groups in the diaspora had issued a statement that day.[footnote 56] The article quoted the statement as follows: + + + +‘Since Tinubu became President, what has Alaigbo [the homeland of the Igbo] gained? Why is Umuahia-Enugu railway still moribund when Lagos-Kano and Katsina-Niger Republic tracks are functional? Why is the South-East still having only five ministers with two of them junior ministers while one state in South-West has four ministers? + + + +‘Is Umahi not aware that there’s no seaport in the South-East while our people are the highest importers in the country? Do we have any functional cargo airport in Igbo land? Do we have major federal industries or maritime projects? Other regions have these things. Alaigbo does not.’[footnote 57] + + + +## 9. Security situation and governance in the South East + + + +## 9.1 Security situation + + + +9.1.1 Nextier is ‘a multi-competency firm … [that] focuses on addressing complex development challenges in Africa’.[footnote 58] In a report dated 15 August 2024, Nextier observed: + + + +‘The drivers of insecurity in South-East Nigeria are complex. Armed groups, including separatist movements and criminal gangs, have taken root in the region, their activities fanning the flames of instability. Research asserts that a group such as the IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra) has birthed a monster that it can no longer control or manage. Violent groups often target vulnerable communities, using fear and violence as tools to assert control. The spectre of attacks looms large over everyday life, with families living in constant dread of the next assault.’[footnote 59] + + + +9.1.2 The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), in their ‘Briefing Notes cw40/2024’, dated 30 September 2024 (BAMF brief of September 2024), stated: ‘Members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) group … and its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), are often held responsible for acts of violence in the region. Both organisations regularly deny such accusations. Other armed groups are also active in the region, including herdsmen belonging to the Fulani ethnic group, according to media reports …’[footnote 60] + + + +9.1.3 The Punch, a Nigerian privately-owned news outlet[footnote 61], in an article dated 15 January 2025, reported: ‘The Chief of Defence Staff, Gen Christopher Musa, on Tuesday [14 January 2025] said the arrest of pro-Biafran agitator, Simon Ekpa, in Finland has brought down the level of insecurity in the South-East zone of the country. He also stated that the launch of Operation Udoka by the Defence Headquarters is gradually restoring peace in the troubled region.’[footnote 62] The article did not provide statistics on the reported changes. + + + +9.1.4 For more information on Operation Udo Ka, see State treatment. + + + +9.1.5 SBM Intelligence, a consulting firm that provides analysis on West Africa[footnote 63], in a report dated 26 May 2025 (2025 SBM Intelligence report), based on various sources, stated: + + + +‘Apart from the more organised separatist movements, various local criminal gangs have been using the escalating conflict to their advantage. These gangs often engage in kidnappings, armed robbery, and extortion, especially in areas where the state’s security presence is weak. Many of these criminal elements, while not directly linked to IPOB or ESN, have capitalised on the fear and confusion to terrorise local populations. Some even claim to be acting on behalf of IPOB or ESN, making it harder to tell the difference between the separatist militants and regular criminals.’[footnote 64] + + + +9.1.6 The same SBM Intelligence report also noted: + + + +‘The rise of unauthorised actors, such as Simon Ekpa and various criminal gangs, has fractured IPOB’s authority, turning a once-organised agitation into a splintered conflict marked by intimidation, extortion, and fear. Ultimately, the Southeast’s security and political crisis is no longer a straightforward tale of secession versus state but a multi-layered conflict driven by ideological conviction, state failure, criminal exploitation, and generational differences in political vision.’[footnote 65] + + + +9.1.7 HumAngle, in an article, ‘Nigeria’s Governance Gap Widens as Ungoverned Areas Multiply’, dated 27 June 2025 (2025 HumAngle governance article), reported: ‘States like Anambra, Imo, Abia, and Ebonyi have become centres for violence … The violence [in the South East] is driven by a volatile mix: separatist agitation, criminal opportunism, and state withdrawal. IPOB and ESN are often suspected to be responsible for many of the terror attacks, though they frequently deny involvement. Criminal gangs, exploiting the chaos, further destabilise the region.’[footnote 66] + + + +9.1.8 For more information on state withdrawal, see Governance and state security presence. + + + +9.1.9 Nextier, in a report dated 9 July 2025 (2025 Nextier Umuoma report), observed: + + + +‘In recent years, the security landscape in Nigeria’s South East region has undergone a disturbing transformation, shaped by the rise of an elusive armed network now widely referred to as “Umuoma”. Once known generically as “unknown gunmen,” these groups have evolved into more organised, assertive actors embedded within local communities, particularly in Anambra, Imo, and Ebonyi States … Based on the data generated from Nextier’s Nigeria Violent Conflicts Database (June 2020 – June 2025), unidentified armed groups were responsible for 1240 deaths in the South East, including 947 civilians and 293 security personnel. These figures point to a lethal blend of insurgency and organised criminality, cloaked in political grievances and often legitimised by community complicity or fear.’[footnote 67] + + + +9.1.10 The same report noted: + + + +‘… Nigeria’s security agencies and the media are fixated on the common conflict in the region, which is the secession agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), to the detriment of the rapid growth of banditry and terrorism in the region. This fixation implies a lack of deep commitment to understanding the complex nature of IPOB and the Eastern Security Network (ESN). Even if such understanding exists, the lack of ownership of its existence, as evidenced by the Nigerian state’s failure to provide distinctions for all non-state armed groups in the region, is not helping the Nigerian state win the minds and hearts of the people against the criminal groups. Therefore, it is easier for groups like Umuoma, which in many narrations have been described as either a breakaway faction of ESN, or Unknown Gunmen, to be hiding under the pretence of freedom fighting or secession agitation and be carrying out acts that are not short of banditry and terrorism.’[footnote 68] + + + +9.1.11 The US State Department, in their 2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices (USSD 2024 human rights report), dated 12 August 2025, stated: ‘Individuals believed to be associated with the Eastern Security Network … staged attacks on security personnel, civilians, and government offices, including police stations in the South East region.’[footnote 69] The USSD previously referenced ‘multiple’ such attacks in their 2021 human rights report.[footnote 70] In their 2022 and 2023 human rights reports, they made the same observation as in 2024.[footnote 71] [footnote 72] + + + +9.1.12 The USSD 2024 human rights report also stated: ‘Armed criminal groups linked to Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) movement separatists in the South East region conducted significant attacks on government and civilian targets, resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries, destruction of property, and reduction in economic activity.’[footnote 73] + + + +9.1.13 On 13 August 2025, Amnesty International (AI) published a report entitled ‘A decade of impunity: Attacks and unlawful killings in South-East Nigeria’ (2025 AI report), based on various sources including interviews conducted during 3 research missions to the South East zone between April and November 2023.[footnote 74] The report stated: ‘The security situation in South-East Nigeria involves a hybrid of criminal and political violence that different actors can choose to portray and manipulate to suit their interests. The multifaceted nature of the actors in the South-East violence makes it easy for state and non-state actors to reduce the actors to a singular narrative: an IPOB/ESN secessionist group.’[footnote 75] + + + +9.1.14 Similarly, the 2025 AI report also noted: ‘… Nigerian authorities continue to attribute every attack and security challenge in the South-East to the activities of IPOB/ESN, thereby oversimplifying the complex situation on the ground. Amnesty International believes there is no traditional or coherent insurgency in the region.’[footnote 76] + + + +9.1.15 According to the same report, + + + +‘Amnesty International estimates that between January 2021 and June 2023, according to available data, 1,844 people were killed in the South-East region of Nigeria. Since 2021, there have been several attacks on security agents by gunmen leading to the unlawful killing of security agents and residents. Amnesty International has documented several cases of killings in different areas in the South-East by so-called “unknown gunmen,” cult groups, and IPOB and its militant arm, the ESN.’[footnote 77] The report also noted that killings had been perpetrated by herders over grazing lands.[footnote 78] + + + +9.1.16 The 2025 AI report further stated: ‘The so-called “unknown gunmen” are prevalent in conducting random assaults across the South-East, as opposed to a coordinated and calculated attack targeted at the Nigerian state and its institutions or interests … The “unknown gunmen” are indeed known persons in the communities where they operate … There is no clear-cut difference between the activities of the “unknown gunmen” and IPOB/ESN in the South-East, as both have committed violations and abuses of human rights.’[footnote 79] + + + +9.1.17 For more information on the ‘unknown gunmen’, see Eastern Security Network (ESN). + + + +9.1.18 Additionally, the 2025 AI report stated with reference to the Ebube Agu security outfit: + + + +‘On 11 April 2021, … the five governors of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo, announced the setting up of the South-East security outfit code-named “Ebube Agu”, to support the efforts of security agencies to curb insecurity … Ebube Agu has become available to the state governors who wish to use them as the private army of their administration … Imo and Ebonyi states are the only states where Ebube Agu became operational …’[footnote 80] + + + +9.1.19 The Premium Times, in an article, ‘IPOB not major cause of insecurity in South-east – Odinkalu’, dated 24 October 2025 (2025 Premium Times insecurity article), reported: + + + +‘Human rights activist and a former Chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Chidi Odinkalu, says cultism financed by politicians is the major security challenge confronting Nigeria’s South-east … + + + +‘He admitted that the impact of violence linked to the outlawed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South-east is undeniable, but argued that IPOB’s contributions to the insecurity in the region are “overblown.” “The idea that every issue in the South-east is an IPOB issue is ridiculous. It’s absolutely not the case,” he said … + + + +‘The former NHRC chairperson acknowledged that there is a possibility of “crossover between cultism and IPOB” in the South-east violence, but argued that cultism remains “the biggest single security challenge confronting” the region.’[footnote 81] + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section + + + + +9.1.20 The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only. + + + + +Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section + + + + +9.2.21 The 2025 Cedoca report stated: + + + +‘For four decades following the Biafran War, the southeastern region was the safest in terms of violent incidents and deaths. Today, it is the most dangerous place in southern Nigeria. This region has become a hotbed of militant activity, violence, and instability … + + + +‘All southeastern states are experiencing attacks from various armed groups including separatist activists, criminal gangs (sometimes also operating under the separatist banner), government security forces, state militias and community militias … + + + +9.2.22 The 2025 Cedoca report stated: ‘From January 1, 2023 to July 18, 2025, ACLED [Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset] recorded 1,683 incidents (violence against civilians, explosions/remote violence, battles) in southestern Nigeria, resulting in 2,109 victims …’[footnote 82] The 2025 Cedoca report featured a graph produced by Cedoca using ACLED data to show distribution of incidents in this period, which is reproduced below.[footnote 83] ACLED data is derived from reports by traditional and social media, international organisations and non-governmental organisations and local partner data. For further details on ACLED methodology, see the ACLED Codebook.[footnote 84] + + + + + +9.1.23 According to Cedoca’s 2025 report, ACLED data showed the distribution of perpetrators of incidents in the same states and during the same period as: + + + +- Unidentified Armed Group (Nigeria) – 40% + +- Military Forces of Nigeria – 11% + +- Police Forces of Nigeria – 9% + +- Unidentified Cult Militia (Nigeria) – 7% + +- IPOB – 6% + +- Fulani Ethnic Militia (Nigeria) – 6% + +- Other – 20%[footnote 85] + + + + + +The report did not provide information specifically on the number of pro-‘Biafran’ supporters killed or injured. + + + +9.1.24 According to the 2025 Cedoca report: + + + +‘The authorities systematically attribute responsibility to IPOB or its armed wing whenever there is evidence suggesting that Biafran activists might be involved, but this does not always correspond to reality. Research conducted by AI and the expert on the security situation in Nigeria indicates that several criminal and militant groups in the Southeast have begun operating under the cover of IPOB in order to conceal the true nature and intentions of their operations.’[footnote 86] + + + +9.1.25 Citing Cedoca’s conference with an expert on the security situation in Nigeria, the 2025 Cedoca report further stated: ‘In the Southeast, the escalation of armed attacks against government security personnel and assets, along with a surge in criminal violence in recent years, has plunged the region into a state of siege.’[footnote 87] + + + +9.1.26 For more information on: + + + +- attacks on pro-‘Biafran’ separatists, see Attacks and killings (General treatment), Attacks and killings (MASSOB) and Attacks and killings (IPOB) + +- attacks blamed on IPOB/ESN and BRGIE/Autopilot/BLA, see Other activities and methods + + + + + +## 9.2 Governance and state security presence + + + +9.2.1 The BAMF brief of September 2024 observed: ‘Military offensives are seen as an attempt at systematic countermeasures against the threat to the security situation in several parts of the country. The violence in the south-east is one facet of this.’[footnote 88] + + + +9.2.2 For more information on military, police and vigilante roles and use of the armed forces for internal security, see the Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Actors of Protection. + + + +9.2.3 The 2025 HumAngle governance article reported ‘The secessionist group known as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has transformed parts of Imo and Anambra States into shadow states. What began as ideological agitation has evolved into fragmented shadow governance, particularly in Orsu, Oguta, and Nnewi South, where IPOB’s Eastern Security Network (ESN) now operates checkpoints, enforces lockdowns, and levies informal taxes …’[footnote 89] + + + +9.2.4 Referring to the South East’s forest belts, the same source continued: + + + +‘The state’s coercive apparatus has collapsed in these ungoverned interiors, like Ihiala and stretches of rural Imo. Local vigilante outfits like Ebube Agu and Operation Udo Ga Chi [a police operation in Anambra State conducted in collaboration with other security agencies[footnote 90]] strive to maintain a fragile order, often overwhelmed by better-armed non-state actors … + + + +‘Ultimately, the region faces a dual crisis of security and legitimacy. As uniforms vanish from the rural southeast, so does any semblance of state authority. What remains is a precarious state of fear and survival – residents trapped between hostile non-state actors and a disengaged state, teetering on the edge of anarchy.’[footnote 91] + + + +9.2.5 The 2025 Nextier Umuoma report observed: + + + +‘The rise of “Umuoma” signals not just a security crisis, but a deeper erosion of state authority, where the monopoly of force is being contested not only by secessionist rhetoric but by emergent hybrid structures of justice and coercion. Far from being isolated criminals, “Umuoma” factions increasingly operate as parallel governance structures issuing weekly sit-at-home orders, extorting local vigilante groups, and enforcing informal justice in communities where state institutions are weak or absent.’[footnote 92] + + + +9.2.6 For more information on ‘Umuoma’, see Security situation, above. + + + +9.2.7 The 2025 AI report observed that gunmen ‘have turned some communities [in the South East] into “ungoverned spaces,” by sacking traditional rulers, displacing residents, and taking total control of communities, including Agwa and Izombe in the Oguta Local Government Area (LGA) of Imo state and Lilu in Ihiala LGA of Anambra State.’[footnote 93] + + + +9.2.8 BBC News, in an article, ‘The kidnap gangs, jihadists and separatists wreaking havoc in Nigeria’, dated 28 November 2025 (2025 BBC News security article), reported: ‘ESN has been in control of several towns in Imo and Anambra states where thousands were forced from their homes.’[footnote 94] + + + +9.2.9 For more information on IPOB and ESN activities, see Sit-at-home orders and Other activities and methods. + + + +## 10. Overview of separatist groups and methods + + + +10.1.1 Obi-Ani 2024 stated that among the ‘Biafra’ movements that have evolved since the Nigeria Civil War are the Biafra Zionist Movement, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Biafra Independent Movement and IPOB, noting: ‘However, IPOB has been the most influential of all these groups in recent times …’[footnote 95] + + + +10.2.2 For more information on: + + + +- the evolution and fragmentation of he main separatist groups, see Nyor, GA, and others, Nationalities Papers (Cambridge University Press), Biafra Since 1999: Common Cause Versus a Divided Interest in the Struggle for the Creation of Nationhood, 16 October 2025 (Nyor 2025) + +- minor separatist groups, see section 3 of the 2025 Cedoca report and Nyor 2025 + + + + + +10.1.3 The 2025 Cedoca report stated: + + + +‘The investigative media outlet HumAngle has identified numerous similarities in the strategies and trajectories of the MASSOB and IPOB movements, with the latter having supplanted the former: aggressive rhetoric towards adversaries, support networks, funding, propaganda, civil disobedience and violent actions, political struggles, etc. Another common tactic is to maintain ambiguity regarding responsibility or to firmly reject any accusations related to criminal acts that could damage their image. Members of these movements are also subjected to fierce repression, including criminal prosecutions and abuses (mass arrests, unfair trials, torture and ill-treatment, extrajudicial killings, etc.). + + + +‘Both MASSOB and IPOB have always been able to count on the financial support of the Nigerian diaspora. + + + +‘Both movements also employ similar methods to express their opposition to the government and draw attention to their cause. One of the main tactics used is civil disobedience, particularly through calls for voluntary confinement, asking people to stay home on certain days. However, these instructions are sometimes enforced by force. The first such call dates back to 2004. + + + +‘MASSOB and IPOB use propaganda, notably by trying to create the impression of widespread international support for the Biafran cause. Both groups discredit traditional media, which they often refer to as “Yoruba media,” and have invested heavily in creating their own information platforms, primarily blogs. + + + +‘MASSOB also exploited the rise of jihadist groups in northeastern Nigeria to bolster nationalist sentiment among the Igbo people. IPOB follows in this tradition by relying on conspiracy narratives, particularly those surrounding an alleged plot to Islamize Nigeria.’[footnote 96] + + + +10.1.4 The French Institute of International Relations, ‘an independent think tank’[footnote 97], in a report, ‘Understanding the Role of Women in Nigeria’s Non-State Armed Groups and Security Architecture’, dated January 2024, stated with reference to secessionist groups in the South East, among others: + + + +‘Although these groups are often male-dominated and may be perceived as threatening women’s security, they also open space for female agency … The women’s wings of these groups often operate at the fringe of the male-dominated main group, and the percentage of female aggressors in these conflicts is usually very low … Nonetheless, the evidence shows that beyond the soft contributions, including providing intelligence, moral guidance, and spiritual protection, women also actively participate in the group’s violent operations. The few women who can transcend their peripheral roles often show a willingness to engage in ruthless violence as the price of transcending the confinement of marginality that describes the position of most female actors in armed conflicts.’[footnote 98] + + + +## 11. General treatment of pro-‘Biafran’ separatists + + + +## 11.1 Attacks and killings + + + +11.1.1 For information on the general security situation in the South East, including the state security presence, see Security situation and governance in the South East. + + + +11.1.2 An article by the state-funded[footnote 99] News Agency of Nigeria, dated 5 December 2024, published on the website of the People’s Gazette, quoted the director of the Defence Headquarters’ media operations as reporting that from January to December 2024 in the South East, ‘… the troops of Operation UDO KA neutralised 666 terrorists [and] arrested 893 suspects …’.[footnote 100] ‘Operation Udo Ka’ is the code name for the Nigerian Army’s Joint Task Force South-East.[footnote 101] The article did not explicitly state how many, if any, of the ‘terrorists’ were pro-‘Biafran’ separatists. + + + +11.1.3 Freedom House (FH), a US-based non-government organisation that monitors freedom and democracy across the world, in their Freedom in the World 2025 report (FH FitW 2025 report), covering events in 2024, stated: ‘The military has been repeatedly criticized by local and international human rights groups for extrajudicial killings, torture, and other abuses, including during … operations against separatist movements in the southeast …’[footnote 102] FH made the same observation in all FitW reports dated from 2018 (covering events in 2017)[footnote 103] to 2024 (covering events in 2023).[footnote 104] + + + +11.1.4 For information on oversight and accountability mechanisms for the armed forces, see the Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Actors of Protection. + + + +## 11.2 Monitoring + + + +11.2.1 The 2025 EUAA country report stated: ‘The Nigerian senior security advisor added that most prominent individuals who are strongly supportive of the Biafran cause – considered “individuals of concern” by the security system – are being monitored very closely online and offline. However, the state does not have the capacity to track the large number of people who support the cause. “Therefore, it is unlikely that all supporters are being monitored.”’[footnote 105] The report did not explicitly state whether the observation applied to supporters in the diaspora as well as those in Nigeria. + + + +11.2.2 For information on: + + + +- monitoring of separatists in the diaspora specifically, see Monitoring and other treatment of pro-‘Biafran’ groups/separatists + + +- monitoring of IPOB/ESN, see Monitoring and surveillance + + +- expansion of the government’s general monitoring and surveillance capabilities, see the Polis Project, In Tinubu’s Nigeria, Dissent Faces Digital Crackdown, 12 January 2026 + + + + +## 11.3 Arrests, detention and enforced disappearances + + + +11.3.1 The 2025 AI report stated: ‘According to Amnesty International findings, persons found in possession of a Biafra flag or insignia were often arrested or abducted by the authorities, whether the person was a member of IPOB or not. State security agents teamed up with members of state-backed Ebube Agu militia, who understand local terrains, as they live in the same community as the suspected IPOB members …’[footnote 106] + + + +11.3.2 The 2025 Cedoca report, citing Cedoca’s conference with an expert on the security situation, stated without specifying a particular separatist group: ‘Real or suspected supporters are arrested and detained, sometimes for years, without charge or trial, often in military facilities with inhumane conditions. Some are held indefinitely, without being brought to justice or released, while their families are repeatedly subjected to extortion …’[footnote 107] + + + +11.3.3 Citing the same expert, the 2025 Cedoca report also stated: ‘When people are arrested, the authorities often choose not to provide any information about their whereabouts or status … Those arrested are often held incommunicado … Even when they are eventually located, their families and lawyers are sometimes denied access … Some security agents extract confessions through torture.’[footnote 108] The report did not explicitly state whether these observations applied specifically to detained suspected pro-‘Biafran’ separatists. + + + +11.3.4 For general information on extortion, torture, and prison and detention centre conditions, and on oversight and accountability mechanisms for the security forces, see the Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Actors of Protection. + + + +11.3.5 Regarding suspects’ ‘wanted’ status, the Telegraph, a Nigerian privately-owned ‘multimedia news brand’[footnote 109], in an article dated 23 March 2024 (2024 Telegraph article), reported that [the] BRGIE’s [‘Biafran’ Republic Government In Exile] Simon Ekpa, the head of DOS [Directorate of State], Chika Edoziem, and an unspecified number of South East ‘insurgents’ were among 97 people declared wanted by the Defence Headquarters in Abuja.[footnote 110] The article did not explicitly state whether the insurgents included pro-‘Biafran’ separatists. + + + +11.3.6 However, Lawyard, a Nigerian legal media and services platform[footnote 111], in an article dated 21 February 2025, reported: ‘A Federal High Court in Owerri has declared as illegal and wrongful the designation of a member of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Mazi Chika Edoziem as a wanted person, terrorist and insurgent. The court also nullified his [designation] as a kidnapper, and violent criminal by the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff.’[footnote 112] + + + +## 11.4 Internet censorship + + + +11.4.1 FH, in their Freedom on the Net report 2024, dated 16 October 2024, covering events from 1 June 2023 to 31 May 2024, stated: ‘According to OONI [Open Observatory of Network Interference, a ‘[g]lobal community measuring Internet censorship’[footnote 113]] data, 16 pro-Biafran websites that were blocked in 2017 continued to show signs of censorship during the coverage period.’[footnote 114] + + + +11.4.2 The FH FitW 2025 report stated: ‘Internet service providers sometimes block websites at the request of the Nigerian Communications Commission, particularly sites that advocate independence for the region known to separatists as Biafra.[footnote 115] FH made similar observations in all FitW reports dated from 2019 (covering events in 2018)[footnote 116] to 2024.[footnote 117] + + + +11.4.3 HumAngle, in an article dated 1 July 2025, observed that the Nigerian government had restricted access to Biafra War Memories, a digital archive of first-hand accounts of the Nigerian Civil War. It quoted the compiler of another digital repository of the war, the War Archives, as saying that their site had also been blocked but access returned after they changed the domain name and removed the word ‘Biafra’.[footnote 118] + + + +11.4.4 Business Vanguard, a Nigerian business news website[footnote 119], in an article dated 21 August 2025 that reported on general online safety efforts and did not refer to separatism, cited ‘growing concerns from the Nigerian government over the misuse of digital platforms for cybercrime, misinformation, online fraud, and threats to national security’.[footnote 120] + + + +## 11.5 Journalists covering separatism-related violence + + + +11.5.1 According to the FH FitW 2025 report, ‘Officials restrict press freedom in practice by publicly criticizing, harassing, and arresting journalists, especially when they cover … separatist … violence … [among other topics]’[.[footnote 121] FH previously made the same observation in all FitW reports dated from 2014 (covering events in 2013)[footnote 122] to 2024.[footnote 123] + + + +11.5.2 The Associated Press (AP) news agency, in an article dated 20 October 2025 (2025 AP article), reported that a journalist with French news agency Agence France-Presse (AFP) was arrested during a demonstration in Abuja against Nnamdi Kanu’s detention, but was released shortly afterwards. The article did not state the nationality of the journalist or the reason for his arrest. The article also reported that: ‘… [H]is equipment was destroyed during the altercation. “There were no protesters at the scene where he was arrested,” AFP said.’[footnote 124] + + + +## 12. Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) + + + +## 12.1 Background + + + +12.1.1 Njoku 2025 observed: + + + +‘In the early 2000s, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), under the leadership of Ralph Uwazuruike, emerged as a pacifist platform promoting the peaceful emancipation of the Biafran people … MASSOB’s nonviolent strategy was initially rooted in civil disobedience and cultural revival, but tensions with Nigerian security forces and the arrest of Uwazuruike led to a decline in its influence and effectiveness.’[footnote 125] + + + +12.1.2 The 2025 Cedoca report stated: + + + +‘MASSOB was created in 1999 and is one of the first and most important pro-Biafran movements. Under the leadership of Ralph Uwazuruike, MASSOB advocated for Biafran self-determination through peaceful demonstrations and civil disobedience … + + + +‘The Nigerian government responded to the crisis caused by MASSOB primarily through acts of repression by the police and the judicial system, including imprisonment … Ralph Uwazuruike was first arrested in April 2000, when MASSOB announced its intention to raise the Biafran flag and adopt official symbols such as a coat of arms and a national anthem for the secessionist region … Summary executions were reported as early as May 2000, when two young members, Gabriel Oga and Joseph Okereke, were shot dead by police during an operation against the MASSOB secretariat in Aba … Demonstrators were also victims of extrajudicial killings. + + + +‘The official banning of the movement in 2001 marked the beginning of an authoritarian policy. Law enforcement launched a massive crackdown on its members, while intelligence services and the military conducted raids on their offices and headquarters. A large number of activists were arrested and imprisoned across the country, often for extended periods and without trial. One of the most significant incidents occurred on March 29, 2003, in Umulolo Okigwe, Imo State, where more than 600 MASSOB members were reportedly killed. In the following years, particularly in 2005 and 2006, numerous activists lost their lives in clashes with security forces. Faced with this violence, MASSOB leader Ralph Uwazuruike called on his supporters to remain peaceful. + + + +‘In October 2005, MASSOB leader Ralph Uwazuruike and several others were arrested and tried in November for treason. Authorities accused them of plotting a war to intimidate and overthrow the president and the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Uwazuruike remained in custody until his release on bail in October 2007 … Shortly after his release, he declared he would not be intimidated and would continue his struggle. However, this period appears to have marked the beginning of MASSOB’s decline in influence. + + + +‘Following the release of Ralph Uwazuruike, the mobilization in favor of Biafran independence continued, but with less intensity. MASSOB organized two sit-at-home protests in 2008, aiming to send a signal to the international community. However, these actions were accompanied by a clear warning, with the MASSOB official in Lagos emphasizing the peaceful nature of the protests, without any public gatherings. + + + +‘Many activi